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“Pre-merger Earnings Management: Sarbanes Oxley, Leverage and 
Non-cash Acquisition Premia.” Alsharairi, Malek A. R. 2012. 
Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate earnings management within a structured 
sample design focusing upon a M&A context in the US by addressing three main empirical 
questions in three studies. The first study examines whether firms near M&A manage their 
earnings and whether this practice has changed after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The second 
study investigates whether debt-financing has implications on event-specific earnings 
management. Finally, the third empirical study challenges the effectiveness of earnings 
management in a M&A context by proposing that acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management 
can be uncovered and adjusted by the transacting targets. The key findings of the first study in 
this research suggest a strong tendency on the acquirer’s side to manage their earnings 
upwards before completing non-cash deals, while weak evidence is reported on the target’s 
side. More importantly, pre-merger earnings management does not seem to be significantly 
different between pre- and post-SOX eras, despite the assertions that the enactment of SOX 
was aimed at improving the reporting quality and the containment of earnings management 
practices. Given that SOX led to stronger due diligence and a more intense use of advisors for 
M&A deals, it could be argued that the setting of M&A activity creates a greater opportunity 
to manage earnings, given that managers’ resourcefulness for planning and altering accounting 
numbers is exclusively much greater in the case of M&A after SOX. However, this finding 
could be a consequence of employing cross-sectional accruals’ models, by which earnings 
management is detected relatively to the average level of normal accruals in peer firms at the 
time of estimation, whilst peer firms’ in general have adopted conservative reporting policies 
since the enactment of SOX. The second study reports a strong inverse relation between the 
pre-merger income-increasing earnings management levels and the industry-adjusted leverage 
of the non-cash acquiring firms, which is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis. 
This evidence highlights the importance of the industry-adjustment for leverage proxies in 
earnings management studies and proposes the use of structured sampling designs that 
controls for the firms’ motivation to manage earnings. The second study’s contribution leads 
to a better understanding of how a firm makes an accounting choice when it does favour one 
choice for its economic incentives but at the same time it is under creditors’ monitoring 
pressures. The third empirical study provides robust evidence of a positive relation between 
acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management and the non-cash acquisition premia. This 
evidence contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that even if the managerial team 
has succeeded in manipulating what is reported on paper, it may actually fail to influence the 
users’ perceptions - especially the sophisticated ones. The evidence challenges the naive 
investors’ hypothesis of Sloan (1996), which has been repetitively assumed by several studies 
in contexts where equity shares are issued.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Background and Research Questions  
Earnings management has been an issue of a rising importance in the field of accounting not 
only for academics, but also for practitioners and regulators alike. The phenomenon of 
earnings management has captured the interest of the aforementioned parties since the 
advances of the neoclassical theory of financial economics culminated in the launch of 
empirical research focusing specifically upon accounting in the mid-twentieth century. The 
notably key works from Beaver (1968) and Ball and Brown (1968), who proposed a 
relationship between the reported accounting earnings and value, marked the evolution of a 
new era in accounting research. (Laughlin 1995) 
The mounting gravity of the earnings management issue naturally stems from the elementary 
roles that accounting earnings can play for a wide spectrum of users. This led a number of 
accounting empiricists 1  to call for a positive accounting theory that can “explain why 
accounting is what it is, why accountants do what they do, and what effects these phenomena 
have on people and resource utilization (Jensen 1976, p.13).”  
Up until the late 1990s, earnings management research had focused on detecting the 
abnormality in firms’ accruals and determining the potential managerial motivations to 
                                                 
1 The school of positivism in accounting is known in the literature as “The Rochester School of 
Accounting” because the pro-positivism in accounting research were mainly from the University of 
Rochester, namely, Jensen, Watts and Zimmerman. This term was first coined by Jensen (1976) and 
used afterwards by many such as Tinker et al. (1982), Christenson (1983) and Laughlin (1995).  
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manage the firms’ accruals before having a need to focus more at the constraints of earnings 
management and its ramifications on resource allocation decisions (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Interestingly, two research streams have evolved in earnings management and can be 
identified by their sampling design (i.e. structured versus unstructured).  
A general stream of literature has been investigating earnings management in unstructured 
datasets of firms (i.e. random samples or even taking the whole market) in order to find links 
between earnings management and the different presumably related proxies. This wide stream 
of literature has also enormously fed the research of income smoothing2 and earnings quality.3 
However, a more specific stream of earnings management research has adopted a structured 
design by considering firms involved in specific corporate events4 around which managers 
have the incentive to make purposeful decisions over altering the reported earnings. Instances 
of these events include raising capital by issuing shares in either initial public offerings 
(hereafter IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (hereafter SEOs), management buyouts 
                                                 
2 Income smoothing is defined and explained later in Chapter 2 section  2.3.1. 
3 Earning quality is defined by Dechow et al (2010, p.344) as follows: “Higher quality earnings provide 
more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific 
decision made by a specific decision-maker.” The absolute value of abnormal accruals has 
commonly used as a proxy for earnings quality. “The general interpretation is that if the ‘‘normal’’ 
component of accruals is modeled properly, then the abnormal component represents a distortion that 
is of lower quality (Dechow et al. 2010, p.357).”   
4 This design of earnings management research is somehow analogous to event-studies in economics 
and finance research. However, event studies focus on the anomalies in value by “measuring the 
effects of an economic event [or news] on the value of firms (MacKinlay 1997, p.13).” See 
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). "Event Studies in Economics and Finance." Journal of Economic 
Literature 35(1): 13-39. and McWilliams, A. and D. Siegel (1997). "Event Studies in Management 
Research: Theoretical and Empirical Issues." Academy of Management Journal 40(3): 626-657.   
Chapter 1: Introduction 
4 
 
(hereafter MBOs), mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) and meeting or beating 
benchmarks.  
Unlike the first stream of literature that employs unstructured datasets, event-specific earnings 
management research (i.e. with a structured sample design) can effectively control for the 
firms’ motivation to manage earnings and is likely to reduce the unintentional5 increase in 
firms’ accruals as well as the noise from other extraneous events. Thus, the diagnosis and 
explanation of earnings management, its related drivers, constraints and implications should 
be more persuasive and accurate in such a research design. 
By adopting a structured sampling design, this thesis introduces three empirical studies that 
investigate event-specific earnings management. The unique context of M&A is used in order 
to investigate earnings management by their engaging firms prior to the deal’s announcement 
so as to address three related empirical questions. The first research question addressed in this 
thesis is whether firms’ pre-merger earnings management after the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 (hereafter SOX) has been significantly different from its level in the pre-SOX 
era. More specifically, the different patterns and timing of pre-merger earnings management as 
well as the differences in earnings management practices between pre and post-SOX eras are 
investigated in public firms engaged in mergers and acquisitions (i.e. acquiring and target 
firms). 
                                                 
5 Earnings management is identified by the intentional endeavours of management to alter the firm’s 
accruals, as asserted by Phillips et al. (2003) and explained more in detail in section 2.3.1. 
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The second empirical question addressed in the thesis is whether the monitoring role of 
creditors can inhibit management’s ability to manage earnings preceding events characterised 
by evident incentives for earnings management. More specifically, the hypothesised 
controlling effect of abnormally high leverage on pre-merger income-increasing earnings 
management is investigated in non-cash acquiring firms. The third research question is 
whether the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management can be detected and revised in the 
deal’s valuation by the target firm. In other words, the relationship between acquirer’s pre-
merger earnings management and the non-cash acquisition premium is examined in M&A 
deals where equity is used in the payment structure. 
1.2. Research Motivation 
The investigation in this thesis is conducted on the largest market in the world in terms of 
M&A activity – the US market. In 2008 for example, around 24% of the global M&A deals 
undertaken were initiated by a US based acquiring firm.6 More interestingly, the US corporate 
environment has experienced one of the most drastic regulatory and governance reform in the 
past decade by enacting SOX. Subsequently, the debate regarding its implications on corporate 
reporting, agency problem and governance consequences has been on-going since then 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Madura and Ngo 2010). The debate has recently become 
extended to include numerous research areas such as earnings management (Cohen et al. 
2008), market efficiency and major business transactions such as M&A (Chelikani and 
D'Souza 2011). 
                                                 
6 Source: Thomson ONE Banker 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
6 
 
Despite the mounting accounting research related to this revolutionary piece of legislation, 
there are two related concerns which motivated the first empirical study described in  Chapter 3 
of this thesis. First, the extant literature compares earnings management levels around SOX in 
a typical way for the whole market or random samples by adopting what we called above the 
general stream approach (Cohen et al. 2008; Zhou 2008; Wilson 2009). This approach is 
useful to understand whether the reporting mode of the market in general shifted toward 
conservative accounting (i.e. reporting lower levels of abnormal accruals) in post-SOX era, for 
example. However, the outcome of these studies does not explain the reaction of those firms 
that have incentives to manage earnings. Second, it is asserted by a recent review study that 
the majority of studies have been done before the full effect of SOX upon the reporting 
environment has reached its equilibrium state and, thus, current investigations should produce 
better results (DeFond 2010).  
Another motivation for the research in this thesis is the controversy over the impact of 
leverage on earnings management, which has stimulated the second empirical study described 
in  Chapter 4 of this thesis. Interestingly, the relevant literature is split into two opposing 
viewpoints over this empirical issue. On the one hand, there is a viewpoint that advocates a 
positive relation by arguing that looking at debt-contracts from an agency perspective should 
pose incentives to firms to manage earnings so as to align with accounting-based debt 
covenants. On the other hand, the opposing viewpoint advocates a negative relation by arguing 
that debt-contracts bring an additional monitoring group (i.e. creditors) to the firm, which 
should improve control and governance over the managerial opportunism and can more 
effectively deter practices such as earnings management. Motivated by this empirical debate, 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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this thesis asserts that employing the event-specific design for investigating the leverage 
impact on earnings management can provide a profound understanding to the proclaimed 
relationship – given that the structured sampling design includes firms that initially possess 
consistent intent and incentive to manage earnings. 
The third empirical study, described in Chapter 5 of this thesis, is motivated by the assumed 
validity of the naïve investor premise of Sloan (1996) in the pre-merger earnings management 
research. Interestingly, the literature of pre-merger earnings management arguably implies that 
reducing the cost of equity raised in a M&A is guaranteed by the success of adopting income-
increasing earnings management before the deal. Evidently, this assumption collapses if the 
naïve investor premise is proven to be untrue.  
In fact, reporting positive evidence of pre-merger earnings management per se indicates 
nothing but the success of altering the reported numbers on paper. Hence, this does not 
necessarily indicate that the users’ perceptions – especially those of well-informed ones like 
the participants in M&A – are also successfully manipulated. Motivated by this view, the third 
empirical model investigates how pre-merger earnings management undertaken by a firm is 
perceived and processed by relevant parties by examining the non-cash acquisition premium. 
1.3. Potential Contribution 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. The first empirical study 
in this thesis (Chapter 3) tests earnings management occurrences for each of the last four 
quarters prior to deal announcement not only for the acquiring firms, but also for their targets 
concurrently by using a sample that includes M&A deals before and after SOX was enacted. It 
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also adds to the growing body of the literature examining the effectiveness of SOX in 
improving the credibility of financial reporting by investigating a structured sample of firms 
that have the incentive to practice earnings management – merging firms. Moreover, this 
research uses quarterly reports, which are superior to annual ones in terms of their timeliness 
for detecting pre-merger alteration of earnings. Therefore, this research provides a track of the 
managerial discretion over accruals in the previous four successive quarters prior to a deal’s 
announcement. This would precisely locate the timing of manipulating earnings. 
The second empirical study (Chapter 4) aims at contributing to the existing literature on the 
impact of leverage on earnings management by employing a structured sample of non-cash 
acquiring firms which initially have the motivation to manage their earnings upwards. Such 
design can provide more reliable results when comparing the magnitude of earnings 
management among firms with different level of leverage, since the motivation to manage 
earnings is held consistent for all firms in the testing sample, rather than being random or 
unintentional as has been the case in prior studies. Moreover, this research distinguishes itself 
from previous studies by constructing a leverage proxy more consistent with the industry-
adjusted models of measuring earnings management (see, for example, the adjusted proxy by 
Martin 1996). Since abnormal accruals, which provide a proxy for earnings management are 
normally calculated based upon the universe derived industry-adjusted portfolios, the leverage 
proxy employed within this study is similarly based on the universe derived industry-matched 
portfolios. 
The investigation of the third empirical study (Chapter 5) contributes to the literature by 
proposing a relationship between pre-merger earnings management and non-cash acquisition 
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premium in M&A. Proposing such a relationship challenges the naïve investor hypothesis of 
investors in a M&A context and develops a counter argument that a target’s management is a 
well-informed user that is more likely to detect pre-merger earnings management and reverse 
its impact. The third empirical study can significantly add to the existing literature by 
providing a better understanding of the consequences of manipulating earnings, in cases where 
the user is sophisticated and well informed such as target firms. Finally, by assessing the same 
set of acquisition premium factors for cash and non-cash samples, simultaneously, this 
research provides a significant contribution to whether earnings management is relevant to the 
valuation process and acquisition premia in non-cash M&A deals. 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
This thesis includes three empirical studies on pre-merger earnings management and it is 
structured in six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a general 
overview of the role of accounting earnings. It also reviews some key papers that have had a 
seminal impact on the literature related to earnings management as well as the empirical 
research in financial accounting in general. In addition, the concept of earnings management is 
taken into detailed discussion and the most widely used accrual models for capturing earnings 
management are discussed. Chapter 3 presents the first empirical study, which examines pre-
merger earnings management for acquiring and target firms in pre- and post-SOX periods. 
Chapter 4 presents the second empirical study by examining the impact of leverage on pre-
merger earnings management. Chapter 5 includes the third empirical study that proposes a 
relationship between the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management and the non-cash 
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acquisition premium. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the concluding remarks of this thesis, locates 
some potential research limitations and suggests avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Accounting Earnings and Earnings 
Management: An Overview 
2.1. Introduction 
Before discussing the concept of earnings management and its implications, it is necessary to 
understand the importance and the role of accounting earnings to the stakeholders. The term 
“earnings” or “accounting earnings” in the context of this research indicates the net income or 
the profits reported on a periodic basis by a firm according to a specific set of flexible 
accounting standards. It does not represent a well-defined economic construct, given the 
absence of an ideal theory that can precisely prescribe what accounting policies should be used 
by a firm (Scott 2003).    
Without appreciating the importance of accounting earnings, then the manipulation of the 
reported earnings could arguably not represent a research-worthy problem, indeed. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the role of accounting earnings as 
well as reviewing the existing literature related to earnings management as a key concept in 
the area of financial accounting research. 
This chapter continues as follows. Section  2.2 of this chapter discusses the role of accounting 
earnings and the associated importance from the perspective of stakeholders. It also sheds light 
on the value-relevance of accounting information and the role of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis in the advancement of empirical research in the field of financial accounting, 
leading to the development of the Positive Accounting Theory. Section  2.3 introduces an 
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illustration to the concept of earnings management by looking at different definitions in the 
literature. It also provides a brief discussion of the firms’ motivations for practicing earnings. 
Section  2.4 introduces the most commonly used accruals models to capture earnings 
management practice before this chapter concludes in section  2.5. 
2.2. Understanding the Roles of Accounting Earnings 
Fields et al. (2001) start their paper by addressing the question of whether accounting actually 
matters. They argue that there would be no substantive role for financial reporting in a perfect 
and complete world. However, the demand for accounting implies that accounting reporting 
and disclosures are efficient indicators of market imperfections. 
Accounting provides an important source for information such as earnings to a variety of 
interested users. Accounting earnings’ role for stakeholders is twofold: stewardship and 
informativeness (Lambert 2001; Baldenius et al. 2002; Bushman et al. 2006; Feltham et al. 
2006; Ronen and Yaari 2008; Drymiotes and Hemmer 2009). The stewardship role of 
accounting results from the separation between managers and owners in the corporate form of 
organisations, which makes the manager in a position of a steward to owners. The 
informativeness role of accounting information stems from the demand by users such as 
investors and creditors for information that enables them to predict future cash flows and 
assesses their risk. 
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2.2.1. Stewardship Perspective and the Agency Relationship 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (hereafter SFAC) No.1, which is issued by 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the US (hereafter FASB), stresses that financial 
reporting is meant to provide information about how a firm’s management discharges the 
stewardship responsibility to shareholders (FASB 1978). 
Stewardship, as an objective of financial reporting, can be defined as a process of reporting 
“on the control and use of resources by those accountable for their control and use to those to 
whom they are accountable (Gjesdal 1981, p.209).” It is noted that the terms stewardship and 
accountability have been often used interchangeably within the literature and accounting 
legislators7 to describe the relationship between owners and their stewards or entrepreneurs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.305) cite Adam Smith (1776) commenting on the role of 
stewards’ and the relationship between owners and managers as follows:  
“…being the managers of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected, that [managers] should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private [partnership would] 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are 
apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, 
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company”. 
                                                 
7 For example, there is a joint project between the International Accounting Standards Board and the 
US Financial Accounting Standards Board on harmonising their Conceptual Framework. The board 
material shows that stewardship and accountability are being used interchangeably by FASB (FASB 
2010). 
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The manager-shareholder relationship is known in the literature of economics, finance and 
accounting as the agency relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) view the 
firm as a set of contracts among the interacting factors of production. According to this view, 
the agency theory developed by describing the relationship one in which there is “a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p.308).”   
To organise this contractual relationship, there should be a monitoring and performance 
evaluation basis over the manager’s performance. Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p.113) state 
that one of the most important among the functions “of financial reporting is to constrain 
management to act in the shareholders’ interest.” The stewardship role of accounting provides 
a partial explanation to the importance of earnings. 
Indeed, the importance of earnings stems from the fact that there is a demand for reliable 
information that is useful for contracting and performance evaluation purposes (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). Supported by the premise of agency theory, Bushman et al. (2000) 
developed a model that explains the direct economic connections between the way earnings 
are used in the determination of managers pay. 
Given that managers may act to serve their own interests, matching the objective between 
owners and managers is not an easy task. Naturally, owners demand information about 
managers actions to monitor them while also seeking to offer incentives such as to direct their 
future actions to the owners’ interest (Ronen and Yaari 2008). The agency perspective, with its 
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inherent potential conflict, gave birth to vast streams of research regarding corporate control 
and optimal managerial incentive plans (i.e. management compensation hypothesis), which 
provides evidence that increasing stock-based compensation in managements’ incentives 
package has decreased the weight of earnings in their compensation (Bushman and Smith 
2001; Bushman et al. 2006). 
Under the joint conceptual framework project by the FASB and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (hereafter IASB), there was a debate on whether or not the stewardship 
objective should be emphasised and explicitly included in the conceptual framework of 
financial reporting since this objective is already implied assuming that this objective is a 
subset of the decision-usefulness objective. However, the boards later decided that financial 
reports should be prepared from the entity’s perspective and should aim to provide information to 
a wide range of users, rather than focusing only on the information needs of existing common 
shareholders (FASB 2005). 
2.2.2. Informativeness Perspective and the Economic Consequences 
The conceptual framework that is developed by the FASB emphasises the importance of the 
informativeness role of earnings and their value relevance. SFAC No.1 suggests that the firm’s 
reported earnings may be used by different users to assess the firm’s prospects for cash flows 
by using them as a cornerstone for predicting future earnings and assessing risk. Therefore, 
accounting earnings are useful for estimating the firm’s "earning power" and evaluating its 
management’s performance (FASB 1978).  
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Moreover, it suggests that reporting earnings according to the accrual basis is much more 
informative to users than any other existing method to evaluate performance, predict future 
cash flows and estimate risks. The SFAC No.1 on the objectives of financial reporting in 
business enterprises states the following in paragraph 43-44: 
“The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise's 
performance provided by measures of earnings and its components. 
Investors, creditors, and others who are concerned with assessing the 
prospects for enterprise net cash inflows are especially interested in that 
information. Their interest in an enterprise's future cash flows and its ability 
to generate favorable cash flows leads primarily to an interest in information 
about its earnings rather than information directly about its cash flows... 
Information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by 
accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise 
performance than information about current cash receipts and payments 
(FASB 1978, p.19).”    
The question over the informativeness role of reported earnings is of crucial interest to 
accounting professionals, standard setting bodies as well as to interested users, despite the fact 
that the answer remains empirical. Nevertheless, it is broadly accepted that firms’ earnings 
play a key informational role in influencing their share prices (Chambers and Penman 1984; 
Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Subramanyam and Wild 1996; Bushman et al. 2000; Vafeas 
2000; Yeo et al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2008). 
The influence of accounting information on the firm’s value and on the behaviour of decision-
makers is persuasively defined by Zeff (1978) as “economic consequences.” The concept of 
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economic consequence declares that accounting procedure choice affects the value of the firm, 
regardless of the implications of efficient market hypothesis8 (Scott 2003, p.259).   
2.2.2.1. Early Empirical Evidence 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) launched the empirical evaluation of the usefulness 
of earnings information to users. Informativeness or information content was defined by 
Beaver (1968, p.69) as a sufficient change in expectations that can “induce a change in the 
decision-maker’s behaviour.”  
Beaver’s argument according to the aforementioned definition posits that accounting earnings 
of a given firm have informational value only if they influence the optimal holding of that 
firm's share in a portfolio of a rational investor. This view stands on the underlying 
assumptions of the expectations models at that time, such as Fama (1965), which do not 
consider accounting earnings among the determinants of prices in the capital markets. 
Therefore, Beaver had to distinguish between price and volume tests since price reflects 
changes in the expectations of the market as a whole while volume reflects changes in the 
expectations of individual investors. However, Ball and Brown (1968, p.160) argued that a 
firm’s earnings may exert a direct impact on the firm’s share price in the market so long as 
capital markets are efficient. They commented on the implications of capital theory: 
“Recent developments in capital theory provide justification for selecting the 
behavior of security prices as an operational test of usefulness. An 
impressive body of theory supports the proposition that capital markets are 
                                                 
8 The Efficient Market Hypothesis is explained later in section 2.2.2.2. 
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both efficient and unbiased in that if information is useful in forming capital 
asset prices, then the market will adjust asset prices to that information…” 
Interestingly, their empirical investigation and remarks on the efficiency of capital markets 
opened a wider debate on whether markets are efficient and led to the evolution of the 
“Efficient Market Hypothesis”. 
2.2.2.2. The Relevance of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
An efficient market is a “market in which prices always fully reflect available information” 
(Fama 1970, p.383). This definition is found very general and the term “available information” 
does not provide testable implications unless it is conditional on a relevant information set.  
Jensen (1978) suggests that the essence of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter EMH) is 
just an extension of the economic zero profit equilibrium condition to the prices’ behaviour in 
competitive markets under uncertainty. Based on this view, Jensen (1978, p.96) introduced a 
simpler definition stating that “[a] market is efficient with respect to information set Өt if it is 
impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set Өt.” 
In an attempt to create a testable design for the EMH, Fama (1970; 1991) proposed three tests 
representing three relevant information subsets namely; weak form tests, semi-strong form 
tests and strong form tests. The information subset for testing the weak form includes 
historical prices data; the information subset for testing the semi-strong form includes all 
publicly available information; while the information subset for testing the strong form of the 
EMH includes monopolistic or insider access to information sources.  
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Among the three aforementioned forms of EMH tests, the semi-strong form tests seem the 
most relevant to the positive accounting research, by which the association between firm’s 
earnings and its share value is examined. Fama (1991) adopted the term “event studies” for 
semi-strong form tests claiming that event studies provide the cleanest evidence on market 
efficiency, especially those investigating earnings-announcement anomalies. 
Despite the failure of some studies to document earnings-predictability to future share prices 
(see for example Bernard and Thomas 1989; 1990), it has been argued that “there is no other 
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis” and that testing of the hypothesis, “with very few exceptions, 
found consistent evidence with the data in a wide variety of markets (Jensen 1978, p.95)”. 
2.2.3. The Relevance of the Positive Accounting Theory 
Accounting practice is governed by a given set of accounting standards, by which the 
corporate earnings should be determined and reported on an accrual basis. However, 
accounting standards provide discretionary power to managers - for some accounting 
transactions - to choose among different acceptable accounting methods and, eventually, the 
reported earnings can be affected by this managerial discretion. In fact, there is no extant 
theory that can precisely prescribe the ideal accounting choice that managers should adopt. 
Nevertheless, there have been attempts in the literature to develop a theory that can contribute 
to the understanding of the accounting choice, such as the Positive Accounting Theory, which 
is considerably relevant to the specific context of this thesis as well as to the broader area of 
financial accounting research. 
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The Positive Accounting Theory aims at predicting “the choices of accounting policies by firm 
managers and how managers will respond to proposed new accounting standards (Scott 2003, 
p.273)”. Indeed, the evolution of the school of positivism has had imperative implications for 
financial reporting policy, in general, and on reporting earnings, in particular given its 
attempts to provide reasonable predictions of the events of the real world. 
Back to the 1930s, the securities acts in the US were enacted for regulating disclosure and 
reporting by those firms with securities listed on the stock exchanges, and for creating the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC) “to enforce the newly-passed securities 
laws, to promote stability in the markets and, most importantly, to protect investors (SEC 2011, 
p.3).” After having the securities exchanges regulated, the theorists’ main concern moved 
towards developing accounting theory. The primary purpose of accounting theory, according 
to Demski (1973, p.718), is to explain which accounting policy should be used, whereas Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986, p.2) argue that the objective of accounting theory is to explain as well 
as to predict accounting practice. The explanation role includes offering reasons for an 
observed practice and the prediction role includes forecasting unobserved accounting 
phenomena. 
Until the 1960s, the normative approach had been dominant concerning the accounting policy 
recommendations, research and textbooks9. A normative, prescriptive or regulative science, 
                                                 
9 For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) noted that text books in the 1960s advocated accounting 
methods on prescriptive (i.e. normative) basis without providing a scientific method for testing their 
validity. Among the examples they provide about this issue are Edwards, E. O. and P. W. Bell (1961). 
The Theory and Measurement of Business Income. Berkeley, Univeristy of California Press., 
Chambers, R. J. (1964). "Measurement and Objectivity in Accounting." Accounting Review 39(2): 
264., and Chambers, R. J. (1966). Evaluation and Economic Behaviour. E. Cloiffs. New Jersey, 
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from the perspective of Friedman (1953, p.3), is a body of “systematized knowledge 
discussing criteria of what ought to be”.  
The propositions, under which the prescriptive (i.e. normative) arguments rest, are constructed 
in an irrefutable manner. For example, the normativists may advocate a particular prescription 
that firms should follow to report their assets, such as current cost method, assuming that this 
accounting alternative serves a certain objective, such as economic efficiency, without 
providing a basis to assess their hypothesised relationship between the proposed policy and its 
respective objective (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
Accordingly, the normative theory of accounting policy has been strongly criticised that it 
does not provide empirical validation of the hypotheses on which the theory’s prescriptions 
rest, assuming that these prescriptions were “self-evident” (Demski 1973; Jensen 1978; Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
Unlike the normative school, the positivist approach of theorisation does not prescribe “what 
ought to be” in terms of accounting policy, but it attempts to explain the “what is” (Scott 
2003). In advocating positivism in accounting, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the 
objective of the accounting policy is not the theorist’s choice but the user’s. 
This debate has been on the rise since the 1960s, when Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver 
(1968) and others initiated the empirical research in accounting, benefiting from previous 
                                                                                                                                                         
Princtice-Hall Inc. advocated current cash equivalent and current costs as valuation methods for 
assets.  
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economic and financial methods (for example see Demski 1973; Chambers 1976; Demski 
1976; Tinker et al. 1982; Vickrey 1982; Christenson 1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1990).  
The early encouraging results from testing the relation between accounting earnings and share 
prices (or changes in share prices), alongside the ambition to report evidence of capital market 
efficiency in finance and economics, have left a great impact on accounting literature (also 
see Ball 1978; Watts 1978). 
In fact, the development and testing of the EMH in the 1970s, which is explained in the 
previous section, provided more support to the challengers10 of the normative school. For 
example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) noted that the development of the EMH has “spawned” 
an enormous empirical examination over the association between accounting earnings (and 
changes in reporting procedures) and share prices.    
Holthausen and Watts (2001), in their literature review paper “The Relevance of the Value-
Relevance”, noted that this debate, which started in the 1960s, has led accounting researchers 
to draw implications for standard-setting. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) focused on these 
implications to draw a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards to 
understand the influences of the accounting standard-setting process. They adopted the view 
that management is central to any discussion of financial reporting and they aimed to 
understand the incentives of management to oppose or advocate different standards.  
                                                 
10 The literature sometimes refers to those who challenged the normative approach in accounting 
theorisation as “The Rochester School of Accounting”, specifically Jensen, Watts and Zimmerman. 
This term was coined by Jensen (1976) and used afterwards by many such as Tinker et al. (1982) and 
Christenson (1983).  
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Many proposed these changes in financial accounting standards since they blamed the 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for the low correlation between earnings 
and future market prices of shares (Lev 1989) and, therefore, the informativeness of earnings 
came to be questioned. Ronen and Yari (2008) argue that the informativeness role of earnings 
is questioned by the fact that investors may prefer the analysts’ earnings forecasts over GAAP 
earnings when they predict the future risks and expected cash flows. Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2004) note that the increasing focus on alternative definitions of earnings, such as “Street” 
earnings numbers11, is driven primarily by the reporting strategies of firms’ managers. 
2.3. Earnings Management 
The previous section highlighted the various roles of accounting earnings, their importance 
from the perspective of users as well as the theoretical grounds of their relevance to the firm’s 
value. It showed that providing managers with discretionary power to choose among different 
methods to report earnings would naturally make the managers’ choices questionable to 
researchers, practitioners and standard setters, given that different methods produce different 
periodic earnings.  
The concept of economic consequences by Zeff (1978) implies that accounting earnings “can 
affect the actual decisions that are made by investors as well as managers, rather than simply 
reflecting the results of these decisions (Scott 2003, p.261).” Therefore, the research 
                                                 
11 These are the numbers announced by firms in their press releases and followed up by analyst 
estimate clearinghouse services, such as I/B/E/S, Zacks, and First Call (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) 
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conducted under the Positive Accounting Theory attempts to explain and predict the decisions 
of management regarding the accounting choices made.  
2.3.1. Definitions 
As noted previously, the reported accounting earnings are accounted for according to the 
accrual basis, which means that they consist of two components - cash and accruals. Therefore, 
the level of managerial discretion considerably affects reported earnings over accounting 
choices, accruals or operating cash flows. Such identified managerial discretion, which aims at 
intentionally altering the reported earnings in order to influence the associated economic 
consequences, is described as “earnings management” (Phillips et al. 2003, p.493). 
Corporate managers may prefer to manage earnings by exerting discretion over the accrual 
component of earnings as this manipulation is less noticeable than to change the firm’s 
accounting policies and is also less costly than altering the cash component (Phillips et al. 
2003). Therefore, the literature has increasingly focused on accruals to investigate earnings 
management (see, for example, Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; 
Jeter and Shivakumar 1999; Kothari et al. 2005; Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2005; Gong et al. 
2008; Liu et al. 2010). 
In fact, there is no consensus held by researchers over a single and exact definition of earnings 
management (Beneish 2001). Ronen and Yaari (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the 
different definitions of earnings management provided in the literature. Based on the view that 
a firm is a set of contracts (Fama 1980),  Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.14) offer the following 
loose definition, stating that “earnings management is the choice of accounting treatment that 
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is either opportunistic or economically efficient.” Although this definition is broad and 
captures the contractual outcome of earnings management, it does not seem to contain the 
informational implication of managing earnings. 
An alternative definition that has been widely followed in this research area is provided by 
Healy and Wahlen’s (1999). In their review paper, they provide a definition that covers both 
the contractual and some informational implications of earnings management as follows:   
“Definition: Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p.368)”  
Likewise, Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition focuses on the economic consequences 
perspective and is criticised for inadequately accentuating the informational perspective of the 
accounting policy (Beneish 2001). Beneish (2001) backs this critique by Holthausen and 
Leftwich’s (1983) assertion that both economic consequence theories and information theories 
can explain the association between the firm’s accounting policy and its cash flows. 
Nonetheless, such a definition assumes that managerial discretion is intended only to “mislead” 
stakeholders. 
Furthermore, Beneish (2001) argues that the definition fails to draw an obvious line between 
lawful earnings management and fraud12. Becker et al. (1998) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
stress that earnings manipulation by violating GAAP is further than that of the scope of 
                                                 
12 Beneish (2001) cites the definition of fraud as “one or more intentional acts designed to deceive 
other persons and cause them financial loss”, by the National Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (1993, p.6). 
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earnings management. In line with this view, managers are given a limited latitude to exercise 
their discretion, which remains within the boundaries of GAAP (Chung et al. 2002). Riahi-
Belkaoui (1999, p.49) stresses this point in the definition he offers: “[e]arnings management is 
the process of (the) deliberate use of generally accepted accounting principles to reach a 
desired level of reported earnings.”13  
By reconciling these views, this study considers earnings management as the managerial 
practices, in accordance with GAAP, that are aimed at influencing the accrual component of 
the reported earnings upwards (i.e. reporting positive abnormal accruals) or downwards (i.e. 
reporting negative abnormal accruals) motivated by the associated informational implications 
and the economic consequences.  
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the two directions of the managerial 
discretion over accruals. Depending on the management’s incentive or objective, the firm may 
engage in either income-increasing earnings management (see, for example, Sweeney 1994; 
Teoh et al. 1998; Erickson and Wang 1999; DuCharme et al. 2001; Mantecon 2008) or 
income-decreasing earnings management (see, for example, Healy 1985; Jones 1991; 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Fischer and Louis 2008).   
Income-increasing earnings management can be achieved by adopting “aggressive accounting” 
techniques through, for example, underestimating the provision for bad debts and drawing 
down reserves, while income-decreasing earnings management can be attained by adopting 
                                                 
13 Violating GAAP in order to influence the reported earnings is considered a fraudulent accounting 
practice and should not be classified under earnings management (Beneish 2001).   
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“conservative accounting” through, for example, overly recognising provisions or reserves or 
overstating restructuring charges and assets’ write-offs (Dechow and Skinner 2000). 
There is another term directly linked to earnings management called “income smoothing”. 
Trueman and Titman (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) argue that a firm’s management 
often manipulate the reported periodic earnings to dampen the fluctuations and make the 
earnings’ stream over time less variable (i.e. smoother). Income smoothing can be 
operationally defined as “the repetitive selection of accounting measurement or reporting rules 
in a particular pattern, the effect of which is to report a stream of income with a smaller 
variation from trend than would otherwise have been seen (Copeland 1968, p.102)” 
The literature provides two main explanations over the income-smoothing hypothesis. First, it 
is argued that firms with a smoother stream of periodic earnings have a greater value as they 
are viewed by investors and creditors as being less risky prospects (see, for example, 
Hepworth 1953; Lambert 1984; Moses 1987; Wang and Williams 1994; Grant et al. 2009). 
Second, adopting an income smoothing strategy improves the informativeness of the publicly 
reported earnings (i.e. smoother earnings reflect greater value-relevant information) in 
predicting the firms’ future earnings and cash flows (see, for example, Barnea et al. 1976; 
Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Cahan et al. 2008; Martinez and Castro 2011).  
It is noted that the terms “income smoothing” and “earnings management” are used 
interchangeably in some research (see, for example, Gaver et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999; 
Tucker 2005). Nonetheless, as Dechow and Skinner (2000) intuitively suggested, income 
smoothing can be viewed as just a special form of earnings management such that the research 
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on income smoothing can be considered as a sub-area of research under the wider umbrella of 
earnings management. 
2.3.2. Motivations  
Indeed, appreciating the importance and the roles of accounting earnings, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter (see section  2.2), is an indispensable foundation needed to clearly understand 
the firms’ rationale for managing their reported earnings. The assumptions underlie the 
Positive Accounting Theory can be a start for explaining the firms’ motivation to undertake 
earnings management. Viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts with managers, employees, 
regulators, suppliers and capital providers (i.e. lenders and investors), suggests that the firms 
operations are efficiently conducted if the firm has minimised the associated contracting costs 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the Positive Accounting Theory also assumes that 
managers are rational individuals - just like investors. Thus, the firm’s choice to manage 
earnings is not necessarily explained by efficiency but could also be driven by managerial 
opportunism (Scott 2003).   
The literature investigates different motivations for executing earnings management. 
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Beneish (2001), 
earnings management motivations can be presented under three main classes as follows: 
2.3.2.1. Security market motivations 
The informativeness role of accounting earnings and the value-relevance of the periodic 
income from the perspective of investors can justify the managerial incentive to alter the 
firm’s reported earnings in order to affect the firm’s market valuation (Chambers and Penman 
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1984; Trueman and Titman 1988; Houmes and Skantz 2010). For example, managers may use 
earnings management to align the firm’s earnings with the market expectations by meeting or 
beating ex ante earnings’ forecasts (Waymire 1984; Payne and Robb 2000; Burgstahler and 
Eames 2006; Bartov and Cohen 2009). It is argued that managers may use earnings 
management to avoid reporting lower periodic earnings than what the market expects (i.e. 
analysts forecasts) (Burgstahler and Eames 2006)14. 
Moreover, there are several events where it is argued that managers may attempt to affect the 
firm’s share prices (either positively or negatively) by exercising a planned earnings 
management strategy. Management buyouts represent an example of a severe agency problem 
where incentives to the firm’s managers to adopt income-decreasing reporting strategies arise 
to reduce the share’s purchase price (DeAngelo 1986; Perry and Williams 1994; Fischer and 
Louis 2008). 
In addition, a number of studies investigate income-increasing earnings management 
preceding events that involve offering equity shares such as in initial equity offerings 
(Aharony et al. 1993; DuCharme et al. 2001), seasoned equity offerings (Rangan 1995; 
Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Kim and Park 2005) and non-cash M&A 
(Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Gong et al. 2008).  
                                                 
14 Ronen and Yari (2008) noted that investors may prefer the analysts’ earnings forecasts over GAAP 
earnings when they predict the future risks and expected cash flows. The increasing value-relevance 
of the earnings forecasts should add more pressure on managers to follow and meet the analysts’ 
expectations and avoid negative surprises, which would reflect negatively on the firm’s valuation. 
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2.3.2.2. Contractual motivations 
Recalling the stewardship role of accounting earnings, the reported earnings can be used by 
the firm’s stakeholders as a monitoring and evaluating tool (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
More specifically, the contracting parties may develop their contractual terms based on the 
firm’s earnings. However, incentives to misrepresent the periodic earnings may arise due to 
the conflict of interests between the insiders and the outsiders (Leuz et al. 2003). Therefore, 
managers are expected to use their discretion over accruals and make the best choice (i.e. 
income-decreasing or income-increasing) to influence the potential contractual outcome, given 
the designated contractual terms (Chung et al. 2002). 
There are many examples regarding such contractual arrangements. For example, it has been 
constantly asserted that earnings management should be more pronounced at firms where the 
managers’ compensation contracts are closely tied to the firms’ earnings and performance 
(Healy 1985; Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999; Lambert 2001; 
Leuz et al. 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Kuang 2008; Grant et al. 2009). 
Debt contracts are another example where a firm’s earnings reporting strategies are associated 
with the presence of accounting-based leverage constraints (Press and Weintrop 1990). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990) and Mohrman (1996) argue that firms with higher debt-financing are 
more likely to manage earnings upward due to increasing pressures. Correspondingly, 
Sweeney (1994) and, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provide evidence that managers adopt 
income-increasing accounting choices as a response to the threat of potential credit default. 
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2.3.2.3. Regulatory and tax motivations 
Earnings management can also be driven by the political environment, taxation and 
governmental regulations (Ronen and Yaari 2008). Some renowned examples on regulatory-
driven earnings management include the evidence documented by Jones (1991) on the 
negative discretionary accruals (i.e. income-decreasing earnings management) by firms that 
are under import relief investigation to benefit from the governmental protection from 
competing imports as well as the evidence reported by Cahan (1992) on the downward 
earnings management by firms under investigation for anti-trust laws. 
Likewise, industry regulations can explain the firms’ incentives to manage their reported 
earnings. Insurance industry, for instance, is one the most regulated industries as their 
financial health is monitored and subject to minimum requirements (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Therefore, insurance companies are likely to manage their loss reserves if they reach alarming 
financial indicators (Gaver and Paterson 1999; Beaver et al. 2003). 
A convincing theory that has been examined several times in the literature is that managers 
have the incentive to decrease the present value of a future income tax expense by manage 
earnings downwards (Maydew 1997; Phillips et al. 2003). Firms may adopt earnings for 
different types of tax-planning. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) assert that firms influence their effective 
tax rates to manage their earnings in order to achieve their targets.  
In summary, the managers’ discretion over earnings can be driven by capital market 
motivations as earnings management is used to influence the market valuation. Moreover, 
earnings management may also be induced by the firm’s contractual and regulatory 
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motivations as earnings management is used to the firm’s economic results in line with the 
associated economic incentives and political pressures. Finally, earnings management 
motivations can be understood given the crucial stewardship and informativeness roles of the 
periodic earnings reported by firms and by assuming the potential agency problems between 
the management and the spectrum of stakeholders. 
2.4. Capturing Earnings Management: Modelling the Normal 
Accruals 
Identifying the managerial reporting incentive – advocated by theory – provides an essential 
foundation in the design of earnings management research, while assessing whether the 
reported earnings are actually managed remains the empirical challenge. The competing 
accruals-based models in the literature indicate that measuring firm’s abnormal (i.e. 
discretionary) accruals is not an easy process (Dechow et al. 1995; Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Indeed, the crucial research designing issue, which is a common one for all models, lies in 
determining what the “normal” accruals are. Once this has been clearly defined, any potential 
abnormality in accruals can then be detected and used in order to proxy for managerial 
discretion. Therefore, shedding light on the most influential models that have contributed to 
the evolution of accruals-based research is crucial in understanding the underlying 
assumptions of the modelling of normal accruals. The following discussion focuses on five 
seminal and related models by the following scholars Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones 
(1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). 
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2.4.1. Healy (1985) Model 
Earnings management is identified by Healy (1985) as being equal to the firm’s discretionary 
accruals (DAt), which are calculated as the difference between the total current accruals 
(TACCt) and the nondiscretionary (i.e. the normal) accruals (NDACCt), all scaled by the lagged 
total assets, denoted as follows: 
ܦܣ௧ ൌ ܶܣܥܥ௧ െ ܰܦܣܥܥ௧      ( 2.1) 
The total accruals of a particular firm are calculated as the difference between the accounting 
earnings and the cash flow from operations, while the nondiscretionary accruals (NDACCt) are 
estimated by the average total accruals for a given estimation period (EP) as follows: 
ܰܦܣܥܥ௧ ൌ
ଵ
ா௉
∑
்஺஼஼ೕ
்஺ೕషభ
ா௉
௝       ( 2.2) 
The inference made regarding earnings management are drawn by comparing the DAt means 
of samples in pairs. However, this model assumes that earnings management occurs 
systematically in every period (Dechow et al. 1995). 
2.4.2. DeAngelo (1986) Model 
Earnings management is also identified by DeAngelo (1986) as the firm’s discretionary 
accruals (DAt), and similarly, these are calculated as the difference between the current total 
accruals (TACCt) and the lagged total accruals (TACCt‐1), all scaled by the lagged total assets. 
It can be noticed that the difference between this model and Healy’s model lies in the method 
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by which the nondiscretionary accruals are determined. DeAngelo’s model uses the lagged 
total accruals as a proxy for the nondiscretionary (i.e. the normal) accruals as follows:  
ܰܦܣܥܥ௧ ൌ
்஺஼஼೟షభ
்஺೟షమ
      ( 2.3) 
Moreover, DeAngelo’s model can be considered to be a special case of Healy’s specification 
by restricting the nondiscretionary accruals estimation period (EP) to the previous year 
(Dechow et al. 1995). In essence, this method takes the year to year changes in the total 
accruals. Healy (1985) and DeAngelo’s (1986) models are criticised for unreasonably 
assuming that the change in the levels of nondiscretionary accruals over years is equal to zero 
so that any change in the total accruals is solely attributed to the discretionary accruals (Jones 
1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Ronen and Yaari 2008). Indeed, this cannot be empirically true as 
accruals are found to be changing with the firms economic circumstances, as noted in 
Kaplan’s (1985) discussion paper of Healy’s. 
2.4.3.  Jones (1991) Model 
The main contribution of the model developed by Jones (1991) is relaxing the assumption that 
the firm’s nondiscretionary (i.e. the normal) accruals are constant over time. Instead, Jones 
develops an expectation model that estimates the normal accruals over an estimation period 
after controlling for the effect of different economic circumstances. She uses the size of the 
firm’s property, plant and equipment (PPEt) and the change in revenues (REVt) as a proxy for 
the effect of the economic circumstance in a regression model, a stationary relationship 
between the normal accruals and the explanatory variables, as follows: 
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்஺஼஼೟
்஺೟షభ
ൌ ߙଵ ቀ
ଵ
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߙଶ ቀ
∆ோா௏೟
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߙଷ ቀ
௉௉ா೟
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߝ௧   ( 2.4) 
From this, the coefficient estimates ߙଵ, ߙଶ  and ߙଷ  are used to calculate the expected total 
accruals of the firm. The difference between the firm’s actual total accruals and its expected 
total accruals at time t indicates the discretionary accruals (DACCt).  Jones (1991) justifies the 
need for using the lagged total assets as a scaling factor as this procedure reduces 
heteroscedasticity15.  
The central critique of Jones’ model is that it assumes that earnings management can only be 
practiced by manipulating the firm’s accrual expenses, which means that it fails to capture the 
managers’ discretion of the firm’s revenues (Dechow et al. 1995). Despite this critique, Jones’ 
model remains one of the most influential models in the area of earnings management.  
2.4.4. Dechow et al. (1995) Model:  
Dechow et al. (1995) improve the accruals model introduced by Jones (1991) by relaxing the 
assumption that revenues are not subject to managerial discretion. This model is commonly 
described in the literature as the Modified Jones Model. Dechow et al. modify Jones model by 
considering the change in revenues after deducting the change in trade receivables (ARt), as 
follows16: 
                                                 
15 Jones (1991) selects the lagged total assets as a deflator because she finds that they are highly 
correlated with the error term in the unscaled expectation model.  
16 This practice is also similar to Subramanyam and Wild (1996), DeFond and Park (1997) and Guidry 
et al.’s (1999). 
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்஺஼஼೟
்஺೟షభ
ൌ ߙଵ ቀ
ଵ
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߙଶ ቀ
∆ோா௏೟ି∆஺ோ೟
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߙଷ ቀ
௉௉ா೟
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߝ௧   ( 2.5) 
They argue that exercising managerial discretion over the recognition of credit rather than 
cash revenues is much easier. Moreover, Dechow et al. (1995) estimate the coefficients in the 
same period in which earnings management is to be measured. Therefore, systematic earnings 
management is not assumed. They relax the assumption that normal accruals are constant 
across periods by adopting an industry matched model that assumes that factors influencing 
the change in normal accruals are comparable for firms in the same industry. 
However, Dechow et al. (1995) report that their model, as well as the other previous accrual 
models, do not reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management for samples of firms with 
high performance. 
2.4.5. Kothari et al. (2005) Model 
The main contribution of Kothari et al. (2005) is that it builds upon the findings of Dechow et 
al. (1995) to develop an industry-performance-matched accruals cross-sectional model. 
Kothari et al. (2005) assert that the economic intuition and the existing empirical evidence 
suggest that firm’s accruals are correlated with its current and past performance. This 
argument implies that accruals models, including Dechow et al. (1995) (i.e. the modified Jones 
model), are misspecified and produce biased results (Peasnell et al. 2000). 
Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that accruals models should control for the effect of performance 
on measured discretionary accruals. Therefore they suggest and examine two approaches.  
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The first approach documented is to use the current or the lagged return on assets (ROA) as a 
proxy for the firm’s performance to add it as an additional regressor to the modified Jones 
model, as follows: 
ܶܣܥܥ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ቀ
ଵ
்஺೟షభ
ቁ ൅ ߙଶሺ∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ∆ܣܴ௧ሻ ൅ ߙଷሺܲܲܧ௧ሻ ൅ ߙସ൫ܴܱܣ௧ሾ௢௥ ௧ିଵሿ൯൅ߝ௧    ( 2.6) 
They also argue that the modified Jones model’s misspecification magnifies when the constant 
term is suppressed. Therefore they recommend that an intercept should be added to the model 
to reduce the chance of misspecification. 
The second approach is performance-matching by estimating the normal accruals cross-
sectionally using peer firms similar in performance. Kothari et al.’s compare the two 
approaches concluding that performance matching is superior to the regression approach 
because the relationship between performance and accruals proves to be non-linear. 
In fact, Kothari et al.’s (2005) performance-matching procedure has proven successful in 
mitigating the misspecification of the accruals model. However, Kothari et al.’s method is 
criticised for not being able to perfectly correct for the growth-related model bias (Stubben 
2010), while also for substantially reducing the model’s power (Dechow et al. 2011).  
2.4.6. Other Approaches 
There have been several attempts in the literature to develop both alternative models and 
approaches for estimating earnings management. One such example could be the single 
account approach as introduced by McNichols and Wilson’s (1988). This approach is based on 
analysing the managerial discretion over particular accounts that are affected by accounting 
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estimation such as bad debt expense or the firm’s write-offs. The distributional approach is 
another method of estimating earnings management by which it is assumed that periodic 
earnings follow a particular distribution such that a deviation from this distribution signals 
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
The number of attempts to develop a reliable method that captures earnings management may 
indicate that there is no ideal approach to measure earnings management. Having said that, 
Kothari et al.’s (2005) approach, which is based on Jones (1991) model in its modified version 
by Dechow et al. (1995), remains one of the most widely used models in the area of earnings 
management (see, for example, Gong et al. 2008; Das et al. 2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Ghosh et al. 2010; Aerts and Cheng 2011; Louis and Sun 2011). Stubben (2010, p.695) 
affirms that researchers have “addressed and continue to address earnings management using 
these models, presumably because few viable alternatives exist”. 
2.5. Summary and Conclusion 
In the field of accounting, there is no well-defined economic construct for income given that 
there is no theory that can provide an ideal prescription of accounting policies. However, in 
our imperfect and incomplete world, corporate reporting in general and accounting earnings in 
specific play fundamental roles for the wide spectrum of stakeholders (Fields et al. 2001). 
These roles are primarily centred in stewardship and informativeness. Given the agency 
relationship between managers and their principals, the importance of the stewardship role of 
reporting earnings stems from the fact that managers have control and use over the firm’s 
resources and, naturally, are accountable to their principals. In addition, accounting earnings 
represent a substantial source of information that users can rely on when assessing the firm’s 
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risk and potential for future cash flows (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 
1986; Bushman and Smith 2001; Lambert 2001; Bushman et al. 2006; Drymiotes and Hemmer 
2009). In other words, accounting earnings affect the firm’s value and influence the behaviour 
of decision-makers, as the concept of economic consequences suggests (Zeff 1978). 
In an attempt to investigate the implications of the informativeness role of accounting earnings, 
which is greatly stimulated by the development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, an ample 
amount of empirical research has addressed the value-relevance of accounting information by 
considering the association between accounting earnings and share prices (see, for example, 
Ball and Brown 1968; Beaver 1968; Fama 1970; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Holthausen and 
Watts 2001). 
Within the context of agency problems and information asymmetries, and as a result of the 
management team’s awareness of the substantial roles of accounting earnings and their impact 
on the stakeholders’ decisions, managers may have the motivation to direct their (within-
GAAP) discretion with the aim of influencing the reported earnings upwards or downwards - 
depending on their objectives (Sweeney 1994; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Riahi-Belkaoui 1999; 
Beneish 2001; Phillips et al. 2003). As a least-noticeable and least-cost option, managers 
normally chose to manipulate the accrual component of earnings (Phillips et al. 2003). Such a 
practice is often referred to as earnings management, which can be, more specifically, driven 
by capital market incentives (i.e. impacts on market valuation) (Chambers and Penman 1984; 
Houmes and Skantz 2010), contractual incentives (i.e. managerial compensation and 
accounting-based debt covenants) (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Leuz et al. 2003) and 
regulatory and taxation incentives (Jones 1991; Beaver et al. 2003). 
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Table  2.1 Summary of the commonly used accruals models 
Model Formula Approach Critique 
Healy 1985 Model 
ܰܦܣܥܥ௧ ൌ
1
ܧܲ
෍
ܶܣܥܥ௝
ܶܣ௝ିଵ
ா௉
௝
 
The normal accruals are estimated as the 
average total accruals for a given 
estimation period prior to the period of 
interest. 
The model assumes that 
earnings management 
occurs systematically 
every period. 
DeAngelo 1986 
Model 
ܰܦܣܥܥ௧ ൌ
ܶܣܥܥ௧ିଵ
ܶܣ௧ିଶ
 The normal accruals are determined as the lagged total accruals. This is a 
special version of Healy’s model where 
the estimation period available consists 
only of one year. 
The model assumes that 
firm’s normal accruals 
do not change from year 
to year, while accruals 
are changing with the 
firm’s economic 
circumstances. 
Jones 1991 Model ܶܣܥܥ௧
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
ൌ ߙଵ ൬
1
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
ܲܲܧ௧
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߝ௧ 
The normal accruals are estimated as a 
function of revenue growth and the size 
of the firm’s property, plant and 
equipment. 
The model assumes that 
accrual revenues are not 
subject to the managers’ 
discretionary power. 
Dechow et al. 1995 
(Modified Jones) 
Model 
ܶܣܥܥ௧
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
ൌ ߙଵ ൬
1
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ∆ܣܴ௧
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
ܲܲܧ௧
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰
൅ ߝ௧ 
A modified version of Jones model that 
considers the change in revenues after 
deducting the change in trade 
receivables. They argue that exercising 
managerial discretion over the 
recognition of credit revenues is much 
easier than exercising discretion over 
cash revenues. 
The residual is highly 
correlated with the firm’s 
performance. Null 
hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for firms with 
high performance due to 
the bias of estimation. 
Kothari et al. 2005 
(Performance-
Matched) Model 
ܶܣܥܥ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
1
ܶܣ௧ିଵ
൰ ൅ ߙଶሺ∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ∆ܣܴ௧ሻ
൅ ߙଷሺܲܲܧ௧ሻ ൅ ߙସ൫ܴܱܣ௧ሾ௢௥ ௧ିଵሿ൯൅ߝ௧ 
A modified version of Dechow et al. 
model that controls for the effect of 
performance by either adding ROA as an 
additional regressor or by using 
performance-matched portfolios, which 
proved to be a better approach.  
The model cannot 
perfectly correct for the 
growth-related model 
bias. Controlling for 
performance reduces the 
model’s power. 
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Given that a firm is a nexus of contracts, the motivations and practices underlying earnings 
management can be explained and predicted by the aforementioned Positive Accounting 
Theory. An earnings management hypothesis can take either the efficient form or the 
opportunistic form, since the Positive Accounting Theory assumes that managers are rational 
individuals. It should be noted that the positivist orientation of this research – and earnings 
management research in general – does not seek to find the optimal methods that firms should 
adopt in order to report their earnings (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Rather, the emphasis is 
on explaining and predicting the managerial practices when they actually report the earnings. 
Hence, this thesis contributes to the literature that aims to understand why, when and which 
firms may decide to chose particular accounting methods to engage earnings management as 
well as how users may react to the adopted accounting practices (Scott 2003).  
There is no perfect measure for assessing earnings management, despite the several attempts 
in the extant literature. However, the performance-industry matched accrual models 
(summarised in Table  2.1) are among the most reliable and widely used in the literature, 
primarily the model of Kothari et al. (2005). This model is an improved version of the 
modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al. 1995), which assumes that normal accruals are 
the average accruals cross-sectionally of peer firms that operate within the same industry 
sector and have similar performance. 
The overview on accounting earnings and earnings management provided in this chapter 
presents a generic foundation based upon which several research questions can be addressed in 
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this thesis. Further and more detailed theoretical and methodological concerns are tackled in 
the following chapters respective to the specific research question addressed, as explained in 
the introductory chapter at the beginning of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Event-Specific Earnings Management: 
Evidence from US M&A Pre- and Post-SOX17  
3.1. Introduction 
Since the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley (hereafter SOX) in 2002, the debate regarding its 
implications on corporate reporting and governance consequences has been on-going (see, for 
example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Madura and Ngo 2010). The debate has been recently 
become extended to include several research areas in financial accounting including earnings 
management (Cohen et al. 2008), in market efficiency and major business transactions such as 
mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) (Chelikani and D'Souza 2011). 
As shown in the previous chapter, some of the primary concerns in the research area of 
financial accounting have centred on establishing how to detect and measure earnings 
management, understanding the managerial incentives that are behind the manipulation of 
corporate earnings and relating earnings management to certain characteristics of a firm 
practicing such behaviour. Healy and Wahlen (1999) noted that there are still many directions 
worthy of investigation in this area of research such as the implications of earnings 
management on resource allocation, and of the level of earnings management in special events. 
Since the review paper of Healy and Wahlen was published, there has been a greater concern 
                                                 
17 A major part of Chapter 3 was presented in the 11th International Doctoral Conference of the Faculty 
of Finance and Accounting, University of Economics Prague, Czech Republic, on May 28th, 2010 
and won the Best Paper Award. The title of the paper was “Earnings Management in US M&A: Pre 
and Post-SOX Investigation.”  
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centred upon investigating earnings management around specific events as well as examining 
managerial decisions around which earnings management may have been motivated with the 
manipulation of corporate reports. 
The debate over how to correctly identify earnings management has inevitably fed into one 
concerning reliable empirical measures, as discussed previously in  Chapter 2. Different 
researchers will measure earnings management according to how they define it in relation to 
their particular research frameworks. However, a common trait seen is that many measurement 
methods seek proxies that can directly indicate a management’s exercise of its discretionary 
power to influence corporate earnings. Managerial discretionary power can be exercised over 
the accrual component of the reported earnings and it is for this reason that most researchers’ 
focus is directed toward investigating this variable (see, for example, Healy 1985; DeAngelo 
1986; Schipper 1989; Jones 1991; Dechow 1994; Louis 2004; Kothari et al. 2005; Gong et al. 
2008; Ronen and Yaari 2008).  
The mathematical detection of abnormal patterns in accruals per se does not carry significant 
and meaningful implications unless they are linked to the potential underlying managerial 
motives. Therefore, researchers in earnings management tend to document the managerial 
endeavours of inflating (or deflating earnings) by manipulating the accrual component of the 
reported earnings prior to particular events in an attempt to provide convincing predictions 
related to both the managerial incentives to manage earnings and the direction of such 
manipulation.  
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Examples of such business events are plentiful including management buy outs (see, for 
example, Perry and Williams 1994), seasoned equity offerings (see, for example, Rangan 1998; 
Teoh et al. 1998) and mergers and acquisitions (for example see Erickson and Wang 1999). 
This study focuses on the merger and acquisition event to document potential earnings 
management by the engaged parties, since it could be argued that M&A activity can present an 
ideal incentive for each party to undertake such techniques as they have a motivation to be 
portrayed in the most attractive manner near the time of transaction. 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are a major research topic on its own generating greater 
interest whenever a new wave of M&A ripples capital markets and adds event-specific data to 
databases. The recent M&A wave in 2006 was driven by the process of globalisation, industry 
consolidation trends and the rise in commodities’ prices (DePamphilis 2007). This M&A wave 
became even more pronounced in the US market, the largest market in the world in terms of 
M&A activity18.  
In M&A deals there are two parties inevitably involved, each of which, in theory, seeks to 
maximise their own gains from the deal. Hansen (1987, p.76) describes this transacting 
process as “a two-agent bargaining game under imperfect information.” Given this situation 
of asymmetric information, and considering how crucial the reported numbers are in the 
financial statements of both sides to their decisions regarding any M&A deal, it is argued that 
each side of the deal may have incentives to manipulate the numbers, which is not a costless 
procedure, however, prior to closing the deal (Erickson and Wang 1999). 
                                                 
18 About 24% of the global mergers and acquisitions are performed by a US based acquirer during 
2008 (Source: Thomson One Banker database). 
Chapter 3: Event-Specific Earnings Management: Evidence from US M&A Pre- and Post-SOX 
48 
 
Despite the low number of studies that have investigated pre-merger earnings management 
(such as, Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Pungaliya and Vijh 
2008), the literature still reveals conflicting empirical evidence. The inconsistency of the 
outcome of previous studies is attributed to different observable and unobservable factors such 
as different research designs (i.e. the definition, the method and the timing of measuring 
earnings management), the different procedures applied for deals’ sampling and the peculiar 
nature of each deal (i.e. the enormous possibilities of engaged parties’ industries combinations, 
prior undisclosed relation between parties, attitude of deal …and so forth). Given this debate 
and relative lack of empirical studies in this area, further investigation will undoubtedly prove 
rewarding.  
Interestingly, evidence obtained by most related studies in the US (see, for example, 
Easterwood 1997; Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Baik et al. 2007) has been obtained 
using samples of deals completed before the renowned legislation Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. 
Within the researcher’s knowledge, there is no study that conducts a concurrent investigation 
of event-specific abnormal accruals before and after the enactment of SOX. Instead, the 
literature has been more concerned with investigating the quality of earnings by constantly 
comparing the general level of the signed or absolute value of discretionary accruals19 of all 
firms in the market before and after the enactment of SOX (see, for example, Cohen et al. 
                                                 
19 Since there is no single definition of earnings management, researchers define earnings management 
depending on the contexts of their studies. It is not surprising that the general level of discretionary 
accruals, signed or unsigned, is often described as earnings management like in Cohen et al (2008), 
Bartov and Cohen (2009) and Ghosh et al (2010). However, Zhou (2008) makes a clear distinction 
that studying the general level of discretionary accruals is for examining the overall conservativeness 
or the aggressiveness of the trending reporting behaviour.  
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2008; Zhou 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009; Wilson 2009; Chambers et al. 2010; Ghosh et al. 
2010; Iliev 2010).  
In the wake of major accounting scandals in the US in 2001 and 2002 (i.e. the cases of Enron 
and WorldCom), SOX was enacted with the aim of preventing corporate failure resulting from 
intentional or unintentional misstated financial reports20. Some researchers provide evidence 
that corporate financial reports have become more reliable after SOX since internal controls 
were improved (see, for example, Rittenberg and Miller 2005), and that the implementation of 
SOX resulted in significantly less earnings management (see, for example, Cohen et al. 2008; 
Iliev 2010) or in other words higher accruals quality (see, for example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2008). Others, however, have argued that post-SOX accounting reports have become 
conservative, which does not necessarily infer they are of a higher quality (Zhou 2008).  
In a very recent review paper, DeFond (2010) asserts that SOX continues to provide avenues 
for earnings management research despite the various studies that have already been published. 
He argues that “many of them were done before SOX is likely to have reached a state of 
equilibrium (DeFond 2010, p.405)”, indicating that SOX provided many vital changes to the 
earnings quality environment, which would take years for the full effects to be felt.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that M&A transactions are not specifically and explicitly 
mentioned in SOX, there are major changes in the behaviour of M&A candidates since SOX, 
such as an increased reliance on financial and legal advisors (Madura and Ngo 2010). 
                                                 
20 Sections 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act require a set of procedures by firms to ensure accurate 
financial reporting and to report on the competence of internal controls over financial reporting. 
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Motivated by the above facts, this research addresses the question of whether firms’ pre-
merger earnings management after the enactment of SOX has been significantly different from 
its level in the pre-SOX era. More specifically, this study explores the different patterns and 
timing of pre-merger earnings management as well as the differences in earnings management 
practices between pre and post-SOX eras in public firms engaged in mergers and acquisitions 
(i.e. acquiring and target firms). The sample used in this study is selected to include M&A 
deals completed in both eras, before and after SOX, as described in detail in the sampling 
procedure in section  3.4.3.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it tests earnings 
management occurrences for each of the last four quarters prior to deal announcement not only 
for the acquiring firms, but also for their targets concurrently by using a sample that includes 
M&A deals before and after SOX was enacted. Second, it adds to the growing body of the 
literature regarding the on-going debate of the effectiveness of SOX in improving the 
credibility of financial reporting by investigating a structured sample of firms that have the 
motivation to practice earnings management – merging firms. Finally, by using quarterly 
reports, which are available by the US reporting environment, this study makes a further 
twofold contribution. On the one hand, quarterly statements are superior to annual ones in 
terms of their timeliness. Therefore, this study provides a track of the managerial discretion 
over accruals in the previous four successive quarters prior to a deal’s announcement in order 
to precisely locate the timing of manipulating earnings. On the other hand, since quarterly 
statements are not audited by an external auditor unlike annual reports, this study provides an 
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insight to some implications of SOX on the interim reporting practices, as Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2008) suggested for future research.  
The results reported in this chapter reveal evidence of earnings management by acquirers. 
Acquirers’ which endeavour to manage earnings are found to do so in two to three quarters 
prior to the announcement date of the M&A. As expected, the magnitude of positive earnings 
management is higher and more robust for acquirers that offer their equity in the payment 
structure, while no earnings management is found for those acquirers that offer pure cash to 
their targets. This evidence on the acquirers’ side does not only hold with the pre and post-
SOX segregation, but also shows greater magnitude of positive earnings management in the 
post-SOX period.  
No evidence of earnings management is documented for an aggregate sample of targets of 
deals completed before and after SOX. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence, interestingly, 
of earnings management by post-SOX targets in the last quarter just before announcing a 
merger deal, which at first glance seems to conflict with the notion that greater governance 
requested by SOX should result in deterring management from earnings manipulation. This 
study reports rare evidence on targets’ upward earnings management. 
The unexpected results of greater pre-merger earnings management in post-SOX can be 
explained by the general shift of US firms managerial discretion after SOX toward more 
conservative accrual reporting (see, for example, Cohen et al. 2008). This shift affects the 
cross-sectional results of earnings management associated with a particular event such as a 
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M&A, assuming that managerial motivation to pre-merger earnings management remains 
unchanged after SOX. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section  3.2 reviews the literature of 
earnings management in M&A while section  3.3 states the hypotheses tested in this study. 
Section  3.4 illustrates the sampling procedure and the methodological framework. Section  3.5 
reports the results and section  3.6 provides a summary of the final concluding remarks. 
3.2. Literature Review 
Both the target and the acquiring firms may have incentives to manage earnings prior to the 
event. Section  3.2.1 is intended to review the existing evidence of earnings management in 
target firms while section  3.2.2 discusses the literature related to earnings management by 
acquirers. Section  3.2.3 sheds light on key papers that discuss the implications of SOX on 
earnings management and section  3.2.4 provides a summary outlining how this study 
distinguishes itself from existing literature. 
3.2.1. Evidence of Earnings Management by Targets 
Managing earnings by target firms near M&A deals is subject to many factors including the 
existence of a motivation to do so, which has been among some of the main questions tackled 
by researchers. 
Easterwood (1998) uses a sample of firms that experienced a takeover attempt, regardless of 
the eventual deal outcome, to investigate whether managers of firms that are targets of a 
takeover attempt systematically manage reported earnings upward in the quarters preceding 
Chapter 3: Event-Specific Earnings Management: Evidence from US M&A Pre- and Post-SOX 
53 
 
and following the initiation of a takeover. She argues that firms may have a motivation to 
manage earnings upward before mergers to show the acquirer’s shareholders that their firm is 
performing well. The empirical evidence supports the earnings management hypothesis in the 
quarter immediately preceding the deal but no evidence of earnings management is found in 
the quarter following the deal. This is reasoned as being due to the fact that the target manager 
has no motivation to manage the earnings of the firm after a merger has been announced.  
In an attempt to understand the real motivation behind earnings management (i.e. opportunism 
versus value maximisation), Christie and Zimmerman (1994) adopt a methodology in which 
they chose a non-random (i.e. purposeful) sample including firms that became eventual 
takeover targets. They report a higher use of income-increasing accounting methods in the last 
11 years before a firm becomes a takeover target. The persuasiveness and relevance of the 
evidence presented in their work to M&A deals is not direct since it has largely been obtained 
through comparing the change in choice over the firm’s accounting policy throughout a long-
standing period prior to the takeover event relating a sample of target firms to a control group 
consisting the surviving peer firms in the same industries. In fact, the methodology employed 
was intended to primarily explain the reasons behind accounting methods and efficiency 
versus opportunism. In this way, their findings cannot be interpreted in light of true M&A 
dynamics. 
Measuring earnings management by examining accounting methods is highly criticised since 
the effect of implementing one accounting method may offset the effect of implementing 
another (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). For this reason, Easterwood (1998) measures abnormal 
accruals within empirical tests and reports that targets of hostile acquisitions have a stronger 
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motivation to manage earnings than those subject to a friendly approach. Therefore, targets’ 
managers in hostile takeovers believe that managing earnings upward could serve as a 
management entrenchment procedure and as a defensive response to the proposed takeover. 
Although Easterwood’s approach in measuring earnings management ignores the influence of 
economic circumstances on accruals due to the application of DeAngelo’s (1986) accruals 
model21, she does emphasise the impact of takeover attitude (i.e. hostile versus friendly) on the 
managerial motive to manipulate earnings. 
In a more recent study which focuses on friendly M&A deals, Ben-Amar and Missonier-Piera 
(2008) document evidence based on annual data from Switzerland indicating that targets of 
friendly acquisitions manage earnings downwards in the year preceding the M&A deal. These 
findings suggest that targets’ motivations may be different toward earnings management, if the 
M&A deal was conducted in a friendly environment. Consequently, comparing the results of 
Easterwood (1998) regarding hostile takeovers with the evidence pertaining to friendly 
acquisitions as provided by Ben-Amar and Missonier-Piera (2008) raises questions on the 
relationship between earnings management and anti-takeover procedures (see , for 
example, Jiraporn 2005; Zhao and Chen 2008). 
In another study concerning the managerial motive to manage earnings, Eddey and Taylor 
(1999) investigate whether Australian firms engage in earnings management during takeover 
bids. They propose that directors may inflate earnings using discretionary accruals in order to 
                                                 
21 DeAngelo assumes that any change in total accruals is due to change in discretionary accruals and, 
unlike Jones’ (1991), DeAngelo’s model does not consider the impact of economic circumstances on 
accruals when estimating the abnormal accruals. 
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support their rejection of a M&A bid by showing that the bid, in relation to earnings, is 
inadequate. In examination of this proposition, they primarily focus on opportunism. The 
findings of Eddey and Taylor’s study indicate that target firms’ directors tend to manage 
annual earnings upward (downward) to support their recommendation to reject (accept) the bid 
offer. Detecting this opportunistic behaviour empirically by target directors to keep their 
positions seems interesting since this managerial behaviour exemplifies the agency problem 
between management and shareholders.  
Eddey and Taylor’s interpretation of the evidence implies that the sign of the pre-merger 
abnormal accruals can be a clear signal of the managerial position towards a proposed 
takeover bid. However, this signalling proposition could be characterised as naïve as it falls 
short of fully considering other potential implications of manipulating accruals around M&A 
bids.  
In contrast with Eddey and Taylor’s (1999) proposition, Meisel (2006), in a theoretical paper, 
introduces a more sophisticated perspective concerning the implications of pre-merger 
earnings management by targets. On the one hand, Meisel argues that firms near takeover 
candidacy could have an incentive to manage earnings upward, either to increase their 
attractiveness as a target by showing the acquirer’s shareholders that it is performing well, or 
by using it as an anti-takeover defence procedure believing that by increasing their own value 
effectively rendering their firm unaffordable for the potential bidder(s).  
On the other hand, Meisel (2006) argues that targets may have an incentive to manage 
earnings downward as a pre-merger procedure in order to boost the acquirer’s post-merger 
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share returns, which is backed by the big bath theory22. Alternatively by managing earnings 
downward to portray the target as a bad investment allows for the management to entrench 
itself against undesired takeovers. This theoretical view, whilst fairly holistic in considering a 
wider range of potential managerial motivations, still lacks supporting empirical evidence. 
However, Chen et al. (2011) provide recent evidence of targets’ attempts to manage earnings 
downwards in the period between a deal’s announcement and completion, which provides 
support to the prediction of the big bath theory.  
In contrast, the empirical evidence of Erickson and Wang (1999), Koumanakos et al. (2005) 
and Baik et al. (2007) does not provide support to the earnings management proposition of 
target firms since their studies report positive but insignificant pre-merger abnormal accruals 
by targets. The weak findings of the targets’ pre-merger earnings management are explained 
by the timing of the acquisition and attributed to the targets’ late awareness of a takeover plan. 
Despite the inconsistency throughout the evidence reviewed, there is no persuasive reason to 
forfeit the economic incentive proposition for target firms. Moreover, target firms at times do 
not need to wait until they are approached by a successful bidder in order to start manipulating 
their earnings, particularly if the ex-ante probability of becoming a target is high, as Braga-
Alves et al. (2010) suggest. 
                                                 
22 Meisel (2006) refers this point to Zucca, L. J. and Campbell, D. R. (1992). A Closer Look at 
Discretionary Writedowns of Impaired Assets, Accounting Horizons, (September) 30-41. 
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3.2.2. Evidence of Earnings Management by Acquirers 
Unlike targets, acquirers normally have control over M&A timing and are able to plan their 
strategic investment decisions in advance. Therefore, time limitation is not an issue for a 
bidder and assuming that they have the motivation to manage their earnings, they should 
theoretically be more successful manipulating their earnings compared to their targets.  
Using a sample of acquiring firms conducting deals which successfully completed in Greece, 
Koumanakos et al. (2005) examine whether acquirers manipulate accounting earnings upward 
before the initiation of the deal. They argue that the directors of the target and the acquirer 
rationally anticipate that the other will manage earnings pre-merger to their advantage, which 
would motivate acquirers to manage earnings as a proactive plan. However, there is positive 
evidence reported supporting their claim, although this is predominantly weak.  
Similarly, Erickson and Wang (1999) and Botsari and Meeks (2008) provide significant 
evidence of pre-merger earnings management only for those acquirers that used their equity 
shares in the deal’s payment structure offered to the respective target firms.  
Erickson and Wang (1999) explain that if managing earnings upwards does usually inflate an 
acquirer’s share price then the cost of the deal reduces if these inflated shares are used to remit 
the target’s shareholders. This is argued as being due to the exchange ratio of the deal (i.e. the 
number of shares given up by the acquirer in exchange of one target equity share) which is 
negatively associated with the market value of the acquirer's share. 
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Despite the theoretical significance of Erickson and Wang’s paper (1999), which has become 
the groundwork of later studies in the same research area, their methodology of measuring 
earnings management could be criticised since they use time-series data 23  for estimating 
abnormal accruals instead of cross-sectional data (Kothari et al. 2005). 
Botsari and Meeks (2008) evidence is obtained from a cross-sectional estimation of abnormal 
accruals. However, their evidence of pre-merger earnings management lacks the measurement 
timeliness as they use annual data from the UK in capturing abnormal accruals in the last 
statement before the official announcement date of the M&A deal.  
Similar criticism related to the use of annual data can be applied to the work of Koumanakos 
et al. (2005), whose research is based on Greek data. Furthermore, Koumanakos et al. (2005) 
findings are based on a sample of acquirers that were selected regardless of their method of 
payment, which leaves open questions concerning the robustness of their evidence after 
stratifying their sample of acquiring firms according to the payment method. A crucial 
theoretical issue evolves when explaining the evidence of earnings management, if any, in 
those studies that overlook the importance of considering the deals’ method of payment since 
the incentive of acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management is clearly supported by theory 
only if equity shares are used in the payment structure (for further discussion of this point, see 
section  3.3.3).  
                                                 
23 This exposes the sample to survival bias because of requiring a long time series of data for each 
acquiring firm, for instance (Kothari et al, 2005). 
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Louis (2004), Baik et al. (2007), Asano et al. (2007), Gong et al. (2008), (2008), Guo et al. 
(2008), Lee et al. (2008) and Alsharairi and Salama (2011), among others, present empirical 
evidence on pre-merger upward earnings management by acquirers after they segregate their 
samples according to the method of payment.  
In an event study, Louis (2004) does not investigate earnings manipulation, but rather tests the 
market’s efficiency in processing the managed (i.e. manipulated) reported earnings to explain 
the post-merger share underperformance. He reports strong evidence of upward earnings 
overstatement by acquirers which offer equity shares in the transaction, in the quarter 
preceding the deal’s announcement. 
Baik et al. (2007) provide additional evidence on earnings management using a sample of 
share swap acquirers whose targets are privately held companies. Normally, there is less 
information available regarding private firms compared to public ones because private firms 
receive less attention from stakeholders and regulatory agencies those publicly listed. For this 
reason, Baik et al. (2007) argue that acquirers would have a much greater incentive to manage 
earnings prior to their acquisition if the respective target was privately held in order to make 
up for the relatively higher level of information uncertainty.   
Using a sample Japanese share-for-share acquirers, Asano et al. (2007) document evidence of 
pre-merger earnings management, consistent with the results of Erickson and Wang (1999) 
and Louis (2004). Moreover, they report a negative market reaction to the earnings 
overstatement during the last two-interim periods preceding the deal’s announcement.   
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Lee et al. (2008) obtain similar evidence of pre-merger earnings management by examining a 
sample of acquiring firms from the telecommunications industry in the US. 
Beyond the mere examination of whether or not earnings management does actually exist, 
Gong et al. (2008) shed light on the negative consequences of fooling the market as a result of 
overstating the accrual component of the announced earnings. Specifically, they examine the 
association between pre-merger earnings management and the post-merger probability that the 
practicing acquirer would be sued. Their empirical evidence suggests that earnings 
management increases the probability of lawsuits against the share-for-share acquirer. Gong et 
al. recommend that investors should not only consider the cost of undoing the share price 
effect of pre-merger earnings inflation, but also the expense of contingent legal costs that can 
be associated with earnings management. 
Interestingly, Guo et al. (2008) investigates the acquirers’ attitudes to influencing their share 
price prior to share swap mergers. They not only report evidence of acquirers’ upward pre-
merger earnings management to manipulate the valuation of their shares so that they become 
overvalued, but they also document acquirers’ systematic attempts of splitting their shares 
prior to share swap deals, motivated by the assumption that a share split will delay the 
market’s correction of the misvalued share price.  
In addition to documenting evidence of pre-merger earnings management, Alsharairi and 
Salama (2011) find a strong negative association between the industry-adjusted leverage level 
of acquirers and the magnitude of earnings management. Their evidence suggests that 
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creditors’ monitoring role and debt covenants limit the managerial ability to exercise 
managerial discretion over the reported earnings. 
The relative size of the target to the acquirer in share swap mergers is often used to proxy for 
the economic incentive to manage earnings suggesting that the larger the relative size of the 
target, the greater the economic incentive for the acquirer to manage earnings prior to offering 
shares in the deal’s payment structure  (Pungaliya and Vijh 2008).  
However, the literature does not reveal consistent empirical evidence of earnings management 
by equity-paying acquirers. Moreover, the findings of Heron and Lie (2002), and Pungaliya 
and Vijh’s (2008) do not support the earnings management hypothesis even after stratifying 
their sample for the method of payment used. Applying the modified Jones model on a sample 
of acquirers whose targets are public firms, Heron and Lie (2002) find no evidence to link the 
method of payment in acquisitions to the use of discretionary accruals by acquirers. Likewise, 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2008) show that the discretionary accruals for a large sample of share 
swap acquirers are insignificantly different from zero as well as the discretionary accruals for 
cash acquirers. 
Mixed evidence has driven the focus of related research to examine the cause and effect 
relationship of earnings management in M&A with different variables. Pre-merger earnings 
management by the acquirer is found to have a positive relationship with post-merger lawsuits 
(Gong et al. 2008), with the target’s private listing status (Baik et al. 2007), or with the relative 
size of the deal value (Erickson and Wang 1999). There is a noted negative relationship, 
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however, with the acquirer’s long-term performance if the merger is financed with shares 
(Louis 2004).  
3.2.3. Sarbanes-Oxley and Earnings Management 
The year of 2002 - the year in which SOX was effective - was marked as beginning of a new 
era of corporate reporting and governance practices. Since the passage of SOX, researchers in 
both academia (see, for example, Lobo and Zhou 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Cohen et 
al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2010) and in the profession of financial accounting (see, for example, 
Chambers et al. 2010) have naturally been curious to answer the controversial question of 
whether accounting reports have indeed become more credible or indeed, more accurate. The 
ramifications of SOX are numerous and, therefore, the discussion here is limited to the 
empirical evidence available relating to SOX and its implications specifically toward earnings 
management and M&A. 
In an exploratory study, Braiotta and Zhou (2006) investigate the new legal and regulatory 
environment created by SOX and its effect on the audit committee given its pivotal role in 
stressing the quality of financial reporting. Among their findings, they report a negative 
relation between earnings management, measured by Jones’ (1991) model as modified by 
Kothari et al. (2005), and audit committee alignment associated with SOX requirements. 
However, they fail to compare the level of earnings management among different periods. 
Moreover their work is subject to a limited sample range which includes the year 2002 as a 
post-SOX sub-period. Thus, their conclusions regarding the quality of financial reporting 
improvements cannot be generalised to a larger population. 
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Despite the time span limitation of sampling in a post-SOX period, the critique of small 
sample size was overcome in a study by Lobo and Zhou (2006) where the authors employed a 
large dataset of firms two years before and two years after SOX. The main purpose of their 
study is to investigate the change in managerial discretions over financial reporting following 
the enactment of SOX. Their findings indicate that firms’ abnormal accruals significantly 
decline in the post-SOX period. Lobo and Zhou (2006) describe this overall decline in the 
reported discretionary accruals as a shift toward a conservative accounting practice in the post-
SOX era. In later research, Lobo and Zhou (2010) use data for a sample of Canadian firms 
dually listed on Canadian and US stock exchanges for the same event window - two years 
before and two years after SOX. They focus on examining the effect of SOX on the extent of 
aggressiveness versus conservativism by dually listed public firms. Interestingly, they provide 
similar evidence of increased conservative accounting practice (i.e. lower discretionary 
accruals) in the post-SOX period. Moreover, the results of a matched control sample of firms 
listed only on Canadian stock exchanges (i.e. firms that are not subject to the influence of 
SOX) displayed no significant difference in discretionary accruals between pre and post-SOX 
periods.  
In contrast Cohen et al. (2008) provide a study that examines whether the degree of earnings 
management declined after the passage of SOX. The findings of their study indicate that the 
level of earnings management in the post-SOX period has declined to levels closer to those of 
the period prior to the well-documented scandals, after identifying the scandals’ period as the 
years 1998 to 2001. Unlike Lobo and Zhou’s (2006) research methodology, Cohen et al.’s 
methodology processes the sign of the abnormal accruals focusing on the accruals’ quality, 
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which of course affects the definition of earnings management in the context of their study. 
They investigate the trend in the absolute value of abnormal accruals before studying the 
trends of each of the positive and the negative abnormal accruals as subsamples. This practice 
is common in studies that do not predict a particular direction for the abnormal accruals.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) investigate the impact of SOX requirements for reporting on the 
effectiveness and deficiencies of internal control over financial reporting on accruals quality 
and financial information reliability. They provide similar evidence suggesting that the 
requirements of SOX do improve the quality of accruals, which implies that less earnings 
management takes place. Their findings were drawn from firms that remediated their SOX 
internal control deficiencies according to Section 404 of SOX24. 
In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting results of the earlier studies , Zhou (2008) pointed in 
his paper “Financial reporting after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Conservative or less earnings 
management?” that different treatments of the sign of the abnormal accruals results in 
different interpretations to the findings since conservatism (i.e. abnormal accruals without any 
treatment to the sign) and “less earnings management” (i.e. the absolute value of the abnormal 
accruals) have different implications for financial reporting. For that reason, he provides 
evidence in his work from a simultaneous examination of conservatism and earnings 
management suggesting that firms have been reporting more conservatively as well as 
engaging in less overall earnings management since the enactment of SOX. Thus, the results 
do not seem to disagree with the conclusions of Cohen et al. (2008) or Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
                                                 
24 For more detailed information concerning Section 404 of SOX, please see section  2.3.4.2 of this 
chapter. 
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since the concepts of conservative accounting and earnings management do not necessarily 
contradict one other.  
Adding to the above empirical studies, which are based on the firms’ annual earnings, Chang 
and Sun (2009) and Iliev (2010) investigate whether the provisions of SOX have in fact 
improved the quality of earnings, as proxied by the level of earnings management. Their 
findings advocate the belief that corporate governance functions required under SOX have 
improved the quality of earnings (i.e. it has limited the practice of earnings management) as 
measured by the level of signed or unsigned (i.e. absolute value) discretionary accruals. 
In a different study, this time based on quarterly earnings unlike the studies above, Bartov and 
Cohen (2009) examine the change in the pervasiveness of earnings management to meet or 
beat analysts’ expectations in the post-SOX period. Their evidence indicates that the 
frequency of meeting or beating financial analysts for quarterly earnings has declined in the 
post-SOX period, a fact attributed to a relative decline in accruals-based earnings management 
since SOX. 
In contrast to the wealth of literature that seems to support the mitigating effect of SOX on 
earning management, Wilson (2009) and Ghosh et al. (2010) provide results indicating that 
there has been no increase in the quality of reported earnings since the enactment of SOX. 
Furthermore, these studies fail to provide any significant evidence that SOX has impacted 
earnings management. Both studies’ control for factors believed to influence discretionary 
accruals including some corporate governance factors. However, these studies fall short of 
explaining how uncorrelated SOX potentially is to the control variables. Moreover, the 
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univariate analysis of Ghosh et al. (2010), which compares earnings management’s proxies in 
pre and post-SOX periods, indicates that earnings management has significantly declined after 
the enactment of SOX. 
Recently, Chambers et al. (2010) survey the recent research about the effectiveness of SOX in 
order to examine whether SOX has indeed led to better financial reporting. Unconvincingly, 
they conclude that the quality of the financial reporting environment has improved since SOX, 
while they hold the perception that “[t]he research is not yet at the point where an overall 
cost/benefit comparison can be made” (p.27).  
3.2.4. Summary and Potential Contributions to Literature 
The analysis of the related literature reveals a number of issues of interest for further 
investigation. First, although the body of research in the area of earnings management in 
M&A agrees on the motivational framework of the pre-merger earnings management by the 
acquirer and the target, the empirical evidence in the literature does not enjoy consistency on 
either side of the transaction. Heron and Lie (2002) suggest that this is due to the extremely 
wide range of sample sizes and sampling procedures implemented by previous studies.25 In 
addition to the complicated nature of M&A deals, it could also be argued that the vagueness of 
the real managerial incentives literature, the timeliness of the accounting data used in 
measurement, the variation in the countries’ regulatory frame, and the differences in the 
models employed to measure the abnormal accruals, may be behind this mixed evidence. 
                                                 
25 For example the sample size included in the study of Botsari and Meek (2008) consists of only 42 
acquirers while Pungaliya and Vijh (2008) included up to 2,614 acquirers. 
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Second, prior research seems to neglect the significance and the relevance of SOX provisions 
to the dynamics of earnings management and M&A’s. After SOX, it has been argued that 
earnings manipulation is discouraged and that acquirers are requested to validate their merger 
motives, resulting in a lower level of information asymmetry (Madura and Ngo 2010). 
Recently, there has been a growing interest towards documenting evidence in wake of the 
claimed consequences of SOX and its effectiveness in increasing the transparency of financial 
reporting (Heron and Lie 2002; Rittenberg and Miller 2005). 
Finally, the amount of research on the controversial influence of SOX on earnings 
management has repeatedly considered random samples of firms that do not necessarily have 
the motivation to manage their earnings, while tests have been designed and based on annual 
earnings cross-sectionally. Hence, their findings are relevant to describe the overall trend in 
abnormal accruals but they might be problematic if used to make inferences about the 
influence of SOX on managerial practices (i.e. managing earnings) that may not be initially 
intended and planned by management. 
In summary, this study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it extends the 
previous research of earnings management in M&A by considering SOX while investigating 
the different patterns and timing of pre-merger earnings management. Second, it also 
contributes to the area of the consequences of SOX by comparing earnings management 
between pre and post-SOX periods, using a non-random (i.e. structured) sample of firms that 
are believed to have the incentive to manage their earnings. 
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3.3. Theoretical Framing and Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1. Why Do Firms Manage Earnings before M&A? 
Research on earnings management has suggested different motivations for managing a firm’s 
earnings from the perspective of it managers, as discussed previously in section  2.3.1 
of  Chapter 2. The decision to manage earnings could stem from particular economic, financial, 
political or social incentives. A class of these incentives is represented by the capital market 
incentives, which are explained by the informativeness role of the reported earnings and their 
value-relevance from the perspective of investors (Chambers and Penman 1984; Houmes and 
Skantz 2010). Therefore, managers may naturally think to employ an earnings management 
policy in order to influence the market’s expectations regarding the firm’s risks and cash flow 
prospects – and eventually alter the firm’s equity value (Waymire 1984; Payne and Robb 2000; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bartov and Cohen 2009). 
The advances in earnings management-related theories provide examples on how empiricists 
tend to adopt a case-specific approach, unlike theoreticians who look for generalisations 
(Ronen and Yaari 2008). So in a M&A context, deals are normally completed by paying the 
target’s shareholders 100 percent cash, 100 percent equity, or via offering a combination of 
both. In order to complete the transaction process, regardless of the structure of the payment 
method, the target should perceive that the consideration offered by the bidder is equal or 
greater in value when compared to the value of the consideration given up by the seller - 
otherwise the seller will not sell. On the other side of transaction, the offer is made by the 
acquirer reflecting how it perceives both parties; the value of obtaining and controlling interest 
in the target and the value of expected operating and financial synergies which could result 
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from combining the two firms (DePamphilis 2007). While the goal of the target’s management 
is to ensure its firm’s value is maximised, the acquirer’s management will undertake actions to 
minimise the cost of capital of its forthcoming investment decision. The underlying 
assumptions of the reasoning in the following sections include the level of capital market 
efficiency in reflecting accounting information in securities prices and the managerial 
efficiency of acting on behalf of their principals. 
The purpose of this section is to develop a relevant theoretical foundation for the proposed 
research hypotheses and provide an insight to understanding firms’ motive to manage earnings 
upward in the case of M&A in particular. 
3.3.1.1. The Value-Relevance of Accounting Earnings  
It has been often reported in the literature, as asserted previously, periodic earnings that are 
reported in accounting reports are largely used by investors for valuation purposes (see, for 
example, Holthausen and Watts 2001; Hirshleifer et al. 2004). A good example of this is the 
common use of earnings in the “multiples of comparables”26 approach in determining a firm’s 
value for merger and acquisition purposes (Copeland et al. 2000; Arzac 2004; DePamphilis 
2007; Gaughan 2007).  
The association between earnings and value formed some of the early seminal empirical 
research in accounting. Subsequent work has extensively researched this relation from 
                                                 
26 The multiples are normally calculated as a ratio of value to a normalising metric such as earnings, 
EBTDA or revenues. Therefore, valuation multiples include price-to-earnings, price-to-book, 
enterprise value to EBITDA or enterprise value to revenues. The multiples are estimated from peer 
firms, called comparables, which have characteristics comparable to the firm being valued (Arzac, 
2004, p.63).  
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different perspectives and has predominantly followed the renowned work of the likes of Ball 
and Brown (1968), and Beaver (1968) as well as Fama’s (1970; 1991) view of efficient 
markets. Empirical evidence indicates that a firm’s share value is influenced by earnings 
suggesting that accounting earnings do provide information about a firm’s ability to generate 
future cash flows (Sloan 1996; Xie 2001). Therefore, the value-relevance of earnings explains 
the managerial approach of exercising their discretion over the reported earnings (i.e. earnings 
management) whenever managers wish to influence their firm’s value (Graham et al. 2005). 
The empirical evidence obtained by Teoh et al. (1998) supports the notion that a firm adopts 
abnormally high income-increasing accounting procedures in order to have their share 
overpriced by the market. 
The proposition of value-relevance of earnings does predict managerial concern concerning 
earnings due to its known connection with value. This proposition alone, however, does not 
predict how or when management have the motivation to use this relation. 
3.3.1.2.  Stewardship Theory 
“Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual 
goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their 
principals (Davis et al. 1997, p.21).” In essence, this theory predicts that managers have the 
motive to practice earnings management to impact the value of their firms in line with the 
wealth maximisation objective of shareholders. Therefore, accounting earnings are not only 
used in equity valuation, but also in measuring managerial performance and how well the 
managers are acting in the interest of their shareholders (Dechow 1994).  
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In other words, if each of the acquirer and target’s management team believed that pre-merger 
income-increasing earnings management maximises their respective current shareholders’ 
gains from the deal, stewardship theory would predict that each management team has a 
motivation to do so prior to a M&A. 
3.3.1.3. Agency Theory 
Due to the separation of ownership and control in the firm, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
develop a theory that predicts a general agency problem to exist in the context of various 
contractual relationships in the firm. Traditional agency problems are associated with the 
conflict of interests between management and outside equity and debt holders (Eisenhardt 
1989).   
Nonetheless, agency theory has also implications in situations involving cooperative effort by 
two or more parties where information is asymmetrically distributed between stakeholders and 
a conflict of interests exist (Jensen 1986; 2005). 
In a corporate M&A context, agency problems between the shareholders of each the acquiring 
and the target firms explain the motivation of pre-merger earnings management at each side. 
3.3.2. The Target’s Side: the Timing Issue and the Lemons’ Problem 
The target’s ability to manage its earnings preceding a M&A relies on when it learns about an 
acquiring firm’s intention to take it over (Botsari and Meeks 2008). There is no standard 
timing of a target firm’s awareness about an impending M&A. Jemison and Sitkin (1986, 
p.161) note that “acquisitions are strategic, complex, [and] occur sporadically…” Each deal 
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has peculiar circumstances with respect to the way in which the target becomes aware about 
being approached by a potential acquirer. This means that the revelation of a M&A deal of a 
particular target can vary between a mere surprise up to a strategic managerial decision 
planned years before the execution of a deal (Jemison and Sitkin 1986; Walsh 1989).  
The deal’s attitude, market rumours, and the managerial intuition (or intention) of their firm 
becoming a target are three general factors that can impact the timing that the target becomes 
aware it is being pursued. In terms of a deal’s attitude, there are two main attitudes an acquirer 
can adopt in pursuing a target firm; either a friendly bidding process or through a hostile 
takeover (DePamphilis 2007).  
In a friendly deal, an acquirer makes an initial contact with the target’s management in order 
to negotiate the deal’s term. A friendly M&A may be preceded by a long negotiation process. 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986, p.148) describe the negotiation process as a courtship that is 
required to make the marriage (the M&A) successful.  
If the friendly M&A proposal was not successful and rejected by the target’s management, the 
acquirer may decide to make an offer to the target’s board of directors, which is often called a 
bear hug (Gaughan 2005). Alternatively, a common technique in a hostile takeover process is 
for the acquirer to make a tender offer, by which the acquiring firm makes offers directly to 
the shareholders of the target, bypassing its management and directors.  
This does not necessarily mean that a target is completely unaware about its candidacy until it 
is approached by a bidder, be that approach friendly or hostile. The leakage of information and 
market rumours surrounding a M&A sometime before any official announcement can 
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effectively increase the target firm’s awareness about the emerging deal. This can mean that 
the target becomes aware earlier than it should it simply wait for a direct or indirect contact by 
the potential acquirer. These phenomena are frequently documented by the literature and are 
empirically detected by reporting an abnormally high trading volume ahead of a significant 
price movement of the target’s share (Gao and Oler 2008; Chou et al. 2011). 
Another factor that can impact a target’s awareness of its M&A candidacy is its managerial 
intuition and intention (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Easterwood 1997; Meisel 2006). In 
other words, a firm’s management may adopt a strategy by which it considers a merger with 
another entity as optimal for its firm and, correspondingly, it may directly seek to boost its 
M&A candidacy and attractiveness. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) argue that firms which 
become eventual targets may choose to adopt income increasing accounting procedures years 
before they engage in M&A. 
Getting closer to the transaction itself, the managers of each party (i.e. the target and acquiring 
firms) have proprietary information on their own individual firms, i.e. the firms they are 
managing. However, information is imperfect for each party regarding the state and value of 
the other, which eventually creates a state of information asymmetry in the merger market 
between the two parties. The resultant effect of mergers under imperfect information for 
buyers and sellers creates a problem that Akerlof (1970) describes as the lemons’ problem.  
According to Akerlof’s (1970) theory, an acquirer believes that a target accepts only the offer 
that is greater than its real value, which is only and perfectly known to the target firm itself. 
Given that the acquirer’s management is imperfectly informed about the real value of the 
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sought target firm, the acquirer would consequently discount the value of target to avoid 
adverse selection assuming that the target is normally overpriced in the M&A market. 
Acquirers may not discriminate those targets which are fairly priced assuming all targets are 
lemons.  
As a reaction to the anticipated lemons’ problem, the target’s management is motivated to 
make decisions - such as managing earnings and its share price upward - when it attempts to 
counteract the intuition of the acquirer and ‘make–up’ the discount that the acquirer applied on 
the target’s value.   
Hence, the first hypothesis in this study is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Target firms manage their earnings prior to the announcement date of 
a M&A deal. 
3.3.3. The Acquirer’s Side: Payment Method, Window-Dressing and 
the Double Lemons’ Problem 
Firms’ motives to merge and acquire other firms are numerous and the basic underlying 
motives include expansion and growth, tax avoidance and/or financial motives (Dunstan 
1999; Gaughan 2007). It is sometimes difficult to establish what the real reasons for a merger 
truly were, since the stated reasons at the time may not reveal the full truth (Gaughan 2005). 
However, M&A activity is repeatedly justified by managers who argue that individual firms 
can efficiently generate greater benefits to their shareholders if they combine to create one 
larger entity, which is referred to as the creation of synergy (Koumanakos et al. 2005). 
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Therefore, making the M&A proposal seem attractive to the shareholders of both firms 
involved is another managerial concern. 
Despite the real reasons behind a M&A deal, or indeed the post-merger consequences, when 
and how to use the firm’s resources for a M&A remain among the most significant decisions 
made by top management. There are different financing options available for management to 
finance a M&A deal. The most commonly used methods are either to make a pure cash offer, 
to issue equity or to use a mixture of both equity and cash in an offer to target’s shareholder 
(Hansen 1987). 
Given that the market value of a share is influenced by earnings management, an acquirer’s 
motivation to manage earnings differs depending on the use of equity in the payment structure 
(hereafter non-cash deals), according to Hansen’s (Hansen 1987) theory of the management’s 
choice of payment method. The target’s shareholders are proposed to be concerned regarding 
the true value of the acquirer’s share, only if they are offered an ownership interest (i.e. 
offered share issues in the payment structure) in the combined firm in exchange of their old 
shares. This is mainly due to the fact that target firm shareholders would then bear some of the 
equity risk as a result of the M&A.  
Two theories are used in this study to predict pre-merger earnings management by non-cash 
acquirers, namely window-dressing and the double lemons’ problem.  
The term ‘window-dressing’, from an accounting perspective, refers to a broad range of 
techniques undertaken by a firm aimed at enhancing the financial position of the firm as 
perceived by users. This occurs through adjusting reports, financial ratios and disclosures to 
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look better (Dutta and Gigler 2002; Hillier et al. 2008). In a narrower view, window-dressing 
can also be directly associated with financial reporting practices that impact the earnings 
figure (Feltham and Xie 1994), since one of the incentives for window-dressing “relates to 
perceptions of earnings figures as [a] key cognitive reference point in the eyes of financial 
statement users (Guan et al. 2008, p.26).”  
According to this view, it could be argued that a non-cash acquirer has a motivation to 
brighten up its reports by managing earnings upward before approaching a target firm, in order 
to seem more attractive and convincing to the target’s shareholders to receive acceptance and 
successful completion of a M&A deal.  
From a different theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, the participants in the M&A market 
have imperfect information regarding each other’s firm. Each party expects the other to make 
rational decisions that maximise their own M&A gains. The acquirer’s information uncertainty 
regarding the target’s real value - the lemons’ problem (as explained in detail in section  3.3.2) 
- causes the acquirer to discount the target’s value avoiding potential adverse selection. A 
parallel scenario may occur on the target’s side if it was offered equity issue in the payment 
structure. Hansen (1987) describes this situation as a double lemons’ problem, suggesting that 
a target would suffer a similar information uncertainty regarding the acquirer’s true value.  
According to Hansen’s (1987) theory, the choice over the exchange medium in M&A 
particularly the choice for an acquirer to use equity shares in a M&A, sends a signal to the 
target that the acquiring firm is overvalued. As a result, the target may discount the acquirer’s 
share value in order to avoid potential adverse selection. 
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Given that managing earnings is not a costless option, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
commend the practice of earnings management if the anticipated cost of undoing earnings 
management exceeds the cost of doing it. Therefore, a non-cash acquirer has a motivation to 
manage earnings upwards to influence its share price before approaching a target in order to 
make up for the anticipated discount due to the double lemons’ problem. 
Given this scenario, pre-merger earnings management implies two incentives to the acquiring 
firm. The first is that the acquirer has an incentive to obtain capital at a lower cost so that the 
acquirer’s management attempt to reduce the number of shares issued to the target and retain 
stronger control. The second incentive is to try to mitigate the post-merger diluting effect on 
the acquirer shareholders’ rights of voting and profit sharing (i.e. their EPS) by minimising the 
number of shares that the acquirer is going to issue to the target’s shareholders in the merger 
exchange (Erickson and Wang 1999). 
Unlike target firms, acquirers do not only have the motivation to manage earnings, but they 
also have control over the timing element in initiating the M&A process, which enhances their 
efficiency in undertaking pre-merger earnings management (Erickson and Wang 1999; 
Koumanakos et al. 2005; Baik et al. 2007; Guo et al. 2008). 
Hence, the non-cash acquirers are expected to manage earnings prior to a M&A deal and, 
therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2a: Acquiring firms manage their earnings prior to the announcement 
date of a M&A deal if they offer equity shares in the deal. 
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Correspondingly, cash acquirers do not have the obvious motivation to manage their earnings, 
which makes it a costly process that carries no economic return. Hence, a priori according to 
the theoretical framework of this study, it should be expected that no pre-merger earnings 
management by cash acquirers should be undertaken so that the following hypothesis holds: 
Hypothesis 2b: Acquiring firms do not manage their earnings prior to the 
announcement date of a pure cash M&A deal. 
3.3.4. The Sarbanes-Oxley: Purpose and Implications   
3.3.4.1. The Purpose of SOX 
As a reaction to the renowned reporting scandals in the US in 2001 and 2002, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC) along with other institutional regulators became 
concerned about reforms that could lead to a more reliable financial reporting environment, in 
which frauds and conflicts of interests are reduced and informational transparency is increased. 
In the wake of calls for corporate legislation reform, a new public law officially entitled the 
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, but commonly known as 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 after the underwriters of the new law - Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
Representative Michael - was enacted by the US Congress. It became active on July 30, 2002 
and was aimed at restoring investors’ confidence and protecting stakeholders by enhancing the 
reliability and the accuracy of financial disclosure (SEC 2002). 
The Act touches upon a range of urgent and contemporary issues that range from identifying 
the scope of the external auditor’s practices, guidelines of general corporate governance 
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accountability in publicly held companies to relevant criminal penalties in case of 
noncompliance. SOX explicitly states the fines and imprisonment penalties for those corporate 
executives who violate the provisions outlined.         
3.3.4.2. The Relevance of SOX 
Among its eleven titles, Titles III and IV focus on corporate responsibility, emphasising the 
need for enhanced financial disclosures that may limit the practice of earnings management 
and the associated unfair presentation of corporate performance to external stakeholders. 
Section 302 of SOX focuses on corporate responsibility in financial reporting in companies 
that are required to file periodic reports under sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Section 302 requires management (represented by the CEO, the CFO 
or another person of similar responsibility) to certify in each quarterly (10Q form) or annual 
(10K form) report - which is prepared according to the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (hereafter GAAP) - filed with the SEC that: 
1- The management has reviewed the report; 
2-  The report does not contain any untrue statements of material facts or there are no 
omissions that may result in misleading financial statements; 
3- The financial statements and other related disclosures in the report fairly present the 
financial position and results of the firm’s operations for the designated period covered 
by the report; 
4- The financial reports do not contain material misrepresentations; 
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5- The management has disclosed all material deficiencies related to internal controls, all 
frauds and all material changes in internal accounting controls (SEC 2002, p.777).  
The SEC has also reconsidered its position regarding the term “fair presentation” of financial 
statements as noted in its explanation of Section 302 of SOX (SEC 2002, p.6) as follows: 
“…We have added a specific reference to cash flows even though Section 302 of 
the Act does not include such an explicit reference. We believe that it is 
consistent with Congressional intent to include both income or loss and cash 
flows within the concept of "fair presentation" of an issuer's results of 
operations.… We believe that Congress intended this statement to provide 
assurances that the financial information disclosed in a report, viewed in its 
entirety, meets a standard of overall material accuracy and completeness that is 
broader than financial reporting requirements under generally accepted 
accounting principles…”  
 
The SEC explanation above, which is based on the substance and intent of SOX, exerts 
stronger pressure on preparers and auditors of financial statements in order to reduce attempts 
to manage earnings by emphasising the fair presentation and disclosure of accounting earnings 
as well as the respective cash flow component in contrast with accruals. 
Section 401 of SOX focuses on improving the disclosures in periodic reports. It requires that 
annual and quarterly financial reports filed with the SEC must: 
1- Reflect all material correcting adjustments to enhance accuracy;  
2- Disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements and obligations.  
Moreover, Section 401 of SOX also regulates non-GAAP financial statements as it requires 
that public disclosures of pro-forma (i.e. non-GAAP) financial statements must be presented in 
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a manner that does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact while they must not 
omit a material fact necessary in order to ensure these reports are not misleading, in light of 
the circumstances under which they are presented (SEC 2002, p.785-6). 
Section 404 of SOX requires that management must state its responsibility for: 
1- Establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for 
financial reporting; 
2- Reporting their evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control structure, which 
eventually needs to be attested by the firm’s external auditor (SEC 2002, p.789). 
McEnroe (2007) suggests that this aspect of SOX is created not only to combat fraudulent 
reports which result from the violation of GAAP, but also aim to eliminate misleading 
practices including earnings management through the application of GAAP.  
Furthermore, amid the increased attention towards earnings management, SOX directed the 
SEC in Section 704 to review and analyse enforcement actions regarding violations of 
reporting requirements in order “to identify areas of reporting that are most susceptible to 
fraud, inappropriate manipulation, or inappropriate earnings management” (SEC 2002, 
p.799).  
Correspondingly, the SEC issued a “Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002” based on an earlier study which included all entities involved in the SEC’s 
enforcement actions filed in the last five years preceding SOX enactment date. The report 
revealed that most enforcement matters are related to improper revenue and expense 
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recognition, including practices of inaccurate timing of revenue recognition, improper 
capitalization or deferral of expenses, incorrect use of reserves, and other understatements of 
expenses. Besides, the report indicated a number of enforcement matters associated with 
improper M&A related accounting practices such as improper valuation (SEC 2003). 
Mark Jamrozinski, partner and co-chair of Deloitte’s private equity practice, comments on the 
fashion of the focused due diligence which has evolved in the post-SOX era writing that 
“M&A due diligence has evolved from the financial verifications and skeleton hunts of the past 
into a focused, integrated approach that proves valuable in assessing the thesis behind doing 
a transaction.” (Jamrozinski 2009, p.1)  
Although M&A activity was not frankly dealt with in SOX, recent empirical evidence 
suggests that M&A has been greatly influenced since SOX. For example, Madura and Ngo 
(2010) find substantial evidence that M&A candidates tend to rely heavily on financial and 
legal advisors since SOX, which would consequently reduce the informational asymmetry 
between acquirers and targets. Furthermore, they explain that compliance with SOX leads to 
more due diligence and better governance.  
The majority of chief audit executives also believe that SOX implementation has significantly 
improved internal controls over often-manipulated accounting areas27, according to a survey 
by  Rittenberg and Miller (2005) for the Institute of Internal Auditors. Besides, there is 
additional empirical evidence from Cohen et al.(2008), Zhou (2008) and Iliev (2010) that there 
                                                 
27 The often-manipulated accounting areas in Rittenberg and Miller’s (2005) study are defined based on 
the findings summary of the “Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” by 
SEC. 
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is a general (i.e. not event-specific) declining trend of documented abnormal accruals in 
financial statements in periods after SOX. 
The overall theoretical reasoning, based on the purpose of SOX and previous empirical 
evidence, can establish the a priori suggesting that the implementation of SOX may enhance 
the containment of earnings management in a M&A context. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by firms engaged 
in M&A in post-SOX deals is significantly lower than those in pre-SOX 
period. 
This hypothesis can be broken down into two sub-hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by target firms 
in post-SOX deals is significantly lower than those in pre-SOX period,  
and 
Hypothesis 3b: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by acquirers in 
post-SOX deals is significantly lower than those in pre-SOX period. 
3.3.5. Summary of the Testable Hypotheses 
According to the theoretical discussion above, this study attempts to assess five hypotheses by 
testing the below listed null hypotheses against them, given that (µEM) indicates the proxy of 
earnings management:   
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• H01: µEM (Targets) = 0 
• H02a: µEM (Non-cash acquirers) = 0 
• H02b: µEM (Cash acquirers) ≠ 0 
• H03a: µEM pre-SOX (Targets) = µEM post-SOX (Targets) 
• H03b: µEM pre-SOX (Non-cash acquirers) = µEM post-SOX (Non-cash acquirers) 
3.4. Research Methodology and Design  
3.4.1. Earnings Management Proxy 
Justifying earnings management motivation is theoretically reasonable around specific events. 
However, the design of the empirical measurement model for accrual-based earnings 
management has been a centre of debate in the literature (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Ronen and 
Yaari 2008).  
Among the major challenges faced by researchers in earnings management is the difficulty of 
clearly identifying and measuring the portion of accruals arising from managerial discretion. 
Hettihewa and Wright (2010) argue that previous research is basically subjective and that 
empirical models being advocated based on judgment of the managerial intent and 
discretionary power with respect to accruals and other estimates affecting earnings.  . 
In financial reporting, which is guided by GAAP, reported earnings consist of two components; 
accrual component and cash accrual. Therefore, earnings management can, arguably, be either 
accrual-based or cash flow-based, which is often referred to “real earnings management” in 
the literature (see, for example, Xu et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009).  
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Nonetheless, the accrual-based models of measuring earnings management have been 
exceedingly adopted in the literature, up to the point where the term “earnings management” 
per se, unless otherwise indicated, has become an implicit reference to the accrual-based type 
(see, for example, Schipper 1989; Teoh et al. 1998; Dechow et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2008; 
Grasso et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2010). 
Hettihewa and Wright (2010) argue that the remarkable focus of research on accrual-based 
earnings management has two main causes. First, given that the principal product of GAAP is 
accruals, earnings are more likely to be managed on accrual rather than on the cash part of 
earnings, and second, because of the difficulties in clearly measuring the effect of different 
accounting policies; thus, if earnings management is considered to be an unobservable 
component of accruals, it is more likely that users will be unable to uncover the effect of 
earnings management on earnings. 
In similar studies, in which earnings management is investigated around specific events such 
as management’s buy-outs (hereafter MBO) (Perry and Williams 1994), seasoned equity 
offerings (hereafter SEO)  (Rangan 1998), initial public offerings (hereafter IPO) (DuCharme 
et al. 2001) as well as M&As (Gong et al. 2008), a common research design in examining 
earnings management is followed by identifying events when firms have strong motivation to 
manage earnings, defining the ‘normal’ or expected pattern of accruals to set a control, and 
then reporting any abnormality of accruals to proxy for earnings management.  
Unlike annual earnings-based studies  (see, for example, Koumanakos et al. 2005; Botsari and 
Meeks 2008), this study follows Erickson and Wang (1999) and Gong et al. (2008) by using 
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interim reports. Investigating quarterly earnings can exploit the timing constraint on a firm’s 
ability to manage earnings before a M&A, since examining the patterns of pre-event quarterly 
earnings provides an indication of potential managerial attempts to manipulate earnings (Jeter 
and Shivakumar 1999; Das et al. 2009).    
Earnings management is examined for each of the acquirers and targets in each quarter for the 
last four quarters preceding the event of M&A - identified by the announcement date of the 
deal. Specifically, to identify the timing of earnings management decisions for a firm, 
abnormality in accruals is investigated in the quarterly earnings in quarters j‐1 to j‐4 from the 
announcement date of M&A, hereafter EMj‐1, EMj‐2, EMj‐3 and EMj‐4, where j  is the quarter in 
which the firm was announced as being involved in a M&A deal. 
Interim reporting, in contrast with annual reports, allows firms to plan earnings management 
more efficiently. For instance, a firm’s management may use its accrual reserves in doses over 
more than one quarter (Das et al. 2009). Hence, a cumulative approach is also employed for 
checking the robustness of the quarterly detected abnormal accruals. The cumulative abnormal 
accruals are calculated once for the most recent two quarters (i.e. taking j‐1 and j‐2), three 
quarters and four quarters before the event, hereafter as C2, C3 and C4, respectively, while 
EMj‐1 equals C1.  
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3.4.2. The Metrics of Accruals’ Normality  
The current accruals are computed using the changes in the non-cash working capital, the 
balance sheet method28 (Pungaliya and Vijh 2008) as follows: 
ܥܣܥ௜ ൌ ∆ܥܣ௜ െ ሺ∆ܥܮ௜ െ ∆ܵܶܦ௜ሻ െ ∆ܥܣܵܪ௜      ( 3.1) 
Where: 
CAC: denotes the current accruals,  
ΔCA: is the quarterly change in current assets (Compustat XPF mnemonic29 code ACTQ),  
ΔCL: is the quarterly change in current liabilities (mnemonic code LCTQ),  
ΔCASH: is the quarterly change in cash (mnemonic code CHEQ),  
ΔSTD: is the quarterly change in current maturities of long term debt and other short term 
liabilities included in current liabilities (mnemonic code DLCQ), and 
                                                 
28 As a check for the method used in calculating the current accruals, the abnormal accruals are also 
calculated using the cash flow method for comparison, by which current accruals are calculated as 
CACCi,jൌ  IBCQi,j‐OANCFQi,j൅DPCQi,j, where IBCQi,j is income before extraordinary items appeared in 
the statement of cash flow of firm i at quarter j and this is calculated using the Compustat year-to-date 
item of a mnemonic code IBCY,  OANCFQi,j is net cash flow from operating activities of firms i on 
quarter j but calculated using the year-to-date item of a mnemonic code OANCFY and DPCQi,j  is the 
depreciation and amortisation reported in the statement of cash flow of firm i on quarter j but 
calculated using the year-to-date item of a mnemonic code DPCY. The correlation coefficients are 
examined when relating abnormal accruals calculated using balance sheet method and cash flow 
method. Pearson’s coefficients range from 0.237 to 0.555 while Spearman’s coefficients range from 
0.453 to 0.628 for both acquirers and targets. The coefficients found positive and very significant 
(P<0.00001) indicating additional robustness of the findings.  
29 In late 2007 Compustat switched to Xpressfeed delivery mechanism (XPF) using mnemonic coding 
to data items. 
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i: denotes the firm index which could be either an acquirer or a target. 
A cross-sectional industry-performance-matched accruals model is used in this study,  similar 
to the research design of Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008). As explained in  Chapter 2 
section  2.4.5, the core of this model emanates from the work of Dechow and Sloan’s (1995) 
modified Jones’ (1991) model after considering Kothari et al.’s (2005) non-linear control for 
performance.30 
The industry-performance matching procedure is achieved in this model by building matching 
portfolios using the universe of firms in each quarter. More specifically, data of all firms 
available on Compustat is clustered by calendar years and quarters. In each quarter, all firms 
are categorised into industry sectors based on their 2-digit SIC. In each industry, all firms are 
ranked according to their performance - defined as ROA of same quarter last year - to form 
five quintiles. 
Before ranking firms portfolios into quintiles, three procedures are followed for stronger 
robustness and to reduce measurement error at this stage (Gong et al. 2008); discarding the 
universe outliers represented by observations that have the highest and the lowest 0.1 percent 
ROA, dismissing each observation with the absolute value of current accruals divided by 
lagged total assets greater than one (หܥܣܥ௝/ܶܣ௝ିସห  ൐ 1) to reduce the likelihood of including 
                                                 
30  This study follows Kothari et al. (2005) recommendation of employing portfolio performance 
matching instead of adding a performance measure as a regressor to the accrual regression model for 
more reliable results. 
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observations with extreme values due to improper data entry in the database, and finally 
excluding portfolios with less than 20 observations. 
The matching procedure leads to the creation of five performance-matched portfolios per 
industry per quarter for each year of data. Each portfolio of peer firms is used as a firm’s 
control in order to estimate the parameters that are used in calculating the expected current 
accruals for each firm in the same portfolio. 
Therefore, the following cross-sectional model is estimated for each portfolio constructed by 
the aforementioned procedure: 
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Where: 
Qq: is a dummy variable to control for seasonality, takes 1 if the deal is announced in quarter q 
prior to merger announcement and 0 if the otherwise,  
ΔREV: is the quarterly change in sales (code REVTQ),  
ΔAR: is the quarterly change in accounts receivables (RECTQ),  
PPE: is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment in a quarter (PPENTQ),  
TAj‐4: denotes the total assets in the same quarter last year (ATQ), and 
ε: denotes the residual term of the regression model. 
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To reduce potential heteroskedasticity in residuals, all variables are scaled by the total assets 
in the same quarter last year as a deflating procedure, following the recommendation of 
Kothari et al. (2005).  
3.4.3. The Test Procedure  
In a particular quarter, the magnitude of a firm’s abnormal accruals is determined as the 
difference between the firm’s actual current accruals, as calculated by equation ( 3.1), and the 
estimated current accruals, as estimated by the respective set of portfolio-matched parameters 
of the model in equation ( 3.2).  
A zero difference indicates that a firm’s current accruals in that particular quarter is as 
expected (i.e. normal) and no earnings management is detected. However, a positive 
difference indicates that the firm’s actual accruals are greater than expected (i.e. abnormal) 
and that upward earnings management is detected, while a negative difference indicates the 
opposite. 
Some studies in the literature, especially those which focus on the quality or the smoothness of 
accruals rather than the direction of accruals manipulation, define earnings management as the 
unsigned value of abnormal accruals (see, for example, Zhou 2008). In fact, obtaining the 
unsigned magnitude of earnings management may be useful for studies in which the sign of 
earnings management is meaningless, or for those that do not predict a specific direction of the 
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abnormal accruals, most likely due to the lack of managerial motivation31. Nonetheless, this is 
not the case of this study since the sign of abnormal accruals is as important as the magnitude 
when interpreting the results and, hence, the sign of abnormal accruals is not neutralised. 
The sample employed in this study is taken from a period during which a major change in the 
active laws has occurred, leaving a debate about the consequences. Therefore, the hypotheses 
of this study are constructed and tested using two-tailed test instead of one-tailed test. This 
procedure does not only reduce the risk of making Type I error, but also opens a chance of 
detecting unanticipated significant differences in both directions, i.e. the positive and the 
negative tails (Black 1999). The null hypotheses are assessed using a parametric (t-test) as 
well as a non-parametric (Wilcoxon-Z) test for checking robustness. 
3.4.4. Sampling and Data 
3.4.4.1. Sample Construction 
The research design of this study aims at employing a structured sample of firms that are 
believed to have the incentive to manage their earnings. To achieve this objective, a number of 
selection criteria are adopted for selecting the M&A deals that are included in the sample. The 
                                                 
31 For example, DeAngelo (1986) did not take the absolute value of abnormal accrual in her study 
“Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public 
Stockholders” in the Accounting Review (61), because she was hypothesised a downward earnings 
management before management buyouts. Similarly, Teoh et al. (1998) expected an upward earnings 
management before seasoned equity offerings in their study “Earnings management and the 
underperformance of seasoned equity offerings” in the Journal of Financial Economics (50) and, 
accordingly, they did not consider the absolute abnormal accruals.   
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sample includes completed M&A deals that were announced in the ten year period (from 
01/01/1999 to 31/12/2008)32 and obtained according to the following criteria: 
1. M&A deals are completed between US acquirers and domestic targets. Excluding multi-
national M&A deals is necessary to avoid the differences in the institutional settings and 
reporting standards (Erel et al. 2011);  
2. Acquirers and targets must be publicly listed companies for two reasons: to guarantee that 
both acquirers and targets were subject to SOX provisions in post-SOX period and to mitigate 
the differences in the level of information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target;33 
3. Deals in which any acquirers or targets in the financial sector (SIC code between 6000-6999) 
are excluded. This is a common practice in the literature since the financial sector is subject to 
special regulations (see, for example, Erickson and Wang 1999; Gong et al. 2008); 
4. The deal value should be greater than or equal to $1 million to exclude all deals of 
negligible sizes, in which the economic incentive to manage earnings is less likely (Erickson 
and Wang 1999); 
                                                 
32 The sampling period cut-off point (31/12/2008) is determined once data collection for this study 
started in the beginning of 2009. The ten years period is chosen an ad hoc sampling period to include 
observations before and after SOX.   
33 Baik et al. (2007) recommends that the estimation risk in the valuation of a private target is higher 
than that of a public target. Thus, this may motivate the acquirer to apply much more aggressive 
accounting in manipulating earnings prior to acquiring a private target, in an attempt to avoid 
overpayment. 
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5. A controlling ownership interest must be acquired in the deal (i.e. the acquirer owned less 
than 50 percent before the transaction and greater than 50 percent by completing the deal).  
The final sample consists of 704 M&A deals making 1,408 firm observations of acquirers and 
targets that comply with the sampling procedure and have available data (see Section  3.4.4.2). 
A detailed track on the sampling procedure is illustrated in Table  3.1.  
3.4.4.2. Data Sources  
Two main sources are used to obtain data for this study; Thomson ONE Banker and Compustat. 
Thomson ONE Banker34 is a financial product offered by Thomson Reuters and its data is 
derived from sources including SDC Platinum, Edgar filings, I/B/E/S and Worldscope. 
Thomson ONE Banker is used for sampling and to obtain deal related data. However, earnings 
management and other quarterly accounting data are available on Compustat North America 
Fundamental Quarterly dataset by Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS).35  
Since data items for acquirers and targets are obtained from two different sources, a common 
identifier is needed to merge the datasets together. CUSIP Master File on WRDS is used to 
convert the 6-character CUSIP available for firms on Thomson ONE Banker into 8-character 
CUSIP in order to match with the firms’ codes on Compustat. 
                                                 
34 http://banker.thomsonib.com  
35 https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/  
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Table  3.1 Sample selection criteria 
The following table presents the sampling criteria. Thomson ONE Banker database is used for selecting 
the M&A deals before excluding those ones, whose the acquirer and the target’s common identifiers 
were not found on CUSIP Master File to match them on Compustat.  
Criteria   Operator Description Count
 Acquirer / Target nations  Include US 205,661
 Date announced  Between 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2008  91,249
 Deal status   Include Completed 70,018
 Acquirer / Target listing status Include Public 4,273
 Acquirer / Target SIC   Exclude Financial sector ሺSIC 60‐69ሻ  2,508
 Deal value   Between $1 million to HI 2,296
%  shares  owned  prior 
t
Between 0 to 50% 2,230
 % shares owned after transaction Between 50% to 100% 1,421
Firm’s identifier mismatch  Exclude 8‐CUSIP 704
The final sample, consisting of 704 deals, makes 1,408 firm observations (i.e. acquirers and 
targets) and a total of 5,632 firm-quarter observations.   
To meet the data requirement of the methodology in this study, as illustrated in section  3.4.1, 
quarterly accounting data items are downloaded for the universe of firms available on 
Compustat for the years 1997 to 2008, which result in 212,447 firm-quarter observations 
clustered in 3,445 industry-performance matched portfolios for all calendar quarters for the 
period.     
3.5.  Results 
The obtained results in this study are discussed and organised in three subsections. After 
reporting the descriptive statistics related to each of the acquiring firms, target firms and the 
completed deals are shown in  3.5.1, the output of assessing the acquirers-related hypotheses is 
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discussed in  3.5.2 while the findings concerning the target related hypotheses are discussed 
in  3.5.3. 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table  3.2 demonstrates the characteristics of the sample comprising of 704 deals. The total 
sample is roughly evenly distributed into 378 pre-SOX deals and 326 post-SOX deals, 53.7 
percent and 46.3 percent respectively. A control group is formed of the pre-SOX deals and 
matched to a subsample of post-SOX deals for testing the third hypothesis, which compares 
earnings management in both eras. 
In Panel A of Table  3.2, the sample distribution by year shows that many merger deals in the 
US clustered in 2000 with 180 deals being completed in the sample, whereas 2008 provides 
the lowest number of deals in the sample with only 33 M&A deals meeting the 
aforementioned selection criteria. Panel B of Table  3.2 reveals that of the overall sample, 268 
deals (38.1 percent) were financed purely by cash, while the remaining 436 deals (61.9 percent) 
were financed fully or partially by equity issues. 
The distribution of deals per industry of acquirer and target as shown in Panel D of Table  3.2 
depicts the distribution of the sample across a total range of 40 sectors. This was achieved 
through matching the 33 acquiring firms’ sectors with 38 target firms’ sectors. Sectors that are 
highly represented in the sample are chemicals (SIC 28), electronics (SIC 36), instruments 
(SIC 38) and business services (SIC 73). Collectively, these sectors account for the deals of 
405 acquirers (57.6 percent) and 403 targets (55.2 percent). 
Chapter 3: Event-Specific Earnings Management: Evidence from US M&A Pre- and Post-SOX 
96 
 
Table  3.2 Sample distribution 
The following table presents the distribution of the overall sample of M&A deals by year in which the 
deal was announced in Panel A, the distribution of the sample by pre and post-SOX and by method of 
payment in Panel B, the distribution of the sample by the relatedness of the target’s and the acquirer’s 
industry (i.e. matched 2-digit SIC codes) in Panel C, and how the sample is distributed on industry 
sectors of the acquirers and the targets of the deals. 
Panel A: Deals distribution by year Panel B: Deals distribution by payment method
  Freq.  % Total Pre‐SOX   Post‐SOX
1999  83  11.79 Freq.  % Freq.     %  Freq.     %
2000  130  18.47 Pure cash 268 38.1 123  32.5 145 44.5
2001  102  14.49 Non‐cash  436 61.9 255  67.5 181 55.5
2002  63  8.95  
2003  62  8.81 Total 704 100.0 378  100.0 326 100.0
2004  59  8.38 Panel C: Deals distribution by target relatedness to acquirer 
2005  64  9.09 Total Pre‐SOX  Post‐SOX
2006  53  7.53 Freq. % Freq.  %  Freq. %
2007  55  7.81 Related 457 64.9 240 63.5 217 66.6
2008  33  4.69 Unrelated 247 35.1 138 36.5 109 33.4
Total  704  100.00 Total 704 100.0 378 100.0 326 100.0
       
Panel D: Sample distribution by acquirer and target industry
  Acquirers  Targets
SIC  Industry  Freq. %  Freq. %
10  Metal mining  5 0.71 5 0.71
13  Oil & gas extraction  43 6.11 40 5.68
15  General building contractors 0 0.00 1 0.14
17  Special trade contractors 0 0.00 2 0.28
20  Food & kindred products 17 2.41 18 2.56
21  Tobacco products  1 0.14 1 0.14
23  Apparel & other textile products 0 0.00 2 0.28
25  Furniture & fixtures 1 0.14 0 0.00
26  Paper & allied products 1 0.14 3 0.43
27  Printing & publishing 3 0.43 2 0.28
28  Chemicals & allied products 81 11.51 67 9.52
29  Petroleum & coal products 0 0.00 2 0.28
30  Rubber & misc. Plastics products 1 0.14 2 0.28
32  Stone, clay & glass products 1 0.14 1 0.14
33  Primary metal industries 10 1.42 7 0.99
34  Fabricated metal products 7 0.99 6 0.85
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Cont’d Table 3.2 
35  Industrial machinery & equipment 60 8.52 55 7.81
36  Electronic & other electric equipment 87 12.36 86 12.22
37  Transportation equipment 11 1.56 9 1.28
38  Instruments & related products 74 10.51 70 9.94
39  Misc. manufacturing industries 1 0.14 3 0.43
42  Trucking and warehousing 3 0.43 3 0.43
47  Transportation services 0 0.00 2 0.28
48  Communications  47 6.68 38 5.40
49  Electric, gas & sanitary services 24 3.41 22 3.13
50  Wholesale trade‐durable goods 8 1.14 9 1.28
51  Wholesale trade‐nondurable goods 4 0.57 2 0.28
54  Food stores  1 0.14 1 0.14
58  Eating & drinking places 1 0.14 1 0.14
59  Miscellaneous retail 13 1.85 16 2.13
70  Hotels & other lodging places 2 0.28 3 0.43
73  Business services  163 23.15 180 25.57
76  Miscellaneous repair services 0 0.00 1 0.14
78  Motion pictures  3 0.43 3 0.43
79  Amusement & recreation services 4 0.57 4 0.57
80  Health services  10 1.42 13 1.85
82  Educational services 0 0.00 1 0.14
87  Engineering & management services 16 2.27 22 3.13
92  Justice, public order & safety 0 0.00 1 0.14
97  National security & international affairs 1 0.14 0 0.00
Total     704 100.00 704 100.00
Moreover, there are 457 deals (64.9 percent) which completed between acquiring and target 
firms which share the same sector (i.e. the 2-digit SIC matches for both acquirer and its target) 
as summarised in Panel C of Table  3.2. It is worth mentioning that 75 percent of acquirers in 
the sample have had ownership interest in their targets prior to disclosing the M&A deal 
announcement 36.  
                                                 
36 In these cases, the ownership interest has not exceeded 50 percent prior to the M&A deal. 
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Table  3.3 presents a comparison between the two parties of each M&A deal while also 
providing descriptive statistics on the deal itself. Furthermore, it also compares the firms and 
their deals’ characteristics pre- and post-SOX.  
Examination of the acquirers as presented in Panel A of Table  3.3, shows that the sample 
mean (standard deviation) book value of the total assets of the acquiring firms of those deals 
announced prior to SOX is $7.86 billion ($2.3 billion) compared to $8.84 billion ($2.1 billion) 
post-SOX with an average (standard deviation) of $8.31 ($2.18 billion) for the overall sample. 
The pre-SOX subsample profitability (ROA) is lower in mean (-7.8 percent) but higher in 
standard deviation (97.3 percent) compared to the post-SOX subsample (0.15 percent mean 
with 22.18 percent of standard deviation).  
However, comparing the ROA median value in pre- (3.9 percent) with post-SOX (4.9 percent) 
does not indicate a high variation as the median is less sensitive to extreme values of acquirers’ 
ROA. The aggregate sample of acquirers seems more homogeneous in terms of leverage as the 
mean (standard deviation) debt ratio in pre- and post-SOX is 43.32 percent (22.5 percent) and 
45.36 percent (25.1 percent) respectively with roughly a similar median of 43.5 percent in 
both subsamples.   
Panel B of Table  3.3 provides a closer look at the descriptive statistics of non-cash acquirers. 
The mean (standard deviation) size for these firms shows they have a value of $8.88 billion 
($3.7 billion) for the pre-SOX subsample. This is higher and shows a greater dispersion when 
compared to post-SOX subsample’s mean (standard deviation) of $5.34 billion ($1.80 billion). 
The ROA of the non-cash acquirers is again highly dispersed for the total sample (2.7 percent 
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mean with 91.3 percent standard deviation) as well as for both subsamples pre (-15.65 percent 
mean with 122 percent standard deviation) and post-SOX (-5.2 percent mean with 27.3 
percent standard deviation) due to both a variation and the existence of extreme values in 
profitability.  
Therefore, the median value of ROA seems more meaningful for comparing since it has the 
values of 2.7 percent, 2.1 percent and 3.1 percent for the total sample, pre-SOX and post-SOX 
subsamples, respectively.  
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Table  3.3 Sample descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the study sample. The descriptive statistics are organised in four panels. The earnings management proxies EM j-
1, EM j-2, C2, EM j-3, C3, EM j-4 and C4 are in percent. Size is the book value of total assets in millions of US dollars. Profitability is the return on assets. 
Leverage denotes the debt ratio. Deal value in million US dollars. Premium is the percent excess of the offered price over the target’s share market value four 
weeks preceding the deal’s announcement date. Relative sales size is the acquirer’s sales to the target’s sales in the last 12 months before the acquisition. Offer 
to target EPS is the percentage of price offered to target shareholders per share divided by target’s EPS.  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the overall acquirers 
  Total ሺNൌ704ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ378ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ326ሻ
  Mean  Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median STD  
EMj‐1   0.3224  0.0578 5.0702 0.3021 0.2482 5.0265 0.3483 ‐0.1788 5.1353
EMj‐2  0.3952  0.0526 4.6661 0.2840 0.3263 5.3167 0.5114 ‐0.0464 3.8777
C2  0.6480  0.1115 6.7614 0.4894 0.1272 7.2631 0.8112 0.1115 6.2140
EMj‐3  0.1772  0.0563 5.1275 ‐0.1832 0.0273 5.6658 0.4869 0.0564 4.6038
C3  0.8589  0.1133 8.2218 0.2437 0.0620 9.1300 1.4107 0.1948 7.2880
EMj‐4  ‐0.2247  ‐0.0240 6.0134 ‐0.3541 0.3920 6.5623 ‐0.1283 ‐0.3390 5.5805
C4  0.8270  ‐0.1459 10.7007 0.1154 ‐0.0804 11.4741 1.4038 ‐0.2255 10.0190
Size  8313.1  1342.8 21824.7 7857.6 1287.9 22956.1 8834.8 1466.6 20476.1
Profitability   ‐0.0409  0.0459 0.7272 ‐0.0780 0.0387 0.9726 0.0015 0.0488 0.2218
Leverage   0.4428  0.4360 0.2377 0.4332 0.4350 0.2249 0.4536 0.4370 0.2514
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of non‐cash acquirers
  Total ሺNൌ436ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ255ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ181ሻ
  Mean  Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median STD  
EMj‐1   0.4191  0.0625 5.3525 0.3010  0.2548 5.2507 0.5880  ‐0.1694 5.7415
EMj‐2  0.5163  0.2465 5.1132 0.3668  0.7031 6.1100 0.6982  ‐0.0951 4.0162
C2  0.8168  0.4037 7.1384 0.4953  0.7654 7.7450 1.1966  0.4037 6.7150
EMj‐3  0.2448  0.1067 5.7796 ‐0.2863  0.0008 6.5649 0.7725  0.1600 5.0623
C3  1.0886  0.6739 9.0072 0.2146  0.6740 10.1737 1.9447  0.8200 7.9779
EMj‐4  ‐0.4911  0.0061 6.6060 ‐0.6723  0.4054 7.8413 ‐0.3430  ‐0.0406 5.5671
C4  0.7421  ‐0.1154 11.5098 ‐0.2436  0.4859 12.9965 1.5960  ‐0.0832 10.2098
Size  6629.1  897.2  22055.3 8876.3 903.6 37035.0 5335.7 719.6 17959.5
Profitability   ‐0.1053  0.0269 0.9132 ‐0.1565 0.0210 1.2177 ‐0.0524 0.0309 0.2728
Leverage   0.4404  0.4060 0.2646 0.4005 0.3765 0.2302 0.4755 0.4240 0.3050
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Cont’d Table 3.3 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of targets 
  Total ሺNൌ704ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ378ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ326ሻ
  Mean  Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
EMj‐1   0.0049  ‐0.0002 5.8626 ‐0.7323 ‐0.5171 5.9775 0.8222 0.7033 5.6383
EMj‐2  ‐0.2253  ‐0.0944 6.8639 ‐0.5066 ‐0.1043 7.1949 0.0660 ‐0.0767 6.5120
C2  ‐0.1105  ‐0.1947 6.9509 ‐1.1079 ‐0.5790 7.2552 0.9174 0.5408 6.4856
EMj‐3  0.0504  0.1711 6.0495 ‐0.1813 0.1184 4.5984 0.2659 0.3038 7.1470
C3  ‐0.0793  ‐0.2541 8.2141 ‐1.2845 ‐1.3263 7.9559 1.0804 0.8324 8.3159
EMj‐4  0.8193  0.3830 6.2526 1.2252 0.4519 7.9586 0.4853 0.3678 4.3758
C4  0.9010  0.8689 10.297 0.2241 0.2058 11.8308 1.4709 1.6972 8.7999
Size   938.6  115.6  3424.7 858.5 101.4 2931.2 1033.6 136.4 3934.0
Profitability  ‐0.4371  0.0015 4.8994 ‐0.5860 ‐0.0227 6.4075 ‐0.2597 0.0155 1.9242
Leverage   1.8258  0.4270 33.640 2.8850 0.4220 45.5764 0.5589 0.4270 0.8424
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of deals 
  Total ሺNൌ704ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ378ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ326ሻ
  Mean  Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
Deal value  1566.9  234.6 5531.3 1407.4 212.4 5060.3 1752.0 270.1 6034.1
Premium  49.47  34.46 101.03 56.12 42.26 129.47 41.65 30.17 49.01
Relative sales size  97.60  5.870 428.19 90.94 6.370 296.39 105.47 5.170 544.74
Offer to target EPS  91.75  29.01 346.49 71.69 26.29 161.93 110.06 30.14 453.47
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From Panel C in Table  3.3, the targets’ mean size for the total sample is $0.94 billion with a 
standard deviation of $3.43 billion. The post-SOX subsample of targets has a slightly larger 
mean size of $1.03 billion compared to the pre-SOX subsample’s of $0.86 billion. Targets’ 
profitability is, unsurprisingly, highly dispersed. For example, the total sample has a mean 
ROA of -43.7 percent with a 489.9 percent standard deviation. Thus, the median provides a 
better central tendency measure, which shows 0.15 percent, -2.2 percent and 1.6 percent for 
the total sample of targets, pre-SOX and post-SOX subsamples respectively. The median debt 
ratio is roughly consistent (around 42.7 percent) for the aforementioned three groupings. 
When conducting a general comparison of the acquirers with the targets, it can be noticed that 
acquirers on average are much bigger in size, higher in profitability and slightly more 
leveraged than their targets. Therefore, it is not unusual that the mean (median) value of 
acquirer sales to target sales is 97.6 times (5.9 times) bigger, as shown in Panel D Table  3.3. 
The descriptive statistics of deals in the same panel also reveals that the mean (median) deal 
value is $1.57 billion ($234.6 million) with the mean (median) acquisition premium of 49.5 
percent (34.5 percent) and the mean (median) offer per share to target EPS being 91.75 times 
(29 times). 
3.5.2. Earnings Management on the Acquirer’s Side 
3.5.2.1. Analysing the aggregate sample 
Some studies in the literature, such as Koumanakos et al. (2005), examine earnings 
management in samples of acquirers without applying any treatment regarding the method of 
payment in their designs. However, the theoretical framework in this study considers the 
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method of payment during the formation of the hypotheses related to acquirers as shown 
earlier in section  3.3.  
Although the acquirer-related hypotheses are split based on whether shares are used in the 
deal’s payment structure, this study also provides a comparison of earnings management 
results in total by taking all 704 acquirers without stratifying them by the method of payment 
(the “aggregate” sample hereafter) and another following stratification (the “segregate” 
samples hereafter), where there are 436 non-cash acquirers and 268 pure cash acquirers, each 
in their own sample for further analysis. 
The abnormal accruals in the overall sample of acquirers show an increasing trend over the 
four quarters prior to the M&A announcement, hitting a peak in the second pre-merger quarter 
(j‐2) as illustrated in Figure  3.1. The results for the aggregate sample of acquirers in Panel A 
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Figure  3.1 Acquirers’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
The following figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly
earnings of the overall sample of acquirers (N=704) as well as the pre and post-SOX
subsamples (N=378 and 326, respectively) over the last four fiscal quarters prior to the M&A
announcement. j denotes the fiscal quarter in which the M&A deal is announced.   
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of Table  3.3 shows that EMj‐2 has the highest mean (0.3952) and the lowest standard deviation 
(4.666), while EMj‐4 has the lowest mean of abnormal accruals (-0.2247) with the highest 
standard deviation (6.013).  
When the acquirers’ sample is separated into pre- and post-SOX subsamples, the mean 
abnormal accruals in all four quarters prior to the M&A seems to be much higher in the post-
SOX period when compared to the pre-SOX period in Figure  3.1.  
Furthermore, Figure  3.1 also indicates that acquirers used to aggressively inflate their 
abnormal accruals in quarter j‐2 in the pre-SOX era, while in the post-SOX time acquirers 
seem to consider earnings management earlier than before, up to three quarters prior to 
announcing the M&A itself. Although acquirers’ mean abnormal accruals could exert negative 
Figure  3.2 Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
The following figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal accruals percentage in the last four
fiscal quarters prior to the M&A announcement for the overall sample of acquirers (N=704) as
well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples (N=378 and 326, respectively). C1 denotes abnormal
accruals in quarter j-1, C2 denotes the cumulative abnormal accruals in the quarters j-1 and j-2,
C3 denotes the cumulative abnormal accruals in the quarters j-1 to j-3 and C4 denotes the
cumulative abnormal accruals in quarters j-1 to j-4. j denotes the fiscal quarter in which the
M&A deal is announced. 
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values especially in the earlier quarters prior to a M&A, the acquirers’ mean cumulative 
abnormal accruals up to four quarters have always had positive values in the sample as 
depicted in Figure  3.2. However, the mean cumulative abnormal accruals over the past four 
quarters prior to a M&A (C4) in the post-SOX era has a much higher value when compared to 
pre-SOX times which are (1.4038) and (0.1154) respectively.  
This result is no exception since the magnitude of earnings management reported for most 
proxies in this study is greater in the post-SOX era.  
Table  3.4 One-sample test of the acquirers’ earnings management 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for the overall acquirers 
over the last four fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. The table demonstrates the 
results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The one-sample tests were applied for mean and 
median values, respectively, for assessing H0:µEM =0. The results are shown for the overall sample of 
acquirers and for each subsample by pre and post-SOX. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote 
confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test.  
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Total ሺNൌ704ሻ Pre SOX ሺNൌ378ሻ Post SOX ሺNൌ326ሻ
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ 
Median
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Mean
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ 
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
EMj‐1  0.3224  0.0578 0.3021 0.2482* 0.3483  ‐0.1788
  ሺ1.53ሻ  ሺ0.97ሻ ሺ1.08ሻ ሺ‐1.66ሻ  ሺ1.08ሻ  ሺ‐0.50ሻ
EMj‐2  0.3952**  0.0526 * 0.2840 0.3263 0.5114** ‐0.0464
  ሺ1.96ሻ   ሺ1.77ሻ ሺ0.89ሻ ሺ‐1.31ሻ ሺ2.14ሻ  ሺ‐1.06ሻ
C2  0.6480**  0.1115 0.4894 0.1272 0.8112** 0.1115
  ሺ2.11ሻ   ሺ1.04ሻ ሺ1.06ሻ ሺ‐0.72ሻ ሺ2.02ሻ  ሺ‐0.65ሻ
EMj‐3  0.1772  0.0563 ‐0.1832 0.0273 0.4869*  0.0564
  ሺ0.76ሻ  ሺ0.78ሻ ሺ‐0.49ሻ ሺ‐0.11ሻ ሺ1.72ሻ  ሺ‐1.17ሻ
C3  0.8589**  0.1133* 0.2437 0.0620 1.4107*** 0.1948*
  ሺ2.20ሻ   ሺ1.91ሻ ሺ0.39ሻ ሺ‐1.00ሻ ሺ2.95ሻ  ሺ‐1.67ሻ 
EMj‐4  ‐0.2247  ‐0.0240 ‐0.3541 0.3920 ‐0.1283  ‐0.3390
  ሺ‐0.79ሻ  ሺ‐0.18ሻ ሺ‐0.75ሻ ሺ‐1.00ሻ ሺ‐0.37ሻ  ሺ‐0.85ሻ
C4  0.8270  ‐0.1459 0.1154 ‐0.0804 1.4038** ‐0.2255
  ሺ1.57ሻ  ሺ‐1.51ሻ ሺ0.14ሻ ሺ‐1.19ሻ ሺ2.11ሻ  ሺ‐0.95ሻ
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Table  3.4 reports the t-values and Wilcoxon Z-values of all earnings management proxies for 
the overall sample of acquirers. The t-values of the mean abnormal accruals in the second 
quarter (j‐2) for the total sample (0.395), as well as for the post-SOX sample (0.511), indicate 
significant earnings management at a 5 percent confidence interval whereas there is no 
significant evidence of abnormal accruals found in the pre-SOX subsample. EMj‐3 is not 
significant at the total sample level. 
Table  3.5 Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the acquirers 
by SOX 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for overall 
acquirers over the last four fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. The 
table demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The two-
sample tests were applied for mean and median values, respectively, for assessing H0: µEM 
(pre-SOX)= µEM (post-SOX). The results are shown for the overall sample of acquirers and for 
each subsample by pre and post-SOX. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence 
interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Pre‐SOX
ሺNൌ378ሻ
Mean ሺMedianሻ
Post‐SOX
ሺNൌ326ሻ
Mean ሺMedianሻ
Difference 
ሺPost – Preሻ 
Mean ሺMedianሻ 
t‐value  Wilcoxon‐Z
EMj‐1  0.3021ሺ0.3022ሻ 0.3483ሺ‐0.1788ሻ 0.0462ሺ‐0.481ሻ  0.10 1.48
EMj‐2  0.2840ሺ0.3263ሻ 0.5114ሺ‐0.0464ሻ 0.2274ሺ‐0.3727ሻ  0.56 0.21
C2  0.4894ሺ0.1273ሻ 0.8112 ሺ0.1115ሻ 0.3218ሺ‐0.0158ሻ  0.52 0.19
EMj‐3  0.1830ሺ0.0273ሻ 0.4869 ሺ0.0564ሻ 0.3039ሺ0.0291ሻ  1.44 0.84
C3  0.2437ሺ0.0620ሻ 1.4107 ሺ0.1948ሻ 1.1670ሺ0.1328ሻ  1.47 0.46
EMj‐4  ‐0.354 ሺ0.3920ሻ ‐0.128 ሺ‐0.3390ሻ 0.2260ሺ‐0.7310ሻ  0.39 ‐1.33
C4  0.1154ሺ‐0.0804ሻ 1.4038ሺ‐0.2255ሻ 1.2884ሺ‐0.1451ሻ  1.21 ‐0.03
It only shows a significant mean of 0.4869 at the 10 percent confidence interval for the post-
SOX sample. This gives support to the earlier discussion that managers’ attitude toward 
earnings management has shifted in the post-SOX era as they do not wait until j-2 to start 
working out their reported earnings but rather they start inflating the accruals one quarter 
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earlier (i.e. since j-3). Moreover, the mean cumulative abnormal accruals C2 are significant at 
the 5 percent confidence interval for both the total sample and the post-SOX sample. 
The analysis for C3 indicates further evidence in support of early earnings management during 
the current post-SOX period. Even though the total sample mean (0.8589) of C3 is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent confidence interval, there is no evidence found in support of this 
proxy for the pre-SOX sample, while the post-SOX sample mean of C3 (1.4107) is very 
significant with a significantly positive median (0.1948) at the 10 percent level in the 
Wilcoxon-Z test. Interestingly, even the cumulative abnormal accruals proxy C4 has a 
significant positive mean value (1.4038) in the post-SOX subsample. 
Table  3.5 shows that the two-sample mean differentials (i.e. post-SOX minus pre-SOX values) 
are positive since all earnings management proxies show a higher abnormal accruals mean for 
the post-SOX subsample. Despite the fact that the output of two-tailed tests does not reveal 
sufficient statistical significance to conclude that these mean values are significantly different 
from zero, there is little evidence at the 10 percent confidence interval that can be found on the 
positive tail (i.e. right tail) to suggest that EMj‐3 and C3 are higher in the post-SOX time even 
if a one-tailed t-test was performed. 
3.5.2.2. Analysing the segregated samples by the method of payment 
As noted by Erickson and Wang (1999), the acquirers’ motives regarding earning management 
vary considerably with the method of payment used. Cash acquirers lack the economic 
incentive to manipulate pre-merger earnings unlike those acquirers which finance the M&A 
deal using their own equity shares. Consistent with this argument, the acquirers’ sample has 
Chapter 3: Event-Specific Earnings Management: Evidence from US M&A Pre- and Post-SOX 
108 
 
been broken down based on the payment method offered to the target firm. Figure  3.3 
illustrates the acquirers’ mean abnormal accruals behaviour pre- and post-SOX after 
separating the acquirers sample into pure cash versus non-cash acquirers. 
By comparing Figure  3.3 with the previous graph of the overall sample in Figure  3.1, it can be 
seen that the same trend of earnings management patterns as described earlier for the overall 
sample holds only for firms which use equity in their payment method (i.e. non-cash 
acquirers), as shown in graph B of Figure  3.3. Non-cash acquirers in the post-SOX sample 
seem to begin managing their earnings early, starting in quarter j‐3 reaching the maximum 
mean of 0.7725, while pre-SOX non-cash acquirers maximise their abnormal accruals in 
quarter j‐2 with a maximum mean of only 0.3668. Conversely, this does not ring true for pure 
cash acquirers as their pre-merger abnormal accruals curve in graph A of Figure  3.3.  
The graphical depiction does not show any noticeable sharp move which infers that cash 
acquirers seem not to worry that much about managing their earnings in any period prior to 
announcing a M&A deal. Furthermore, the levels of cumulative abnormal accruals are also 
higher for non-cash acquirers in general, and for those relating to the post-SOX era in 
particular (see Figure  3.4). 
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Figure  3.3 Acquirers’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A by payment method 
The following figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly earnings of
the overall sample of acquirers as well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples over the last four fiscal
quarters prior to the M&A announcement after splitting acquirers by the method of payment. j denotes
the fiscal quarter in which the M&A deal is announced.   
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Figure  3.4 Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal accruals prior to M&A by payment 
method 
The following figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal accruals percentage in the last four fiscal
quarters prior to the M&A announcement for the overall sample of acquirers as well as the pre and
post-SOX subsamples after splitting the acquirers by the method of payment. C1 denotes abnormal
accruals in quarter j-1, C2 denotes the cumulative abnormal accruals in quarters j-1 and j-2, C3 denotes
the cumulative abnormal accruals in quarters j-1 to j-3 and C4 denotes the cumulative abnormal
accruals in quarters j-1 to j-4. j denotes the fiscal quarter in which the M&A deal is announced. 
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Table  3.6 provides the results of one-sample tests for the earnings management proxies at the 
subsamples level. The analysis of the cash acquirers subsample as reported in Panel A 
of Table  3.6 reveals that for all earnings management proxies, the mean value of abnormal 
accruals is not significantly different from zero either for the total sample, the pre-SOX 
sample or indeed for the post-SOX sample. This finding is consistent with the predictions of 
hypothesis H2b. Therefore, the null hypothesis H02b in this study can be rejected since no 
statistical evidence is found to support (H02b: µEM (Cash acquirers) > or < 0).  
On the other hand, Panel B of the same table reveals some supporting evidence for earnings 
management by non-cash acquirers in the total subsample and in particular, for those in the 
pre- and post-SOX categories, despite the noted differences in the magnitude, timing and 
significance among the categories. In the total subsample of non-cash acquirers, the one-
sample t-test (Wilcoxon-Z test) for EMj‐2, C2 and C3 all show positive means (medians) of 
0.5163 (0.2465), 0.8168 (0.4037) and 1.0886 (0.6739) respectively revealing significance at 
the confidence interval levels of 10 percent (5 percent), 5 percent (5 percent) and 5 percent (1 
percent), respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H02a: µEM (Non-cash acquirers) = 0) can be 
rejected. Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis (HA2a: µEM (Non-cash acquirers) > 0) can be 
accepted for the proxies EMj‐2, C2 and C3. These findings provide robust evidence that 
managers of non-cash acquirers adopted accruals-increasing techniques around two to three 
quarters prior to announcing the M&A deal. 
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Table  3.6  One-sample test of earnings management for the acquirers’ by the 
method of payment and SOX 
The following table presents mean abnormal accruals percentages for the acquirers over the last four 
fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. The table demonstrates the results of one-
sample t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test for mean and median values, respectively, to assess H0:µEM =0 by 
pre and post-SOX  for the cash acquirers in Panel A and the non-cash acquirers in Panel B. The 
symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in a two-
tailed test.  
Panel A: Pure cash acquirers
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Total ሺNൌ268ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ123ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ145ሻ
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ 
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Mean
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ 
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
EM j‐1  0.1364  0.0469 0.3048 0.1132 ‐0.0370  ‐0.0774
  ሺ‐0.43ሻ  ሺ0.23ሻ ሺ0.63ሻ ሺ0.39ሻ ሺ‐0.09ሻ  ሺ0.72ሻ
EM j‐2  0.1732  ‐0.0544 0.0956 ‐0.1686 0.2348  0.0201
  ሺ‐0.64ሻ  ሺ0.11ሻ ሺ0.23ሻ ሺ0.45ሻ ሺ0.65ሻ  ሺ0.32ሻ
C2  0.3051  ‐0.4769 0.4748 ‐0.8425 0.1730  ‐0.0754
  ሺ0.65ሻ  ሺ0.86ሻ ሺ0.60ሻ ሺ0.67ሻ ሺ0.3ሻ  ሺ0.45ሻ
EM j‐3  0.0570  ‐0.0175 0.0466 ‐0.0082 0.0638  ‐0.0766
  ሺ‐0.2ሻ  ሺ0.24ሻ ሺ‐0.11ሻ ሺ0.09ሻ ሺ0.17ሻ  ሺ0.38ሻ
C3  0.4250  ‐0.717 0.3069 ‐1.0335 0.5147  ‐0.3035
  ሺ0.81ሻ  ሺ0.75ሻ ሺ0.35ሻ ሺ0.61ሻ ሺ0.79ሻ  ሺ0.50ሻ
EM j‐4  0.2171  ‐0.2321 0.2581 0.4309 0.1911  ‐0.500
  ሺ‐0.58ሻ  ሺ0.12ሻ ሺ‐0.67ሻ ሺ0.85ሻ ሺ0.34ሻ  ሺ0.87ሻ
C4  0.9810  ‐0.1565 0.8393 ‐0.1371 1.0827  ‐0.2255
  ሺ1.30ሻ  ሺ0.29ሻ ሺ0.83ሻ ሺ0.004ሻ ሺ1.01ሻ  ሺ0.35ሻ
Panel B: Non‐ cash acquirers
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Total ሺNൌ436ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ255ሻ Post‐SOX ሺNൌ181ሻ
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ 
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Mean
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ 
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
EM j‐1  0.4191  0.0625 0.3010 0.2548* 0.5880  ‐0.1694
  ሺ‐1.52ሻ  ሺ1.31ሻ ሺ0.88ሻ ሺ1.71ሻ ሺ1.29ሻ  ሺ0.17ሻ
EM j‐2  0.5163*  0.2465** 0.3668 0.7031* 0.6982**  ‐0.0951
  ሺ1.88ሻ  ሺ2.15ሻ ሺ‐0.86ሻ ሺ1.74ሻ ሺ2.20ሻ  ሺ1.08ሻ
C2  0.8168**  0.4037** 0.4953 0.7654* 1.1966**  0.4037
  ሺ2.06ሻ  ሺ2.34ሻ ሺ0.87ሻ ሺ1.74ሻ ሺ2.21ሻ  ሺ1.54ሻ
EM j‐3  0.2448  0.1067 ‐0.2863 0.0008 0.7725*  0.16*
  ሺ0.75ሻ  ሺ1.11ሻ ሺ‐0.56ሻ ሺ0.16ሻ ሺ1.93ሻ  ሺ1.80ሻ
C3  1.0886**  0.6739*** 0.2146 0.674 1.9447*** 0.82**
  ሺ2.05ሻ  ሺ2.7ሻ ሺ0.26ሻ ሺ1.48ሻ ሺ2.97ሻ  ሺ2.31ሻ
EM j‐4  ‐0.4911  0.0061 ‐0.6723 0.4054 ‐0.3430  ‐0.0406
  ሺ‐1.25ሻ  ሺ0.31ሻ ሺ‐0.98ሻ ሺ0.58ሻ ሺ‐0.77ሻ  ሺ0.31ሻ
C4  0.7421  ‐0.1154 ‐0.2436 0.4859 1.5960*  ‐0.0832
  ሺ1.05ሻ  ሺ1.42ሻ ሺ‐0.21ሻ ሺ0.81ሻ ሺ1.88ሻ  ሺ1.09ሻ
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The evaluation of the results of pre- and post-SOX categories of non-cash acquirers, as shown 
in Panel B of Table  3.6, indicates a greater magnitude, a higher significance and in some way 
an earlier attempt of pre-merger earnings management in the post-SOX era. The mean values 
for each of the earnings management proxies, EMj‐2 (0.6982) and C2 (1.1966), are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence interval while and the proxies 
EMj‐3 (0.7725) and C4 (1.5960) means are significant at the 10 percent confidence interval. 
Additionally, the C3 proxy has a mean value of 1.9447 which is very significant at the 1 
percent confidence interval with a robust positive median of 0.820, also significant at a 5 
percent level (Wilcoxon-Z= 2.31). 
Interestingly, the one-sample t-test for the pre-SOX category of non-cash acquirers, as shown 
in Panel B of Table  3.6, reveals strong results for the post-SOX categories. Although EMj‐1, 
EMj‐2, C2 and C3 all have positive means (0.310, 0.3668, 0.4953 and 0.2146, respectively), 
none are significant. However, the Wilcoxon-Z scores of the positive median values of EMj‐1 
(0.2548), EMj‐2 (0.7031) and C2 (0.7654) indicate significance at the 10 percent confidence 
interval, which suggests a late (i.e. closer to the deal’s announcement date) attempt to inflate 
pre-merger earnings. 
Surprisingly, the pre- versus post-SOX mean differences for all earnings management proxies 
are positive, as shown in Table  3.7. However, the null hypothesis (H03b: µEM pre-SOX (Non-cash 
acquirers) = µEM post-SOX (Non-cash acquirers)) can only be rejected for the unexpected differences of the 
proxies EMj‐3 with a mean difference of 1.0588, and C3 with a mean difference of 1.7301. In 
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this light, the alternative hypothesis (HA3b: µEM pre-SOX (Non-cash acquirers) < µEM post-SOX (Non-cash 
acquirers)) can be accepted at the 10 percent confidence interval. 
Table  3.7 Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the non-cash 
acquirers by SOX 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for the non-
cash acquirers over the last four fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. 
The table demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The two-
sample tests were applied for mean and median values, respectively, for assessing H0: µEM 
(pre-SOX)= µEM (post-SOX). The results are shown for the overall sample of non-cash acquirers 
and for each subsample by pre and post-SOX. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote 
confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Pre‐SOX 
ሺNൌ255ሻ 
Mean 
ሺMedianሻ
Post‐SOX
ሺNൌ181ሻ
Mean ሺMedianሻ
Difference 
ሺPost – Preሻ 
Mean ሺMedianሻ  t‐value Wilcoxon‐Z
EM j‐1  0.3010 ሺ0.2548ሻ 0.5880 ሺ‐0.1694ሻ 0.287ሺ‐0.4242ሻ  0.51  0.81
EM j‐2  0.3668 ሺ0.7031ሻ 0.6982 ሺ‐0.0951ሻ 0.3314ሺ‐0.7982ሻ  0.60  0.64
C2  0.4953 ሺ0.7654ሻ 1.1966  ሺ0.4037ሻ 0.7013ሺ‐0.3617ሻ  0.88  0.40
EM j‐3  ‐0.2863ሺ0.0008ሻ 0.7725 ሺ 0.1600ሻ 1.0588ሺ0.1592ሻ  1.66* 0.34
C3  0.2146 ሺ0.6740ሻ 1.9447  ሺ0.8200ሻ 1.7301ሺ0.1460ሻ  1.65* 0.42
EM j‐4  ‐0.6723ሺ0.4054ሻ ‐0.3430ሺ‐0.0406ሻ 0.3293ሺ‐0.4460ሻ  0.42  1.25
C4  ‐0.2436ሺ0.4859ሻ 1.5960 ሺ‐0.0832ሻ 1.8396ሺ‐0.5691ሻ  1.30  0.06
In summary, the reported evidence of earnings management for the aggregate sample of 
acquirers is influenced by the non-cash acquirers. Separating acquirers according to the 
payment method used is not only supported by theory, but also by the empirical evidence.  
Comparing the findings from the simultaneous analysis of the aggregate and segregate 
samples highlights the relevance and the importance of the stratification procedure through 
considering the payment method, when testing an earnings management hypothesis. 
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Furthermore, the pre- and post-SOX investigations of earnings management metrics show a 
greater magnitude, higher significance and an earlier exercise of accrual-inflating techniques 
in the post-SOX period. Additionally, there is some evidence for unexpected positive mean 
differentials of abnormal accruals between pre-SOX and post-SOX categories.    
3.5.3. Earnings Management on the Target’s Side 
Analysing the targets within the sample indicates that the mean values of abnormal accruals 
over the last four pre-merger quarters seem to generally decline until just before the very last 
quarter prior to the announcement date of M&A deal (quarter j‐1) as exhibited in Figure  3.5. 
The resultant curves for the total sample and post-SOX category are U shaped and they, 
interestingly, look like a complete opposite to the acquirers’ curves of pre-merger abnormal 
accruals in Figure  3.1. 
At the overall sample level, the descriptive statistics reported in Panel C of Table  3.3 show 
that the mean abnormal accruals are highest in the quarter j‐4 with a value of 0.8193 and a 
standard deviation of 6.2526. On the other hand, EMj‐2 has the lowest mean value of abnormal 
accruals (-0.2253) with the highest standard deviation (6.8639). However, the one-sample test 
results presented in Table  3.8 reveal that EMj‐4 is the only earnings management proxy that has 
a positive mean (0.8193) significantly different from zero, at a 5 percent confidence interval. 
Its median value (0.383) is positive with a Wilcoxon-Z value of 2.43, indicating significance 
of 5 percent as well. 
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Figure  3.5 Targets’ mean cumulative abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
This figure depicts the mean cumulative abnormal accruals percentage in the last four fiscal
quarters prior to the M&A announcement for the overall sample of targets (N=704) as well as the
pre and post-SOX subsamples (N=378 and 326, respectively). C1 denotes abnormal accruals in
quarter j-1, C2 denotes the cumulative abnormal accruals in the quarters j-1 and j-2, C3 denotes
the cumulative abnormal accruals in the quarters j-1 to j-3 and C4 denotes the cumulative
abnormal accruals in quarters j-1 to j-4. j denotes the fiscal quarter in which the M&A deal is
announced
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Figure  3.6 Targets’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
The following figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly
earnings of the overall sample of targets (N=704) as well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples
(N=378 and 326, respectively) over the last four fiscal quarters prior to the M&A
announcement. j denotes the fiscal quarter in which the M&A deal is announced. 
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After splitting the total sample into the pre- and post-SOX categories, the results show there 
are more significant proxies of earnings management. At times, the results indicate a dramatic 
shift in the direction of the abnormal accruals over a time window of four pre-merger quarters. 
Table  3.8 One-sample test of the targets’ earnings management 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for targets 
over the last four fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. The table 
demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The one-sample tests 
were applied for mean and median values, respectively, for assessing H0:µEM =0. The 
results are shown for the overall sample of targets and for each subsample by pre and 
post-SOX. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 
percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Total ሺNൌ704ሻ Pre‐SOX ሺNൌ378ሻ  Post‐SOX ሺNൌ326ሻ
Mean 
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Mean
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median 
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ 
Mean
ሺt‐valueሻ
Median
ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
EM j‐1  0.0049  ‐0.0002 ‐0.7323* ‐0.5171*  0.8222* 0.7033**
  ሺ0.02ሻ  ሺ0.002ሻ ሺ‐1.66ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ   ሺ1.88ሻ   ሺ2.18ሻ
EM j‐2  ‐0.2253  ‐0.0944 ‐0.5066 ‐0.1043  0.0660 ‐0.0767
  ሺ‐0.61ሻ  ሺ1.10ሻ ሺ‐0.93ሻ ሺ‐0.92ሻ  ሺ0.13ሻ  ሺ0.68ሻ
C2  ‐0.1105  ‐0.1947 ‐1.108** ‐0.579*  0.9174* 0.5408
  ሺ‐0.29ሻ  ሺ0.416ሻ ሺ‐1.98ሻ ሺ‐1.81ሻ  ሺ1.81ሻ  ሺ1.35ሻ
EM j‐3  0.0504  0.1711 ‐0.1813 0.1184  0.2659 0.3038*
  ሺ0.15ሻ  ሺ1.30ሻ ሺ‐0.50ሻ ሺ‐0.04ሻ  ሺ0.49ሻ  ሺ1.80ሻ
C3  ‐0.0793  ‐0.2541 ‐1.285** ‐1.326**  1.0804 0.8324*
  ሺ‐0.17ሻ  ሺ0.30ሻ ሺ‐1.99ሻ ሺ‐2.23ሻ  ሺ1.64ሻ  ሺ1.89ሻ
EM j‐4  0.8193** 0.3830** 1.2252* 0.4519*  0.4853 0.3678
  ሺ2.34ሻ  ሺ2.43ሻ ሺ1.85ሻ  ሺ1.89ሻ ሺ1.47ሻ  ሺ1.58ሻ
C4  0.9010  0.8689 0.2241 0.2058  1.4709** 1.697**
  ሺ1.49ሻ  ሺ1.38ሻ ሺ0.22ሻ  ሺ‐0.46ሻ  ሺ2.10ሻ  ሺ2.42ሻ
The documented results on the pre-SOX category show that most of those statistically 
significant earnings management proxies have negative mean (median) values, as shown 
in Table  3.8. Specifically, the mean (median) value of EMj‐1 is -0.7323 (-0.5171) significant at 
the 10 percent (10 percent) level; the mean (median) value of C2 is -1.108 (-0.5790) 
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significant at the 5 percent (10 percent) level; and the mean (median) value of C3 is -1.285 (-
1.326) significant at the 5 percent (5 percent) confidence interval, all pertaining to the t-test 
(Wilcoxon-Z test). However, EMj‐4 has the lone significant positive mean (median) value of 
1.2252 (0.4519), at the 10 percent (10 percent) confidence interval. 
These findings on the pre-SOX category seem to be consistent somehow with the inferences of 
most of the previous literature suggesting that target firms do not have sufficient time to adopt 
accrual-increasing techniques because, unlike acquirers, they are normally not aware about the 
merger plan until they are approached by bidders (Erickson and Wang 1999; Koumanakos et 
al. 2005; Baik et al. 2007). 
In contrast, all earnings management proxies in the post-SOX category are positive. 
Additionally, each one, except for EMj‐4, have much higher mean and median values when 
compared to those of pre-SOX era as reported in Table  3.8. Although each of the proxies EMj‐1, 
C2 and C4 has a mean value significantly different from zero, the evidence concerning 
earnings management in quarter j‐1 is very important because it most likely is indicating that 
there is an intentional accruals manipulation due to being approached by the acquirer. These 
results indicate that the first null hypothesis (H01: µEM (Targets) = 0) can be rejected while the 
alternative hypothesis (HA1: µEM (Targets) > 0) can be accepted for the mean value (0.8222) of 
EMj‐1 in the post-SOX category at a 10 percent confidence interval. The median value (0.7033) 
of EMj‐1 is also significant at the 5 percent confidence interval (Wilcoxon-Z value = 2.18) 
indicating robustness.  
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Table  3.9 Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the targets 
by SOX 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for targets 
over the last four fiscal quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. The table 
demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The two-sample 
tests were applied for mean and median values, respectively, for assessing H0: µEM (pre-
SOX)= µEM (post-SOX). The results are shown for the overall sample of targets and for each 
subsample by pre and post-SOX. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence 
interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Pre‐SOX 
ሺNൌ378ሻ 
Mean 
ሺMedianሻ 
Post‐SOX
ሺNൌ326ሻ
Mean 
ሺMedianሻ
Difference
ሺPost – Preሻ
Mean ሺMedianሻ 
t‐value  Wilcoxon‐Z
EM j‐1  ‐0.732ሺ‐0.517ሻ 0.8221ሺ0.7032ሻ 1.5541ሺ1.2202ሻ  2.50**  2.88***
EM j‐2  ‐0.506ሺ‐0.104ሻ 0.0660ሺ‐0.076ሻ 0.5720ሺ0.0280ሻ  0.78  0.24
C2  ‐1.107ሺ‐0.579ሻ 0.9173ሺ0.5407ሻ 2.0243ሺ1.1197ሻ  2.69***  2.25**
EM j‐3  ‐0.181ሺ0.1183ሻ 0.2659ሺ0.3038ሻ 0.4469ሺ0.1855ሻ  0.67  1.25
C3  ‐1.284ሺ‐1.326ሻ 1.0804ሺ0.8323ሻ 2.3644ሺ2.1583ሻ  2.57**  3.00***
EM j‐4  1.2251ሺ0.4519ሻ 0.4852ሺ0.3677ሻ ‐0.7399ሺ‐0.0842ሻ  ‐1.05  ‐0.41
C4  0.2240ሺ0.2057ሻ 1.4708ሺ1.6971ሻ 1.2468ሺ1.4914ሻ  1.03  1.94**
Holding the pre-SOX category of targets as a control group, an awakening shift in targets’ 
practices toward more aggressive earnings management is noticed in post-SOX targets. More 
specifically, abnormal accruals for the pre-SOX group are negative on average for the past 
three pre-merger quarters, while the image appears completely opposite after the enactment of 
SOX onwards. This positive shift in targets’ earnings management behaviour is reported 
in Table  3.9 in which the results are evaluated specifically concerning the difference between 
pre- and post-SOX for all earnings management proxies.  
The results of testing the null hypothesis (H03a: µEM pre-SOX (Targets) = µEM post-SOX (Targets)) 
in Table  3.9 confirm the observed positive shift in the proxies EMj‐1, C2 and C3. The null 
hypothesis (H03a) can be rejected for these proxies while the alternative hypothesis (HA3a: µEM 
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pre-SOX (Targets) < µEM post-SOX (Targets)) can be accepted at the 5 percent confidence interval level for 
the proxies EMj‐1 and C3 with mean differences of 1.5541 and 2.3644 respectively, and at the 
1 percent level for the proxy C2 and the respective mean difference of 2.0243. This inference 
is robust as it holds under the Wilcoxon-Z test at a confidence interval of 1 percent for the 
proxies EM j-1 and C3 and at the 5 percent level for C2. 
The overall results concerning the target clearly show there has been a dramatic change in the 
magnitude as well as the direction of abnormal accruals. The proposition that SOX has given 
targets a greater capability of manipulating their earnings in the very last quarter before 
announcing a M&A does not have any theoretical foundations and may be inaccurate to posit. 
However, the indirect call of SOX for more due diligence and a stronger use of M&A advisors 
(see Madura and Ngo 2010) may have resulted in a longer duration for the deal’s to complete 
(which is 3 months on average) while there may also have been an effect for more efficient 
management in influencing EMj‐1.    
Despite the fact that this study is using an ex post sample of targets, the intent of their 
respective managerial teams towards the acquisition (and therefore toward pre-merger 
earnings management) is still not easy to anticipate in terms of timing and therefore is 
subsequently not easy to control for. In other words, a M&A proposal could be an absolute 
surprise to some targets, while some other firms in the sample could be already working out 
their reports to boost their acquisition candidacy, as suggested by Meisel (2006). Therefore, an 
active decision by the firm’s management team to increase their firm’s acquisition 
attractiveness could be a motive to conduct early earnings management, which may explain 
the observed abnormal accruals in periods earlier than quarter j‐1.  
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3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
Using the quarterly earnings of a sample of US public firms engaged in M&A’s announced 
between 1999 and 2008, this chapter examines the potential differences in pre-merger earnings 
management in pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley eras over four quarters prior to the M&A 
announcement date. A cross-sectional modified Jones’ (1991) accruals model is employed 
after constructing industry-performance matched portfolios for all calendar quarters for the 
period of the study, as advocated by Kothari et al. (2005), Louis  (2004) and Gong et al. 
(2008). 
There are a number of contributions to the relevant literature presented by this chapter. First, it 
reports the existence of earnings management for each of the last four quarters prior to the deal 
announcement not only for the acquiring firms, but also for their targets concurrently by using 
a sample that includes M&A deals before and after SOX was enacted. Second, it adds to the 
on-going debate of the effectiveness of SOX in improving the credibility of financial reporting 
by investigating a non-random (i.e. structured) sample of firms that have the motivation to 
practice earnings management – merging firms. Finally, by using quarterly reports, which are 
available by the US reporting environment, this study makes a further twofold contribution. 
On the one hand, quarterly statements are superior to annual ones in terms of their timeliness. 
Therefore, this study provides a track of the managerial discretion over accruals in the 
previous four successive quarters prior to a deal’s announcement in order to precisely locate 
the timing of manipulating earnings. On the other hand, since quarterly statements are not 
audited by an external auditor unlike annual reports, this study provides an insight to some 
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implications of SOX on the interim reporting practices, as Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) 
previously suggested for future research 
The findings of this study are consistent with those of Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis  
(2004) Baik et al. (2007) and Botsari and Meeks (2008) reporting significant evidence of 
upward pre-merger earnings management by non-cash acquirers, which use their own shares 
in the deal’s payment structure, while, as expected, no evidence of pre-merger earnings 
management is found by cash acquirers since they lack the motivation to influence their share 
value before completing the deal. Earnings management is most evident in the second and the 
third quarter before the deal. 
Even when acquirers are not separated based on the payment method, significant evidence of 
per-merger earnings management is found similar to the results of Koumanakos et al. (2005). 
However, these results do not mean that acquirers necessarily have the motivation to manage 
earnings regardless of the method of payment. The method of payment analysis (i.e. cash 
versus non-cash) reveals that such results are driven by the existence of non-cash acquirers, 
which evidently have higher abnormal accruals, in the aggregate sample. This explains why 
the exclusion of cash acquirers from the samples is becoming a common practice in most 
research pertaining to earnings management in M&A’s (see, for example, Botsari and Meeks 
2008; Gong et al. 2008; Pungaliya and Vijh 2008; Young 2008; Alsharairi and Salama 2011). 
The renowned SOX Act was enacted in 2002. It has been repeatedly claimed that reliability 
and transparency of financial reporting has improved, while frauds and conflicts of interests 
have reduced in the financial reporting environment since the regulatory reform in the US 
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corporate world since the enforcement of SOX (Grasso et al. 2009; Wilson 2009; Ghosh et al. 
2010). Therefore, this study extends its analysis by comparing the magnitude of pre-merger 
earnings management in pre- and post-SOX periods. Surprisingly, non-cash acquirers in the 
post-SOX period show a higher magnitude and an earlier exercise of pre-merger earnings 
management. 
Interestingly, the investigation of targets reveals significant evidence of pre-merger earnings 
management in the very last quarter immediately before announcing the deal, exclusively in 
the post-SOX subsample. It is noted that the ability of target firms to manage earnings before 
M&A has been a controversial issue in literature, not because they lack the incentive to do so 
as most would agree targets would certainly have a motive to influence their premerger value, 
but rather because of a time constraint (Easterwood 1997; Erickson and Wang 1999; Meisel 
2006; Ben-Amar and Missonier-Piera 2008). However, targets cannot systematically predict 
the time of their M&A candidacy, which inevitably varies considerably, because M&A 
transactions occur in a sporadic manner. Consistent with Chahine et al. (2011), although the 
overall evidence in this study does not support the argument that the containment of earnings 
management improved in the post-SOX era when compared to the pre-SOX era (which is 
argued by a number of studies such as, Lobo and Zhou 2006; Cohen et al. 2008), this does not 
necessarily mean that the earnings management problem has exacerbated since the enactment 
of SOX.  
The following chapter builds on the findings reported here through using a sample of non-cash 
acquirers as a purposeful sample in examining the impact of high leverage on the ability of 
using accruals’ reserves to manage earnings.  
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Chapter 4 
Leverage and Pre-merger Earnings Management by 
Non-cash Acquirers37 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 3) pre-merger earnings management was investigated for 
samples of acquiring and target firms in periods before and after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. At the root of many of large-scale corporate scandals at large 
corporations such as Enron, Worldcom and elsewhere in the US, corporate legislation reform 
embodied by SOX enforcement, was not the only consequence. As a result of these scandals, 
public perception has evolved so that earnings management has been portrayed as a potential 
tool of managerial opportunism, which managers can employ in order to alter accounting 
numbers for their private interests rather than for the greater good of their shareholder group 
(Jiraporn et al. 2008). 
While the conflict of interests between managers and other stakeholders due to separation of 
control and corporate ownership is well known, an important aspect of managing these 
differing interests is the investor need to control the managers’ behaviour through monitoring 
and controlling mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
                                                 
37 A major part of Chapter 4 is accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial and Economic 
Practice in a forthcoming issue of 2011, under the title “Does High Leverage Impact Earnings 
Management?: Evidence from Non-cash Mergers and Acquisitions.” An older version of the paper 
was previously accepted for presentation in the Global Conference on Business and Finance, Las 
Vegas, USA, January 2nd-6th, 2011. The author could not present due to visa issues, however, the 
paper won the Best Paper Award as recommended by two blind conference referees.   
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As a result, a growing area of research has emerged concentrating on the effectiveness of 
various internal (such as boards and audit committees) and external (such as creditors and 
auditors) monitoring and controlling parties in mitigating the exacerbation of opportunistic 
earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; Chung et al. 2002; Goncharov 2005; Peasnell et al. 
2005; Jiraporn et al. 2008).  
This chapter focuses on the role of leverage as a constraint of managerial opportunistic 
discretionary power. It addresses the research question of whether the monitoring role of 
creditors can inhibit management’s ability to manage earnings preceding events characterised 
by evident incentives for earnings management. More specifically, this chapter examines the 
hypothesised controlling effect of abnormally high leverage on pre-merger income-increasing 
earnings management by a non-cash acquirer, given that managers have the incentive to 
manage earnings upward, as supported by the evidence discussed in Chapter 3.  
For many years now, earnings management has been of grave concern for both practitioners 
and regulators alike, and has resultantly received considerable attention in the accounting 
literature. This literature is immense and still continues to develop. Around a decade ago, it 
was noted that research in this field had primarily focused “almost exclusively on 
understanding whether earnings management exists and why (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p.380)” 
while recently it has tended to move towards the examination of causation factors and the 
consequence of such corporate activity. 
Thus far, there has been a general attitude in the research that good corporate governance 
should result in less earnings management (see, for example, Bushman and Smith 2001; 
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Chung et al. 2002; Yang and Krishnan 2005; Chang and Sun 2009; Ghosh et al. 2010). 
Nonetheless, the role of creditors or the leverage effect on earnings management is not 
adequately understood at present, with much inconsistent empirical evidence in different 
research settings being found (Jaggi and Picheng 2002; Zhaoyang et al. 2005; Shen and Chih 
2007; Wasimullah et al. 2010). 
Cheryl Gray, a lead economist at the World Bank, emphasises the crucial role of creditors in 
promoting corporate governance stating that “effective debt monitoring and collection play a 
crucial role in corporate governance in market economies and require adequate information, 
creditor incentives, and an appropriate legal framework (Gray 1997, p.29).” This view is 
consistent with an interactive system of corporate governance as introduced by Triantis and 
Daniels (1995). Their work tries to describe a stylised theory of the role of stakeholders, 
including lenders, in an effective governance system that is more able to control managerial 
opportunism. 
The different definitions of earnings management are broad enough to embrace both 
opportunistic and beneficial (i.e. efficient) earnings management practices38. For example, 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) define earnings management by the use of “... judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
                                                 
38 The classification of managerial practices into opportunistic or beneficial is based on an agency 
theory perspective (Jiraporn et al. 2008). Therefore, managerial opportunism occurs whenever 
managerial practices are meant to benefit firm’s managers rather than shareholders. The beneficial 
type is associated with the efficiency of management.  
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Despite the fact that the bottom line of an income statement (i.e. the reported accounting 
earnings) consists of two components - a cash component and an accrual component - it is 
used practically for assessing a firm’s ability to generate future cash flows in order to pay 
dividends and interest so that the firm’s equity value can be determined while managerial 
performance can also be evaluated (Ronen and Yaari 2008). However, it is important to bear 
in mind that a major portion of accruals is subject to managerial discretionary power, and this 
brings to light a management team’s ability to shift earnings between accounting periods to 
influence users’ perceptions. 
Managers’ motivation to manage earnings is driven by various incentives. On the one hand, 
the underlying incentives could be opportunistic (i.e. arising as a consequence of conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders), to improve the managers' position for example 
(Iturriaga and Hoffmann 2005), obscuring facts that stakeholders ought to know (Loomis 
1999), making extra gains from management buy outs (Perry and Williams 1994) or obtaining 
bonuses through management compensation contracts (Schipper 1989; Dechow and Skinner 
2000).  
On the other hand, earnings management can benefit shareholders and affect their wealth 
positively in instances whereby reported earnings could either meet analysts’ forecasts and 
fulfil capital market expectations (Yu 2008), influence short-term share prices before equity 
issues in IPOs, SEO and M&A (Teoh et al. 1998; DuCharme et al. 2001; Louis 2004), or can 
act as a response for carrying out debt and other external contractual agreements (Dechow and 
Skinner 2000; Jaggi and Picheng 2002). 
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Since managerial motives per se play a decisive role when exercising the discretionary power 
over accruals, examining the impact of leverage on earnings management should lead to a 
better understanding if the motive effect is neutralised for all observations. In other words, the 
empirical test needs to control for the experimental setting so that all firms under study have 
the same motive that drives their decision to manage earnings. 
Controlling for the motive of premerger earnings management by holding it constant, this 
Chapter investigates the leverage controlling effect on earnings management of a sample of 
non-cash acquiring firms. It provides empirical evidence on how excess debt creation does 
impact managerial discretionary power, given the existence of the managerial motivation to 
inflate the pre-merger reported earnings. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section  4.2 reviews the relevant 
literature related to leverage in earnings management studies while section  4.3 develops a 
theoretical foundation for the stated hypothesis that is to be tested in this study. Section  4.4 
specifies the sample, discusses research methodology and defines the variables employed 
within this work. Section  4.5 reports the results generated while section  4.6 provides a 
summary of the final concluding remarks of this chapter. 
4.2. Literature Review  
4.2.1. Introduction 
There are two main areas of research in the literature that are closely related to the research 
question addressed in this chapter. The first relevant area of research for this work pertains to 
pre-merger earnings management undertaken by non-cash acquirers. For brevity, because this 
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area has already been discussed in detail in the previous chapter (see specifically section  3.2.2), 
it is not repeated here. However, a reference to those studies is made whenever needed in later 
sections of this chapter. 
The second area of related literature for the theoretical foundations of this chapter is the 
relationship between leverage and earnings management, which is discussed in section  4.2.2 
as follows. 
4.2.2. Leverage and Earnings Management 
The literature portrays the relationship of leverage on earnings management with controversial 
debates in both empirical and theoretical schools. In particular, two leading schools of thought 
are found describing the relationship between leverage and earnings management. 
4.2.2.1. The Positive Association between Leverage and Earnings Management 
A number of studies have suggested that managers have a motivation to change accounting 
methods in order to evade accounting-based restrictions which are found in debt contracts.  
Press and Weintrop (1990) report that the level of leverage is a good proxy for the existence of 
accounting constraints, default risk or firms’ investment opportunities. They provide evidence 
that high leverage is positively associated with the likelihood of violating debt covenants. 
Furthermore, their work documents a positive relationship between the presence of 
accounting-based leverage constraints and the firm’s income reporting strategies. 
In accordance with these results, Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) further 
work in this field opting not to use the level of leverage as a proxy for debt covenants. Instead 
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they use samples of firms which have actually reported violations of debt covenants in their 
annual reports. In Sweeney’s (1994) study, evidence is shown that supports the notion that 
managers adopt income-increasing accounting choices as a response to the threat of potential 
default.  
Similarly, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms near default employ income-
increasing accounting changes in order to delay their technical default. Specifically, their 
evidence reveals that abnormal accruals are significantly positive in the year prior to default 
violation by firms in their sample. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Mohrman (1996) 
support these results and argue that firms with higher leverage levels are more likely to adopt 
accounting procedures that increase their income.  
Richardson et al. (2002), in a paper that examines the usefulness of accounting information in 
predicting earnings management, argue that leverage provides two different sources to 
motivate the managing of earnings. Firstly, incentives are argued to be provided within the 
covenants of debt contractual agreements in order to avoid the costly violation while they can 
also be found in the performance pricing features of private debt contracts which can be 
violated in order to receive lower rates of interest. The evidence obtained indicates that higher 
leverage is a motivation for aggressive accounting policies when studying a sample of firms 
that restated their annual earnings. 
Unlike these particular studies which look at the level or magnitude of accruals, Zhaoyang et 
al. (2005) investigate the determinants of the variability of accruals. Along with other 
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variables included in their study, leverage is found to be positively related to the variability of 
accounting accruals. 
4.2.2.2. The Negative Association between Leverage and Earnings Management 
While evidence has documented the positive relation between lavage and earnings 
management, as is true with most academic fields, this does not completely reveal the full 
picture. There exists strong debate over the nature of the relation with opposing academics 
arguing that leverage reduces abnormal accruals and has a deterring effect on managers’ 
attempt to manage earnings, rather than the above discussed motivating effect. For example, 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) study the accounting choices of a sample of troubled firms with 
binding debt covenants - which are normally characterised by high leverage - and find that the 
managers of these firms adopted accounting choices that largely reflected their firms’ financial 
difficulties, instead of attempting to inflate accruals. 
In a similar study that also considers financially distressed firms, Jaggi and Picheng (2002) 
find mixed evidence regarding the accounting choices adopted by managers of firms with 
financial difficulties. However, Jaggi and Picheng (2002) explain that their mixed findings are 
influenced by the differing severity of financial distress and whether debt is renegotiated or 
restructured. 
Addressing the prevailing academic debate, Becker et al. (1998) argue that leverage might be 
either positively or negatively associated with earnings management. Nonetheless, their 
analysis reveals that their leverage variable has a significant negative coefficient when 
regressed on earnings management. The authors argue that since high leverage is associated 
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financial difficulties, contractual renegotiations may then provide incentives to reduce the 
level of reported earnings and thus offer this as an explanation for their findings.  
DeFond and Park (1997) reflect upon the implications of the evidence provided by the work of 
Becker et al. (1998). In their analysis they include leverage, among other control variables, 
and examine the effect of earnings management when anticipating the firm’s future earnings. 
They confirm Becker et al.’s evidence by reporting a significant negative relationship between 
leverage and earnings management.   
Moreover, support can also be found in the work of Dechow et al. (2000) who conduct a study 
which compares high-accrual firms with low-accrual firms. The study examines a sample of 
firms that outperformed their benchmarks and document significant evidence that leverage is 
negatively associated with a firm’s accruals.  
Beneish (2001), in his paper “Earnings Management: A Perspective”, discusses different 
sources of incentives for earnings management including debt contracts. Assuming that 
lenders in debt contracts may use accounting numbers to require certain performance-related 
objectives to be met, Beneish (2001) argues that debt covenants provide incentives for 
managers to manage earnings to avoid the cost of debt covenant violations. Nonetheless, the 
mixed results of the work do not provide a reliable support for the positive influence of 
leverage as proposed in his paper. 
In a different paper, Ke (2001) investigates the factors that influence consecutive increases in 
quarterly earnings as well as long strings of consecutive earnings increases including those 
due to manipulating accruals. Ke (2001) provides interesting evidence highlighting the 
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external monitoring pressure of financial analysts and creditors by reporting that firms are less 
likely to show increases in earnings through manipulating accruals if the firms are highly 
leveraged as well as followed by analysts.   
There is a number of papers in the literature in addition to Ke’s (2001) study that stress the 
monitoring role of creditors and the creation of extra managerial control via debt financing. 
Chung et al. (2002), for instance, argues that managers’ ability to opportunistically manage 
their firms’ reported earnings is constricted by the existence of outside monitoring by 
stakeholders such as institutional ownership and creditors. Their empirical evidence supports 
their proposition by reporting that abnormal accruals are inversely related to the level of the 
firm’s leverage – used as a proxy for the monitoring conducted by creditors. Later, Chung et al. 
(2005) re-examine the leverage versus earnings management relationship and robustly report 
consistent evidence confirming that firms with high debt levels are subject to increased 
monitoring by lenders and bankers thus restraining the excessive use of discretionary accruals. 
Likewise, Zhong et al. (2007) investigate the impact of monitoring by outside stakeholders 
such as blockholders on earnings management. They include a leverage proxy (a simple debt 
ratio) in their regression analysis to control for the monitoring effect exerted by creditors. The 
results of their study reveal a significant coefficient for the leverage proxy indicating further 
evidence of the negative relationship between leverage and managers’ discretionary power 
over reported accounting earnings. 
Lee et al. (2007) include a leverage variable in their study while examining the impact of 
particular attributes of organizational structure on earnings management. Their results indicate 
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that earnings management is inversely related to leverage as well as the presence of external 
directors in the firm’s board. The findings of Lee et al. (2007) provide support to the argument 
of the role of external monitoring in corporate governance. 
Constructing the creditors’ monitoring proxy slightly differently to previous studies, Jelinek 
(2007) focuses on the increases in leverage instead of considering the absolute volume of 
leverage. She examines the effect of these changes on earnings management across a five-year 
sample period for firms that undergo leverage increases. The findings suggest that firms 
associated with leverage increases have shown a greater reduction in earnings management 
relative to those firms with consistent high leverage volumes (i.e. without observed further 
increases). 
The literature also shows consistent international evidence obtained from samples from 
different countries. Using a sample of Chilean firms, Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005) examine 
the effect of capital structure on earnings management. They emphasise the monitoring and 
governance role of leverage as they argue that there is a negative relationship between debt 
financing and the use of discretionary power in managers' accounting decisions, since the 
higher the leverage the more thoroughly the monitoring control is applied by lenders. 
Moreover, they suggest that managers of highly leveraged firms have fewer motives to 
manage earnings because their creditors are interested in debt service rather than accounting 
information, which means that financial statements have less relevant informational content in 
this case. The empirical findings of Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005) support their argument by 
indicating a significant negative influence of leverage on earnings management. 
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In the German market, Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find some evidence of the negative 
relationship between the absolute value of abnormal accruals and leverage while investigating 
the implications of the voluntary adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) by German firms on earnings management. In another recent paper, Wasimullah et al. 
(2010) analyse firms from the textile industry in Pakistan and address a direct research 
question of whether or not high leverage can control opportunistic earnings management. 
They find that high leverage reduces positive abnormal accruals that result from the 
managerial opportunistic adoption of accounting choices. Similar evidence from Spain is 
presented in another recent paper by Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010), who argue that 
managers’ informational advantage over debt-holders (i.e. agency problem) is reduced by 
increasing the monitoring cost involved. 
4.2.1. Summary and Potential Contributions to Literature 
The literature relating to the potential implications of debt financing on earnings management 
is split regarding the nature of this relationship with two leading trends, resulting in a number 
of issues worth investigating further. 
On the one hand, some literature has documented evidence of a positive relation between the 
level of the firm’s leverage and earnings management. This has most notably been explained 
by the notion of firms’ attempts to avoid the cost of violating debt contractual covenants 
(Press and Weintrop 1990; Watts and Zimmerman 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Sweeney 1994; Mohrman 1996; Richardson 2000; Zhaoyang et al. 2005). 
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On the other hand, there is a wealth of literature which provides robust evidence of an inverse 
relationship between leverage and earnings management that is justified by two main 
arguments - either managers’ of financially distressed firms, which are normally excessively 
leveraged, use income-decreasing accounting choices in view of contractual renegotiations 
and restructuring (DeAngelo et al. 1994; Becker et al. 1998; Jaggi and Picheng 2002), or 
managers’ decisions over obtaining additional capital through issuing debt, indeed, results in 
bringing an additional monitoring group (i.e. creditors) to the firm, which eventually 
intensifies the containment of managerial opportunistic behaviour and improves the overall 
governance (Ke 2001; Chung et al. 2002; Chung et al. 2005; Jelinek 2007; Lee et al. 2007; 
Zhong et al. 2007). There is further evidence in the literature based on samples obtained from 
different countries such as Chile (Iturriaga and Hoffmann 2005), Germany (Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2005), Spain (Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen 2010) and Pakistan (Wasimullah et 
al. 2010).  
Both sides of the arguments are supported by theory and evidence in their favour, but neither 
has delivered a compelling and definitive conclusion. For instance, many studies have either 
failed to find statistically significant evidence on the relation between leverage and abnormal 
accruals (see, for example, Beneish 2001; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Peasnell et al. 2005), or 
they have provided mixed evidence (see, for example, Jaggi and Picheng 2002; Shen and Chih 
2007).  
Furthermore, despite the enormous research that has been done so far on the association 
between leverage and earnings management, there still remains a number of researchable gaps 
in this area of research, including the influence of leverage on earnings management in the 
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presence of other intervening incentives of earnings management. Therefore, the question of 
the association between leverage and earnings management is still open for further 
investigation.  
This study distinguishes itself from prior studies and offers two main contributions to the 
existing literature. First, it employs a structured sample of non-cash acquiring firms which 
already have the motivation to manage their earnings upwards, in examining the impact of 
debt-financing on earnings management. The methodology of this study provides more 
reliable results when comparing the magnitude of earnings management among firms with 
different level of leverage, since the motivation to manage earnings is held consistent for all 
firms in the testing sample, rather than being random or undetermined as has been the case in 
prior studies. 
Second, unlike previous studies, which usually use a common debt ratio to proxy for leverage, 
this study constructs a leverage proxy more consistent with earnings management research 
methodology (see, for example, the adjusted proxy by Martin 1996). Since abnormal accruals, 
which proxy for earnings management are normally calculated based on the universe derived 
industry-adjusted portfolios, the leverage proxy in this study is similarly based on the universe 
derived industry-matched portfolios. 
The intuition presented in this study along with the related theoretical basis is discussed in 
more detailed in the following section. 
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4.3. Theoretical Framing and Hypothesis Development 
This section presents a theoretical framework consisting primarily of a number of related 
implications of leverage on pre-merger earnings management. The framework developed here 
aims at providing a relevant theoretical foundation for developing the research hypothesis and 
the rationale behind the expected relationship between leverage and pre-merger earnings 
management. 
4.3.1. Leverage: Basic Concepts 
4.3.1.1. Definition and Measurement 
The term leverage is used in the financial literature to refer to the firms’ use of debt finance 
relative to its use of equity in its capital structure (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Lang et al. 
1989; Kim and Park 2005). Leverage is used interchangeably with the term gearing in the 
literature (Servaes 1991). However, the term leverage is more often used in the US market 
(Lang et al. 1989). 
A general approach to indicate a firm’s level of leverage is to use financial ratios (such as debt 
ratios, gearing ratios or leverage ratios) which can be computed in different ways with 
sometimes different terms. These ratios are commonly constructed by dividing a debt indicator 
by a capital indicator (Lang et al. 1989). For example a firm’s leverage can be obtained by 
dividing the total book value of debt by the total book value of assets (see, for example, Zeff 
1978; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Kim and Park 2005) or by dividing the total market 
value of long-term debt by the total market value of equity (see, for example, Lang et al. 1989; 
Servaes 1991). 
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4.3.1.2. Why Do Firms Use Leverage? 
In the absence of income tax in the perfect world of Modigliani and Miller (hereafter M&M) 
(1988), M&M argue that a firm’s value is indifferent to the use of leverage under the 
assumption that homemade leverage (i.e. individuals can borrow on similar terms as the firms’) 
is possible. This is known as M&M Proposition I, while M&M Proposition II states that the 
expected rate of return on equity increases with the greater use of leverage in obtaining more 
funds to invest, because the risk to shareholders increases with leverage as well. 
The implication of M&M Proposition II is that the higher a firm’s level of leverage, the more 
volatile or sensitive its equity returns are, which denoted in the literature by the term financial 
risk (Lang et al. 1989).     
However, considering income taxes in Modigliani and Miller’s model results in tax gains for 
leveraged firms because interest payments are deductable from taxable income before 
deducting taxes. Accordingly, a firm’s value can increase by increasing its leverage, i.e. the 
use of debt (Stulz 1988; 2003).  
4.3.1.3. What Limits the Use of Leverage? 
Creating value by using leverage in the real world (i.e. a world with taxes) portrays the 
advantageous side of leverage. However, this can only remain true under certain conditions. 
For example, if we consider an extreme case whereby we have a firm which is 100 percent 
leveraged and is thus financed completely with debt, then this would only be advantageous to 
the firm if the the risk and costs of the increased leverage remain unchanged as leverage 
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increased. Miller (2010) clarifies that with increasing leverage, the shareholders incur 
increasing risks of financial distress along with the associated direct and indirect costs. 
4.3.1.3.1. The Bankruptcy Costs of Leverage 
Unlike the case of equity finance, leverage puts the firm under an “obligation” to make the 
interest and principal payments agreed. Failure to meet these obligations can leave the firm 
with the risk of financial distress up to an eventual situation of bankruptcy, where the 
ownership rights of the firm would transfer to lenders (Kim and Park 2005). 
The direct costs of financial distress that are repeatedly explored in the literature consider the 
administrative and legal costs of corporate restructuring or liquidation (see, for 
example, Warner 1977; White 1983; Altman 1984; Weiss 1990), while the indirect costs of 
financial distress represent the damage to the business’s trust and vital relationships with its 
suppliers, customers and creditors (see, for example, Altman 1984; Cutler and Snmmers 
1988; Andrade and Kaplan 1997; Mark L 2010). 
4.3.1.3.2. The Agency Costs of Leverage 
In a firm with higher levels of leverage, shareholders have a lower claim on the assets of the 
firm such that a smaller residual equity is left at risk if the firm fails. As a result an agency 
problem may arise between the contracting parties, i.e. between the shareholders and the 
debtholders. In other words, shareholders may prefer the firm to invest in a high risk project in 
order to obtain higher returns while the firm’s lenders have to share the extra risk burden 
without enjoying higher returns (Lang et al. 1989).  
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Agency costs, as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and later by Jensen (2005, p.6), are 
“the sum of the contracting, monitoring and bonding costs undertaken to reduce the costs due 
to conflicts of interest plus the "residual loss" that occurs because it is generally impossible to 
perfectly identify the agents' interests with that of the principal.” 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their seminal paper, argue that agency costs explain how the 
probability distribution of a firm’s cash flows is affected by its capital structure. Similarly, an 
analogous argument can be extended to a firm’s debt contractual relationship for explaining 
the agency costs of leverage (Haugen and Senbet 1988; Copeland et al. 2000; Mark L 2010).  
4.3.2. Leverage as a Determinant for the Method of Payment in M&A 
An acquiring firm is implicitly faced with two options to pay to acquire its target firm. It can 
either offer cash or issue equity shares to the shareholders of its target.  
Hansen’s (1987) theory for the choice of exchange medium in M&A predicts that an acquiring 
firm offers cash to a target firm when its share is undervalued whereas it offers equity when its 
share is overvalued, based on its proprietary information. 
This theory relates the acquiring firm’s choice of M&A payment method to how its share is 
valued by the market. This view is used in explaining the incentive for pre-merger income-
increasing earnings management by non-cash acquiring firms (see Erickson and Wang (1999) 
and the previous chapter section  3.3.1 for further discussion). However, it assumes that 
different methods are equally feasible and ignores any possible constraints, which may restrict 
the use of a particular method. 
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Faccio and Masulis’ (2005) work develops another view on the choice of payment in M&A by 
suggesting that the choice between issuing debt or equity to pay in a M&A is a function of the 
debt-capacity of the acquiring firm. This proposition is based on the core premises of the 
Pecking-Order Theory of capital structure by Myers and Majluf (2004), which implies that a 
firm can only issue further debt until it encounters the potential cost of financial distress. 
 In other words, highly leveraged acquirers are more restricted39 in their choice to use debt and, 
consequently, they may be forced to use equity shares as a financing method without enjoying 
the opportunity of efficiently choosing among different methods. 
Therefore, it could be argued that, for a highly leveraged acquiring firm, choosing to pay with 
equity in M&A is more likely to be the only option it faces rather than the viewpoint of a 
flexible “choice” for managers to use equity when the share price is overvalued, e.g. because 
of earnings management. Consequently, it is expected that a highly leveraged acquiring firm 
has a lower chance to efficiently adopt income-increasing accounting methods before a M&A 
due to the firm’s limited choice.  
                                                 
39 Debt-capacity is not the only restriction on a highly leveraged firm, contractual clauses (i.e. debt 
covenants) in debt agreements may explicitly inhibit the borrowing firm from issuing further debt. In 
“Kim, Y. and M. S. Park (2005). "Pricing of Seasoned Equity Offers and Earnings Management." 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40(2): 435-463.” there is cited evidence that 91 
percent of public debt issue in the US include contractual clauses that prohibit the borrower from 
issuing further debt. 
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4.3.3.  Leverage as a Restraint for Managerial Opportunism 
Jensen (1986) argues that excess amounts of free cash flow are more exposed to managerial 
opportunistic misuse in a setting of lower growth and fewer profitable opportunities of 
investment. Jensen’s (1986) view is explained by agency costs and is extended in formulating 
the Control Hypothesis, which predicts that higher leverage has a mitigating effect over 
managerial opportunism since management’s control over free cash flow is reduced.    
There is a wealth of evidence (see, for example, Ke 2001; Chung et al. 2002; Chung et al. 
2005; Jelinek 2007; Lee et al. 2007; Zhong et al. 2007) that supports the control hypothesis (as 
well as the close monitoring hypothesis in  4.3.4 below) to explain the documented negative 
association between leverage and earnings management. The assumption underlying their 
rationale is the positive link between managerial opportunism and earnings management as 
managers adopt income-increasing methods to mask non-value maximising (i.e. opportunistic) 
decisions (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Easterwood 1997; Jelinek 2007). 
4.3.4. Leverage as an Added Monitoring Mechanism 
The firm’s decision of agreeing to a debt contract to obtain funds implies adding a new 
contracting party (i.e. the lender) to the firm’s existing stakeholders. Consistent with the 
agency theory, the Close Lenders’ Monitoring Hypothesis by DeAngelo et al. (1994) posits 
that the relationship between lenders and borrowing firms is governed by the firm’s 
accounting numbers and that lenders resultantly seek to protect their interests. 
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Information is asymmetric between the contracting parties in a debt contract, i.e. the borrower 
has information that the lender does not have access to. The level of uncertainty that the lender 
is exposed to is positively related to the cost of debt, given that the lender is risk averse (Stulz 
1988). Close monitoring costs are incurred to protect the lender against the borrower’s 
opportunistic attempts to take advantage of his better information and deliberately attempt to 
deceive the lender (Ritter 1984).  
Therefore, DeAngelo et al.’s (1994) argument suggests that, in a highly leveraged (i.e. 
monitored) firm, managers’ attempts to alter accounting numbers in order to avoid accounting-
based debt covenants are unlikely to succeed consistently.   
4.3.5. Leverage as a Source of Conflicting Incentives 
The basic assumption underlying an earnings management hypothesis is that the economic 
consequences of the accounting choices made motivate firms to favour one choice over 
another (Jones 1991). However, the economic consequences of the accounting choice (i.e. 
income-increasing or income decreasing) are a result of how the reported earnings are 
processed differently by the different users and contracting parties, which would eventually 
generate different incentives for earnings management depending upon the situation 
considered. 
Debt contracts, compensation agreements, equity offerings, political costs and insider trading 
are considered as sources of incentives for income-increasing earnings management (Beneish 
2001; Scott 2003). A basic hypothesis underlying the Positive Accounting Theory, by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), is the debt-covenant hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that firms 
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closer to violating accounting based debt-covenants are more likely to use income-increasing 
accounting procedures. This could be true if we assume that all other factors to be held 
constant as well as there being no other conflicting motivations toward adopting income-
decreasing policy for the same period. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Jones (1991) note 
that the various firm’s processes and the contractual and political pressures can provide 
managers with conflicting incentives when choosing among different accounting procedures. 
In other words, opportunistic managers would shift reported income from a subsequent  
accounting period to the current accounting period in order to minimise the chance of 
technical fault in the current period (Scott 2003), if these managers were free from other 
incentives (and monitoring pressures as explained in the previous section  4.3.4) in the current 
period as well as the subsequent one. Having said that, the impact of earnings management is 
indeed transient, meaning that the effect of discretionary accruals on earnings of a given 
accounting period can have a reversal effect on earnings in a future one (Chung et al. 2002).  
Hence, the existence of other conflicting incentives – not necessarily associated exclusively 
with the current period – may influence earnings management practices. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the creation of higher leverage levels in a firm should restrict earnings 
management driven by other incentives, such as a non-cash M&A.    
4.3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the influence of leverage on earnings management, particularly pre-
merger earnings management by acquiring firms. The testable hypothesis in this chapter is 
developed based on two theoretical foundations. 
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The first foundation relates to the proposition of the motivation for pre-merger earnings 
management by acquiring firms. This proposition predicts that acquiring firms have the 
incentive to apply upward earnings management methods before offering to pay for the M&A 
deal(s) using their shares (Erickson and Wang 1999; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Gong et al. 
2008). The detailed discussions of this argument as well as the empirical evidence are 
presented in the previous chapter (see sections  3.2.2,  3.3.3 and  3.5.2). 
The second theoretical foundation relates to a number of propositions including that leverage 
is a determinant of the payment method in a M&A (Faccio and Masulis 2005), a control of 
managerial opportunism (Jensen 1986), an effective external monitoring device (DeAngelo et 
al. 1994) and a source of conflicting incentives for earnings management (Jones 1991; Beneish 
2001; Chung et al. 2002). 
Therefore, it is argued in this chapter that despite the strong and evident motivation of pre-
merger earnings management by non-cash acquirers, abnormally high leverage can effectively 
inhibit managers’ ability to alter accounting earnings through adopting income-increasing 
methods. 
Specifically, the main hypothesis in this chapter is formulated as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: Pre-merger earnings management by non-cash acquiring firms is 
contaminated by high leverage. 
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4.4. Research Methodology and Design  
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of leverage on earnings management in a 
purposeful sample of firms that have at least a similar motivation to manage earnings upward. 
To achieve this objective, earnings management of a sample of acquiring firms is examined 
during a pre-merger period focusing on those acquirers that offer shares in their payment 
method to their targets (Erickson and Wang 1999; Gong et al. 2008). 
Once this has been conducted, a leverage proxy is then constructed in order to investigate its 
hypothesised effect on the magnitude of acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management. Two 
methods are employed in this study to test the leverage effect on earnings management. First, 
in a sample splitting univariate analysis, earnings management is examined for subsamples 
which are formed based on the scale of their leverage to explore earnings management 
differences between firms characterised by high and low leverage. Second, the relationship 
between leverage and earnings management is tested in a linear regression model for the 
collected observations after controlling for other intervening factors. 
In section  4.4.1, the sampling procedure is explained. Section  4.4.2 explains the research 
methods used to achieve the objective of this study and section  4.4.3 defines the variables 
employed. 
4.4.1. Sample Construction 
Unlike previous studies that investigate unstructured samples of firms with unclear or 
undefined motives for earnings management, the objective of this research is to examine the 
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leverage effect on earnings management by a structured sample of firms that have a 
determined motivation to manage earnings. 
The control for the earnings management incentive is achieved by constructing a purposeful 
sample of firms. Therefore, a sample of non-cash acquiring firms in their pre-merger period is 
considered to measure their discretionary accruals and then to examine the impact of leverage 
on the magnitude of earnings management. 
A sample of US acquiring firms is taken from Thomson One Banker according to the 
following criteria: 
1. The acquiring firm belongs to a M&A deal announced between 01/01/1999 and 
12/31/2008.40 
2. The merger and acquisition deal is completed. 
3. The acquiring firms and their respective targets are both publicly listed companies to 
mitigate variation in information asymmetry and motives in managing earnings (Baik 
et al. 2007). 
4. Acquiring firms from the financial sector, which have SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999, are excluded from the sample. This is a common practice in the literature as this 
sector is subject to special regulations (see, for example, Erickson and Wang 1999; 
Gong et al. 2008). 
                                                 
40 The sampling period cut-off point (31/12/2008) is determined once data collection for this study 
started in the beginning of 2009. The ten years period is chosen as an ad hoc sampling period.  
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5. The deal value is at least $1 million to exclude all deals of negligible sizes. The 
purpose of this procedure is to discard firms with lower motivation to manage earnings 
due to the insignificant economic motivation (Erickson and Wang 1999). 
6. The acquiring firm obtains a controlling ownership interest in the deal (i.e. the acquirer 
owned less than 50 percent before the transaction and greater than 50 percent by 
completing the deal).  
A total of 661 firms meet the criteria and have earnings management and other needed data 
available on Compustat. Of them, 417 acquiring firms use their equity shares in financing the 
M&A deals. Section  4.5.1 provides a detailed descriptive analysis of the research sample. 
4.4.2. Methods 
4.4.2.1. Univariate Analysis: Sample Partitioning 
The objective of the univariate analysis conducted is to test the magnitude, the sign and the 
significance of the earnings management proxies in subsamples partitioned according to the 
observations’ rank of leverage. The tests include parametric tests as well as non-parametric 
tests, where no assumptions are made regarding the population’s probability distribution from 
which the observations are selected, are employed for robustness (Gujarati 2004).  
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The sample partitioning approach is useful for observing the behaviour of earnings 
management in subsamples with discrepancies in the level of leverage. Earnings management 
by acquirers is tested for the past three quarters prior to the M&A deal announcement.41 
Because univariate analysis is normally subject to higher likelihood of bias due to omitted 
factors (Stock and Watson 2007), the outcome of this method is backed by a further multiple 
regression analysis, as illustrated in the following section.    
4.4.2.2. Linear Multiple Regression Analysis 
A linear multiple regression model is proposed in order to analyse the leverage effect on pre-
merger earnings management using the ordinary least squares method after holding three 
control variables constant (Stock and Watson 2007). More specifically, this analysis focuses 
on testing the slope coefficient (β1) of the leverage proxy (LEVi) as shown in equation ( 4.1): 
ܧܯ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܮܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߚଶܴܵܫܼܧ௜ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܵܪ௜ ൅ ߚସܱܵ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜   ( 4.1) 
Where the dependent variable: 
 EM: indicates pre-merger earnings management by the acquiring firm, 
LEV: represents the leverage proxy measured as the industry-adjusted debt to equity ratio, 
RSIZE: indicates the relative size of the deal, 
                                                 
41 Based on the findings of  Chapter 3, acquirers’ abnormal accruals are most evident up to three 
quarters prior to deal’s announcement (See section  3.5.2).  
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CASH: is a dummy variable that indicates the payment method of the deal. It takes 1 if the 
deal was paid completely in cash, and 0 otherwise, 
SOX: is a dummy variable that indicates whether the deal was announced in Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) era. It takes 1 if the M&A deal was announced after in post-SOX era, and 0 otherwise, 
ε: denotes the residual term of the regression model, and 
i: denotes the acquiring firms index. 
In a further analysis, as shown in equation (4.2), LEVi is replaced by a splitter dummy variable 
(HDLDi), which takes 1 if the acquirer’s leverage proxy is above sample median and 0 
otherwise, and an interaction term (CASHi* HDLDi ) is added to the model to capture the 
potential multiplicative effect of leverage in non-cash deals (Gujarati 2004). 
ܧܯ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܪܦܮܦ௜ ൅ ߚଶܴܵܫܼܧ௜ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܵܪ௜ ൅ ߚସܱܵ ௜ܺ ൅ ߚହܪܦܮܦ௜ ൈ ܥܣܵܪ௜ ൅ ߝ௜      ( 4.2) 
 
4.4.3. Variables Measurement 
4.4.3.1. The Dependent Variable (EMi) 
The dependent variable here is defined as the signed value of the cumulative abnormal 
accruals over the last three quarters prior to announcement date. The previous chapter 
documented evidence that acquiring firms manage their earnings up to three quarters prior to 
the deal’s announcement date (see section 3.5.2). For this reason, this chapter focuses on the 
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abnormal accruals calculated in the last three quarterly statements issued by the acquiring firm 
before it announced the respective M&A deal.  
McNichols (2000) found that highly profitable firms have higher discretionary accruals. 
However, the profitability effect is not controlled for at this stage since the study’s 
methodology of calculating abnormal accruals is similar to Kothari et al.’s (2005). This 
approach already considers the profitability effect as the expected accruals are determined 
based on the Dechow et al’s (1995) modified Jones (1991) model in a cross-sectional 
estimation for the industry-performance matched portfolios in each quarter, following Louis 
(2004) and Gong et al. (2008).  
Detailed discussion about the methodology of estimating the abnormal accruals is provided 
earlier in the previous chapter sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
4.4.3.2. The Independent Variable (LEVi) 
Besides being an indicator of capital structure, the firm’s level of leverage is typically used in 
the literature to capture the consequences of debt contracting (Holthausen and Leftwich 
1983; Beneish 2001; Jelinek 2007), the magnitude of accounting-based contractual covenants 
(DeAngelo et al. 1994), the rigidity of general debt provisions (Press and Weintrop 1990; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Ke 2001; Jaggi and Picheng 2002; Richardson et al. 2002) or the 
controlling and monitoring pressure that can be created by lenders (Chung et al. 2002; Chung 
et al. 2005; Peasnell et al. 2005; Zhong et al. 2007). 
Yet, the corporate finance literature has not thus far agreed upon a single leverage proxy (see 
section 4.3.1.1). D'Mello and Farhat  (2008) advise that different leverage proxies may lead to 
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different empirical results. Therefore, consideration of the peculiarity of the different research 
designs while constructing the leverage proxy is vital for the reliability of this chapter’s 
discussions. 
Given the nature of the sample in this study (i.e. it is an event-based sample), it could be 
argued that an industry-adjusted leverage proxy may provide more reliable results than other 
approaches (Martin 1996). Bradley et al. (1984) present evidence that debt ratios differ 
remarkably among industry sectors. Even those researchers which debate the optimal capital 
structure42 of firms fail to disagree that this cannot be determined without taking the industry 
into consideration (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983). Correspondingly, practitioners hold a 
similar view with CFOs, as surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001), showing that industry-
wide leverage ratios do significantly influence firms’ financing decisions. 
The leverage proxy construction in this study is primarily motivated by the intuition of Fama 
and French (1997) who reason that the optimal leverage ratio varies over time and industry. 
Therefore, the method adopted for calculating LEVi is somehow analogous to the approach of 
matched portfolios in estimating the abnormal accruals.  
Using the Compustat universe of firms, the average debt-to-equity ratio is first calculated per 
industry in each year over the ten-year sampling range. Then, LEVi is obtained for each 
acquiring firm by weighing its debt-to-equity ratio against the industry average in the same 
                                                 
42 The optimal capital structure is usually recognised as the capital structure that contains an ideal 
portion of debt at which the weighted average cost of capital is at its minimum level (Ross et al. 
2005). 
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year during which the M&A deal is announced. It is this measure which we use to capture the 
level of leverage for each acquirer.  
4.4.3.3. The Control Variables 
4.4.3.3.1. The Relative Size (RSIZEi): 
The relative size of the deal is measured by relating the book value of total assets of the target 
to the book value of total assets of the acquirer. Recalling the findings of Erickson and Wang  
(1999) and Baik et al. (2007), the larger the deal, the higher the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals. This is explained by the increased motivation to manage earnings due to the 
increased potential economic benefits as proxied by the deal’s size. 
4.4.3.3.2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOXi): 
Controlling for Sarbanes-Oxley Act 200243 (SOX) effect is relevant in this study for, at least, 
two main reasons. First, the reliability in financial reports is perceived as higher since SOX 
was enforced (Rittenberg and Miller 2005) and this is found to affect the metrics of event-
specific earnings management 44 , and second, there is substantial evidence that M&A 
candidates started to rely heavily on financial and legal advisors since SOX came into effect 
(Madura and Ngo 2010), which could impact also pressure managements’ decisions regarding 
discretionary accruals. 
                                                 
43 The purpose and the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 are taken into detailed discussion 
in  Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.4). 
44 The evidence on this issue is documented in  Chapter 3 (see sections  3.3.4.2 and  3.6). 
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4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In Panel A of Table  4.1, the sample distribution by year shows that merger deals peaked in 
2000 with 111 acquirers centred in this year. In contrast, there is the lowest volume of mergers 
undertaken in 2008 with only 32 observations. From the total sample, 244 acquirers (36.9 
percent) pay their targets using only cash, while 417 acquirers (63.1 percent) use equity to 
totally or partially pay for the M&A deal. As explained later, non-cash acquirers are 
subsampled for further analysis since pre-merger earnings management is not evident nor 
theoretically supported for cash acquiring firms. Stratifying the sample by industry, Panel B 
of Table  4.1 shows that the total sample of acquirers is distributed across a range of five main 
industry divisions representing 31 major groups.  
The overwhelming majority (80.48 percent) of the total acquirers studied can be represented 
by two key industry divisions - Manufacturing and Services. While the manufacturing industry 
division (SIC 2000-3999) represents 50.68 percent of the total sample, the services industry 
division (SIC 7000-8999) accounts for 29.80 percent. Consideration of the major industrial 
groups shows that four classifications cover 59.76 of the total sample. Namely, they include 
chemicals (SIC 2800-2899) with 75 acquirers (11.35 percent), electronics (SIC 3600-3699) 
with 85 acquirers (12.86 percent), instruments (SIC 3800-3899) with 71 acquirers (10.74 
percent) and business services (SIC 7300-7399) with 164 acquirers (24.81 percent). 
  
Chapter 4: Leverage and Pre-merger Earnings Management by Non-cash Acquirers 
156 
 
Table  4.1 Sample characteristics 
The following table presents, in Panel A, the distribution of the overall sample by year in which the 
deal was announced. The final sample of overall acquirers comprises 661 firms between 1999 and 
2008 inclusive. The sample was initially selected from Thomson One Banker then we require that 
sample firms have accounting data on Compustat. The following table also shows, in Panel B, how the 
sample is distributed on industry sector divisions and major groups, according to acquirers’ SIC. 
Moreover, the following table presents the distribution of the sample by the method of payment used in 
the respective deal. 
Panel A: Distribution of acquirers by year and payment method 
  Total
Non‐cash 
acquirers 
Cash 
acquirers
  Freq. % Freq.  % Freq. %
1999  68 10.3 52  12.5 16 6.6
2000  111 16.8 80  19.2 31 12.7
2001  97 14.7 68  16.3 29 11.9
2002  62 9.4 36  8.6 26 10.7
2003  62 9.4 39  9.4 23 9.4
2004  57 8.6 36  8.6 21 8.6
2005  62 9.4 34  8.2 28 11.5
2006  55 8.3 25  6.0 30 12.3
2007  55 8.3 30  7.2 25 10.2
2008  32 4.8 17  4.1 15 6.1
Total  661 100 417  100 244 100
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of acquirers by industry
 
  Total Non‐cash acquirers 
Cash 
acquirers
SIC Industry Div. & Major Group Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
10‐14 Mining   47 7.11 38 9.11 9 3.69
10 Metal mining  5 0.76 5 1.2 0 0
13 Oil & gas extraction 42 6.35 33 7.91 9 3.69
20‐39 Manufacturing  533 50.68 191 45.80 144 59.01
20 Food & kindred products 15 2.27 5 1.2 10 4.1
21 Tobacco products 1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
25 Furniture & fixtures 1 0.15 0 0 1 0.41
26 Paper & allied products 1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
27 Printing & publishing 1 0.15 0 0 1 0.41
28 Chemicals & allied products 75 11.35 50 11.99 25 10.25
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Cont’d Table 4.1 
32 Stone, clay & glass products 1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
33 Primary metal industries 7 1.06 3 0.72 4 1.64
34 Fabricated metal products 6 0.91 3 0.72 3 1.23
35 Industrial machinery & equip. 59 8.93 28 6.71 31 12.7
36 Electronic & other elec. equip. 85 12.86 56 13.43 29 11.89
37 Transportation equipment 11 1.66 3 0.72 8 3.28
38 Instruments & related products 71 10.74 40 9.59 31 12.7
39 Misc. manufacturing industries 1 0.15 0 0 1 0.41
40‐49
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary Services 59 8.93 40 9.60 19 7.79
42 Trucking and warehousing 3 0.45 1 0.24 2 0.82
48 Communications 45 6.81 33 7.91 12 4.92
49 Electric, gas & sanitary services 11 1.66 6 1.44 5 2.05
50‐59 Retail Trade  22 3.33 13 3.12 9 3.69
50 Wholesale trade‐durable goods 6 0.91 5 1.2 1 0.41
51 Wholesale trade‐nondurables 1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
54 Food stores  1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
58 Eating & drinking places 1 0.15 0 0 1 0.41
59 Miscellaneous retail 13 1.97 6 1.44 7 2.87
70‐89 Services  197 29.80 134 37.84 63 25.82
70 Hotels & other lodging places 1 0.15 1 0.24 0 0
73 Business services 164 24.81 113 27.1 51 20.9
78 Motion pictures  3 0.45 1 0.24 2 0.82
79 Amusement & recreation serv. 3 0.45 2 0.48 1 0.41
80 Health services  11 1.66 6 1.44 5 2.05
87 Engineering & mgt. service 16 2.42 16 3.84 4 1.64
Total  661 100 417 100 244 100
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Table  4.2 Descriptive statistics 
The following table presents the descriptive statistics for the overall sample (661 acquirers) and sub-samples (cash acquirers of 244 and non-cash acquirers 
of 417). Panel A of the following table reports the results for all acquirers aggregated, and the results of acquirers by method of payment used in the 
respective deal. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the 417 non-cash acquirers in a more detailed analysis, where non-cash acquirers are segregated 
into Low and High Leverage based on their industry-adjusted leverage proxy rank in the sample. Total assets, Total sales and Deal value are in million USD. 
Return on equity is net income divided by book value of total shareholders’ equity. Debt to equity ratio is total liabilities divided by book value of total 
shareholders’ equity. Ind-adj leverage is debt to equity ratio of acquirer divided by industry-average debt to equity using universe firms in the year of deal 
announcement. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of all acquirers by payment method
   Total Non‐cash acquirers Cash acquirers
  ሺN ൌ 661ሻ ሺNൌ417ሻ  ሺNൌ244ሻ
    Mean  Median STD Mean Median  STD Mean Median STD
Total assets  9014.4 1269.3 27574.5 7333.9 834.7 30261.1 11891.2 2427.3 21998.9
Total sales  5806.2 856.2 12946.1 4053.2 491.0 11269.9 8799.7 2008.2 14949.2
Deal value  1543.1 227.0 5661.9 2042.4 259.7 7007.3 689.7 189.9 1359.9
Relative size  0.1712 0.1788 0.2053 0.2785 0.3111 0.2316 0.0580 0.0782 0.0618
Return on equity  ‐0.0504 0.0449 0.7564 ‐0.1159 0.0268 0.9432 0.0608 0.0687 0.1255
Debt to equity  0.4390 0.4241 0.2612 0.4387 0.3972 0.2955 0.4395 0.4550 0.1900
Ind‐adj. leverage  0.2922 0.1886 0.2824 0.2900 0.1790 0.2873 0.2960 0.2135 0.2744
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Cont’d Table 4.2 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of non‐cash acquirers by Low‐High leverage 
   Total Low Leverage High Leverage
  ሺNൌ417ሻ ሺNൌ209ሻ  ሺNൌ208ሻ
  Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
Total assets  7333.9 834.7 30261.1 2700.4 370.9 6981.8 12453.9 1592.4 42984.1
Total sales  4053.2 491.0 11269.9 1799.3 203.5 4920.4 6538.7 929.9 15213.3
Deal value  2042.4 259.7 7007.3 1284.0 162.3 4849.6 2816.1 460.9 8785.4
Relative size  0.2785 0.3111 0.2316 0.4755 0.4376 0.6946 0.2261 0.2894 0.2044
Return on equity  ‐0.1159 0.0268 0.9432 ‐0.1971 0.0116 1.2779 ‐0.0271 0.0318 0.2559
Debt to equity  0.4387 0.3972 0.2955 0.3218 0.2724 0.2064 0.5673 0.5361 0.3252
Ind‐adj. leverage  0.2900 0.1790 0.2873 0.0848 0.0770 0.0496 0.5157 0.4336 0.2709
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The descriptive statistics provided in Table  4.2 present a comparison of the acquirers’ 
characteristics by method of payment for the total sample as well as by the level of leverage 
for the non-cash acquirers’ sample. 
Panel A of Table  4.2  shows that cash acquirers in general are larger in both size and sales 
when compared to non-cash acquirers. The statistics show that the mean book value of total 
assets (total sales) of the cash acquirers is $11.891 billion ($8.799 billion), compared to $7.333 
billion ($4.053 billion) for the non-cash acquirers, with an average of $9.014 billion ($5.806 
billion) for the overall sample. Unsurprisingly, cash deals have a mean dollar value of $689.7 
million and mean relative value of 5.80 percent, which make them not as sizeable as those 
financed using equity or mixed method, which have a mean dollar value of $2.042 billion and 
a mean relative value of 27.85 percent. Non-cash acquirers are, on average, less profitable 
with a negative mean ROE of -11.59 percent as compared with cash acquirers (6.08 percent) 
while both samples have nearly the same mean debt to equity ratio of 43.9 percent. From 
Panel A of Table  4.2 the mean values of the industry-adjusted leverage for both cash and non-
cash acquirers do not appear significantly different (28.24 and 29.60 percent, respectively).  
Panel B of Table  4.2 focuses exclusively on non-cash acquirers, which are further split into 
low and high leverage firms with respect to their industries. The splitting procedure is based 
on the sample’s median value of the firms’ industry-adjusted leverage. The mean (median) 
value of the Industry-Adjusted Leverage for the low-leverage (hereafter LD) subsample is 8.48 
percent (7.70 percent) whereas it is 51.57 percent (43.36 percent) for the high-leverage 
(hereafter HD) subsample. On average, non-cash acquirers with HD are of a larger size with a 
mean total assets (total sales) of $12.453 billion ($6.538 billion). This is compared with LD 
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ones which have a mean total assets (total sales) of $2.700 billion ($1.799 billion). This 
explains why the mean (median) relative size of deals in HD subsample is only 22.61 percent 
(28.94 percent) which is in stark contrast to the mean (median) relative size of deals in the LD 
subsample, which is 47.55 percent (43.76 percent). This is further supported by the fact that 
the mean (median) absolute dollar value of deals in HD is $2.81 billion ($460.6 million), 
which far exceeds the mean (median) absolute dollar value of deals in LD that is only $1.284 
billion ($162.3 million). 
4.5.2. Results of Univariate Analysis: Sample Partitioning 
4.5.2.1. Results of Partitioned Sample by the Method of Payment 
It can be argued that acquirers would not be motivated to manage their earnings prior to a 
merger if their targets were offered purely cash (Erickson and Wang 1999; Asano et al. 2007; 
Baik et al. 2007; Botsari and Meeks 2008). On the grounds of this argument, which can be 
supported by the empirical evidence as obtained in  Chapter 3 (see sections  3.5.2.1 and  3.5.2.2), 
and after testing the aggregate sample of acquirers, cash acquirers are withdrawn from the 
experiment sample to form a subsample that is used as a control group. In other words, 
earnings management measures are examined for the total sample (661 firms) as well as for 
cash (244 firms) and non-cash acquirers (417 firms) separately before proceeding to the next 
level in analysis. 
Using the t-test method for testing the mean and the Wilcoxon-z test for testing the median 
in Table  4.3, it is noticed that for the total sample all coefficients of abnormal accruals are 
positive for the three examined quarters, with robust significance at quarter t‐2. More 
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importantly, the cumulative abnormal accruals over the three pre-merger periods have a 
positive mean (median) value of 0.8589 percent (0.1133 percent) significant at a 5 percent (10 
percent) confidence interval, indicating robust evidence of pre-merger income-increasing 
earnings management. 
Table  4.3 Abnormal accruals of the total sample by method of payment 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percentages for acquirers over three 
quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. Abnormal accruals are calculated using industry-
performance-matched abnormal accruals models. The table demonstrates the results of t-test and 
Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The tests were applied for mean and median values, respectively. The 
results are shown for the overall sample of acquirers and for each sub-sample by the method of 
payment. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively, in two-tailed test.  
  Total Non‐cash acquirers  Cash acquirers
   ሺN ൌ 661ሻ ሺNൌ417ሻ ሺNൌ244ሻ
  Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
Abnormal Accruals   ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ   ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Quarter t‐1   0.3224 0.0578 0.3941 0.0578  0.0479 0.0469
  ሺ1.53ሻ ሺ0.967ሻ ሺ1.36ሻ ሺ1.306ሻ  ሺ0.14ሻ ሺ0.232ሻ
Quarter t‐2  0.3952** 0.0526* 0.5246* 0.0525**  0.0849 ‐0.054
  ሺ1.96ሻ ሺ1.767ሻ ሺ1.82ሻ ሺ2.146ሻ  ሺ0.31ሻ ሺ‐0.110ሻ
Quarter t‐3   0.1772 0.0563 0.3101 0.0563  0.1118 ‐0.017
  ሺ0.76ሻ ሺ0.781ሻ ሺ0.91ሻ ሺ1.106ሻ  ሺ0.37ሻ ሺ‐0.241ሻ
Cumulative   0.8589** 0.1133* 1.1378** 0.1132  0.2796 ‐0.717
  ሺ2.20ሻ ሺ1.91ሻ ሺ2.07ሻ ሺ0.405ሻ  ሺ0.53ሻ ሺ‐0.758ሻ
Expectedly, evidence holds only for the subsample of non-cash acquirers providing a positive 
mean of 1.1378 percent significance at 5 percent confidence interval, after splitting the overall 
sample by the method of payment. The subsample of cash acquirers does not show successful 
attempts of earnings management since they lack the motivating incentives to aggressively 
report higher accruals than normal.  
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The evidence of earnings management reported for the total sample seems to be driven by the 
abnormally high discretionary accruals of non-cash acquirers included in the total sample, as 
noted in the previous chapter section  3.5.2.2. The findings so far reveal that the dataset used 
here produces expected and consistent results with the literature before progressing to the next 
level of analysis in this study.  
4.5.2.2. Results of Partitioned Sample by the Level of Leverage 
Proposing that leverage may influence managerial decision making, including those pertaining 
to the firm’s accounting policy, acquiring firms with higher rates of leverage as compared to 
their industry peers may be less capable of managing the pre-merger earnings unreservedly 
despite the M&A incentives (Jensen 1986; Jones 1991; DeAngelo et al. 1994; Beneish 2001; 
Chung et al. 2002). 
To investigate the extent to which abnormal accruals are affected by leverage, the observations 
of the total sample are partitioned into LD and HD subsamples based on the median of 
Industry-Adjusted Leverage, as presented in Table  4.4. Interestingly, very significant evidence 
of upward earnings management is found only in the LD subsample. From Table  4.4, the mean 
values of the abnormal accruals over the three premerger quarters t-1, t-2 and t-3 are positive 
(0.667, 0.9128 and 0.4936 percent, respectively) and significant at 10, 1 and 10 percent 
confidence interval levels respectively.   
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Table  4.4 Abnormal accruals of total sample by level of leverage 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percent for acquirers over three 
quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. Abnormal accruals are calculated using industry-
performance-matched abnormal accruals model. The overall sample is subdivided in this table into low 
(LD) and high leverage (HD) based on the acquirers’ rank in the sample with respect to the industry-
adjusted leverage ratio. The table demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. 
The tests were applied for mean and median values, respectively. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) 
denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
  LD HD
  ሺNൌ331ሻ ሺNൌ330ሻ
  Mean Median Mean  Median
Abnormal Accruals  ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ  ሺt‐valueሻ  ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Quarter t‐1   0.667* ‐0.0662 ‐0.088  0.0735
  ሺ1.88ሻ ሺ0.956ሻ ሺ‐0.3ሻ  ሺ‐0.055ሻ
Quarter t‐2  0.9128*** 0.1486* ‐0.281  0.053
  ሺ3.13ሻ ሺ1.669ሻ ሺ‐0.91ሻ  ሺ‐0.548ሻ
Quarter t‐3   0.4936* 0.0074 0.0604  0.0585
  ሺ1.66ሻ ሺ0.361ሻ ሺ0.15ሻ  ሺ‐0.871ሻ
Cumulative   1.9848*** 0.426** ‐0.433  0.0620
  ሺ3.41ሻ ሺ2.522ሻ ሺ‐0.759ሻ  ሺ‐0.280ሻ
 
The mean value of the cumulative abnormal accruals (1.9848 percent) of the LD subsample 
shows significance at the 1 percent confidence interval level indicating very significant 
evidence of pre-merger earnings management undertaken by low-leveraged acquirers with a 
robust positive median of 0.426 percent (significant at 5 percent in Wilcoxon-z test). 
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However, of the total acquirers the HD subsample does not indicate any evidence of 
managerial attempts to inflate accruals before the announcement of M&A, since none of the 
mean values of abnormal accruals over the three pre-merger quarters is significant45. 
4.5.2.3. Results of Partitioned Sample by Interacting the Method of Payment with 
the Level of Leverage 
Closer examination of the behaviour of the subsamples is provided within Table  4.5, which 
interacts the method of payment (cash vs. non-cash) with the leverage level (LD vs. HD) of 
the acquiring firm for the sample partitioning procedure. Indeed, this interaction adds more 
depth to the analysis of earnings management shown in the previous two sections.  
Interestingly, the results in Table  4.5 indicate that the LD subsample from the non-cash 
acquirers dataset exclusively reveals strong evidence of positive earnings management among 
other subsamples. In this subsample, the mean values of abnormal accruals are positive for all 
three quarters t-1, t-2 and t-3 (0.973, 1.2537 and 0.9903 percent, respectively) and are significant 
at the confidence interval levels 5, 1 and 5 percent, respectively. The mean value of the 
cumulative abnormal accruals is very significant at the 1 percent confidence interval level with 
a robust positive median of 0.9903 percent, which is very significant at the 1 percent 
confidence interval in the Wilcoxon-z test. 
                                                 
45 The analysis is repeated stratifying the sample into quartiles based on the industry-adjusted leverage 
of observations. Positive earnings management evidence is found in each of bottom quartile and low-
mid quartile, which together are equivalent to LD subsample, whose mean values of cumulative 
abnormal accruals are 2.657 percent (t-value=2.93) and 1.343 (t-value=1.81), respectively. Whereas, 
no evidence found in any of high-mid or top quartile, which together are equivalent to HD subsample. 
Therefore, the inferences do not change for both cash and non-cash subsamples in quartile 
stratification. 
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Table  4.5 Abnormal accruals by level of leverage vs. method of payment 
The following table presents mean and median abnormal accruals percent for acquirers over three 
quarters preceding the deal’s announcement date. Abnormal accruals are calculated using industry-
performance-matched abnormal accruals model. The table reports results per payment method sub-
samples after subdividing the overall sample into low (LD) and high leverage (HD) based on the 
acquirers’ rank in the sample with respect to the industry-adjusted leverage ratio. The table 
demonstrates the results of t-test and Wilcoxon-Z test in parentheses. The tests were applied for mean 
and median values, respectively. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 
and 1 percent, respectively, in two-tailed test. 
  LD HD 
 
Non‐cash
acquirers
Cash
acquirers
Non‐cash 
acquirers 
Cash       
acquirers
  ሺNൌ232ሻ ሺNൌ99ሻ ሺNൌ185ሻ  ሺNൌ145ሻ
  Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
Abnormal 
Accruals 
ሺt‐valueሻ  ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ   ሺt‐valueሻ ሺWilcoxon‐Zሻ
Quarter t‐1   0.973**  0.090 0.0241 ‐0.499 ‐0.214 ‐0.0246  0.1603 0.2580
  ሺ2.09ሻ  ሺ1.526ሻ ሺ0.05ሻ ሺ0.667ሻ ሺ‐0.6ሻ ሺ0.141ሻ  ሺ0.31ሻ ሺ0.074ሻ
Quarter t‐2  1.2537***  0.5514** 0.2351 ‐0.3475 ‐0.461 ‐0.1242  0.0503 0.4362
  ሺ3.15ሻ  ሺ2.55ሻ ሺ0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.995ሻ ሺ‐1.12ሻ ሺ0.199ሻ  ሺ0.11ሻ ሺ1.218ሻ
Quarter t‐3   0.9903**  0.1012 ‐0.513 ‐0.0765 ‐0.357 0.0687  0.7693 0.0220
  ሺ2.59ሻ  ሺ0.874ሻ ሺ‐1.16ሻ ሺ0.701ሻ ሺ‐0.63ሻ ሺ0.612ሻ  ሺ0.79ሻ ሺ0.621ሻ
Cumulative   3.0281***  0.9903*** ‐0.339 ‐0.7654 ‐1.317* ‐0.1550  1.137 0.5752
  ሺ4.02ሻ  ሺ3.605ሻ ሺ‐0.43ሻ ሺ‐1.277ሻ ሺ‐1.67ሻ ሺ0.191ሻ  ሺ1.53ሻ ሺ0.798ሻ
No evidence is found relating to income-increasing earnings management at any quarter prior 
to the deal announcement for either the LD or HD subsamples of cash acquirers, or for the HD 
subsample of non-cash acquirers. As an additional robustness check, the analysis was repeated 
after redefining LD and HD according to the mean value, instead of the median value, of the 
industry-adjusted leverage. The results of the univariate analysis continue to hold. 
Finally, it is observed that the magnitude (as indicated by either the mean or median) and the 
significance (as indicated by either the t-test or the Wilcoxon-z test) of the abnormal accruals 
for all pre-merger quarters are greater in the LD subsample of non-cash acquirers when 
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compared to the LD subsample of the total acquirers. This finding is consistent with, and 
reinforces, what is documented in the previous chapter (see section 3.5.2.2) on the relevance 
and importance of implementing the partitioning procedure based on the payment method 
when examining pre-merger earnings management. 
4.5.3. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are presented in two tables. While Table  4.6 
reports the regression results from estimating the model using the total sample of 
acquirers, Table  4.7 reports the results after splitting the sample of acquirers with respect to 
the method of payment.  
The preliminary findings from the univariate analysis in the previous section put forward two 
main points - cash acquirers do not engage in earnings management while low-leveraged 
acquirers are more likely to manage earnings upward than highly leveraged ones. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the multiple regression model fails to predict a significant relationship 
(the adjusted-r squared is either too low or negative) if a subsample of cash acquirers is used 
to estimate the model as shown under the four regressions of “Cash acquirers” in Table  4.7, 
where neither F-statistic nor any of the independent variables’ coefficients are statistically 
significant.  
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Table  4.6 Regression analysis for the total sample of acquirers 
The following table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of acquirers’ pre-merger 
cumulative abnormal accruals. ܧܯ௜  is calculated using industry-performance-matched abnormal 
accruals model for the last three quarters before M&A announcement date. HDLDi is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if the acquirer has industry-adjusted leverage ratio above sample median and 0 
otherwise, CASHi is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the acquirer offered cash to finance the deal and 0 
if shares were included in the offer, CASHi*HDLDi  is a binary interaction term that takes 1 the 
acquirer was non-cash and ranked as low-leveraged in the sample and 0 otherwise, LEVi is the 
acquirer’s industry-adjusted leverage ratio, RSIZEi is the relative size of the deal measured by relating 
the book value of total assets of the target to the book value of total assets of the acquirer and SOXi is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if the deal was announced in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses represent t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote 
confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  Total sample
  ሺ1ሻ ሺ2ሻ ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ  ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ
Constant  1.514** 0.821 0.141 2.462*** 1.606**  0.400 0.849
   ሺ2.62ሻ ሺ‐1.12ሻ ሺ0.17ሻ ሺ3.62ሻ ሺ2.06ሻ  ሺ0.47ሻ ሺ0.99ሻ
LEVi  ‐2.238 ‐2.555* ‐2.554*   
   ሺ‐1.63ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐1.86ሻ   
RSIZEi     1.9529** 1.857** 1.853**  1.739** 1.738**
      ሺ2.41ሻ ሺ2.30ሻ ሺ2.33ሻ  ሺ2.17ሻ ሺ2.19ሻ
CASHi     ‐0.1447 ‐0.287 ‐2.217* ‐1.959  ‐0.263 ‐2.470*
      ሺ‐0.16ሻ ሺ‐0.31ሻ ሺ‐1.8ሻ ሺ‐1.55ሻ  ሺ‐0.28ሻ ሺ‐1.92ሻ
SOXi     1.430* 1.346* 1.733**
      ሺ1.71ሻ ሺ1.63ሻ ሺ2.05ሻ
HDLDi     ‐3.055***‐3.276*** ‐1.977** ‐3.428***
      ሺ‐3.01ሻ ሺ‐3.22ሻ  ሺ‐2.37ሻ ሺ‐3.37ሻ
CASHi *HDLDi     3.362* 3.743**     4.423**
      ሺ1.92ሻ ሺ2.12ሻ     ሺ2.47ሻ
     
N  661  661 661 661 661  661  661
F‐statistic  2.66  3.08** 3.05** 3.24** 4.09***  3.60*** 4.14***
P‐value  0.1034 0.0276 0.0172 0.022 0.0029  0.0068 0.0011
Adj R2  0.0042 0.0158 0.0206 0.0166 0.0309  0.0261 0.0389
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Likewise, regression (1) in Table  4.6 shows weak results when the total sample is tested, when 
either splitting non-cash acquirers in a separate sample or by including CASHi, a dummy 
variable to indicate payment method.    
However, after having the dummy variable CASHi included in the model when the regression 
is run for the total sample in regressions (2) to (7) in Table  4.6, better results are produced in 
terms of statistical significance of the model and its parameters’ coefficients as well as in 
terms of the goodness of fit as presented in Table  4.6. The negative sign of the estimated 
coefficient of the leverage proxy (LEVi) in regressions (2) and (3), -2.555 and -2.554 
respectively, are both significant with a P-value of less than 10 percent, suggesting significant 
evidence on the inverse relationship between leverage and pre-merger earnings management 
exists even after controlling for the relative size of the deal and the effects of SOX. This 
inference holds after replacing LEVi with a top/bottom leverage dummy (HDLDi) that takes 1 
if the acquirer’s leverage proxy is above the sample median as presented under regression (6) 
in Table  4.6. 
In a more focused analysis, the regression model is estimated after excluding cash acquirers 
from the total sample. The results again reveal very significant evidence on the negative 
relation between earnings management and leverage as reported under the “Non-cash 
acquirers” section in Table  4.7, where the estimated coefficient of LEVi (-4.265 with P-value < 
5percent) in regression (1) remains robust (-4.775 with P-value < 1 percent and -5.158 with P-
value<1 percent) after controlling for both the relative size of the deal and the effects of SOX 
in regressions (2) and (3), respectively. 
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Table  4.7 Regression analysis by method of payment 
The following table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of acquirers’ premerger 
cumulative abnormal accruals, which are calculated using industry-performance-matched abnormal 
accruals model. The table reports results per payment method sub-samples. HDLDi is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if the acquirer has industry-adjusted leverage ratio above sample median and 0 
otherwise, CASHi is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the acquirer offered cash to finance the deal and 0 
if shares were included in the offer, CASHi*HDLDi  is a binary interaction term that takes 1 the 
acquirer was non-cash and ranked as low-leveraged in the sample and 0 otherwise, LEVi is the 
acquirer’s industry-adjusted leverage ratio, RSIZEi is the relative size of the deal measured by relating 
the book value of total assets of the target to the book value of total assets of the acquirer and SOXi is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if the deal was announced in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses represent t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote 
confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  Non‐cash acquirers Cash acquirers
  ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ1ሻ ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ
Constant  2.291***  1.399* 0.4115 0.606 ‐0.260 ‐0.645  ‐1.173 ‐0.739
   ሺ3.02ሻ  ሺ‐1.72ሻ ሺ0.42ሻ ሺ0.61ሻ ሺ‐0.33ሻ ሺ‐0.8ሻ  ሺ‐1.09ሻ ሺ‐0.64ሻ
LEVi  ‐4.265**  ‐4.775*** ‐5.158*** 2.120 2.319  2.673
   ሺ‐2.33ሻ  ሺ‐2.62ሻ ሺ‐2.79ሻ ሺ1.16ሻ ሺ‐1.28ሻ  ሺ1.42ሻ
RSIZEi     2.05** 1.956** 1.764* 0.644  0.242 1.272
      ሺ‐2.24ሻ ሺ2.14ሻ ሺ1.95ሻ ሺ‐0.25ሻ  ሺ0.09ሻ ሺ0.51ሻ
SOXi        2.244** 2.222**   0.825 0.639
         ሺ1.99ሻ ሺ1.98ሻ   ሺ0.74ሻ ሺ0.56ሻ
HDLDi        ‐3.474***      0.674
         ሺ‐3.09ሻ      ሺ0.60ሻ
       
N  417  417 417 417 244 244  244 244
F‐statistic  5.44**  5.22*** 4.84*** 5.43*** 1.35 1.02  0.86 0.3
P‐value  0.0205  0.006 0.0027 0.0012 0.2473 0.364  0.4647 0.8233
Adj R2  0.0165  0.0314 0.0425 0.0486 0.0027 0.0003  ‐0.0034 ‐0.0167
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Moreover, the model’s goodness of fit improves in these models since the adjusted r-squared 
values respond positively to these two control factors. The outcome of regression (4), in which 
LEVi is replaced with the interactive term HDLDi, further supports our inference on the inverse 
relation between pre-merger earnings management and leverage of acquirers, given that the 
method of payment is not cash. 
This brings up a natural question on the potential interaction between the two variables, i.e. the 
method of payment and the level of leverage, as the effect of non-cash payment with low 
leverage level on the abnormal accruals may not simply be additive but multiplicative too. 
Therefore, an interactive term is added as an additional regressor - this being CASHi*HDLDi, 
which represents a dummy variable that takes 1 if the acquirer offers equity and is also ranked 
as LD in the sample with 0 otherwise - to regressions (4), (5) and (7) in Table  4.6.  
Interestingly, the interactive dummy variable CASHi*HDLDi, in Table  4.6, has a significant 
positive coefficient of 3.362 (P-value < 10 percent) in regression (4), 3.743 (P-value <5 
percent) in regression (5) and 4.423 (P-value < 1 percent) in regression (7). Adding the 
interactive variable to the multiple regression model improves the estimated line’s goodness of 
fit as well. This finding suggests that the two dummy variables CASHi and HDLDi have a 
significant multiplicative impact on earnings management, which predicts that a low leveraged 
acquiring firm would have an extraordinarily higher magnitude of premerger abnormal 
accruals if equity shares were offered in the M&A payment to its target firm. 
The outcome of the cross-sectional regressions conducted is consistent with the results of the 
univariate analysis in the previous section since the LD subsample taken from non-cash 
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acquirers displays the highest, and the most significant, rates of abnormal accruals when 
compared to all other subsamples. This confirms the hypothesis as proposed in this chapter 
related to the negative relationship between pre-merger earnings management by non-cash 
acquirers and their level of leverage.  
A positive coefficient is reported for RSIZEi in all regressions for the total sample in Table  4.6 
as well as for non-cash acquirers in Table  4.7, ranging from 1.738 to 2.05 at a statistical 
significance level of 5 percent for most regressions. This result is consistent with the economic 
benefit conjecture, which suggests that managerial teams have less economic incentives to 
manipulate earnings in case of relatively small non-cash deals, provided that inflating the 
reported earnings is not costless (Erickson and Wang 1999; Botsari and Meeks 2008). 
Finally, the coefficient of SOXi is positive and significant for all total sample regressions 
in Table  4.6 as well as for the regressions of non-cash subsample in Table  4.7 ranging from 
1.346 to 2.244. These results indicate that pre-merger abnormal accruals are higher in the post-
SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. This is consistent with the evidence presented 
in the previous chapter and reinforces the inferences made earlier in section  3.6.    
4.6. Summary and Conclusion 
The main aim of this research is to contribute to the on-going empirical debate regarding the 
implications of leverage on management’s accounting discretionary power. This study 
distinguishes itself from prior studies and offers two main contributions to the existing 
literature. First, it employs a structured sample of non-cash acquiring firms, which already 
have the motivation to manage their earnings upwards, in examining the impact of debt-
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financing on earnings management. This study claims that the adopted design provides more 
reliable results when comparing the magnitude of earnings management among firms with 
different levels of leverage, since the motivation to manage earnings is arguably consistent and 
intentional for all firms in the testing sample, rather than being random or undetermined as in 
prior studies. Second, unlike previous studies, which usually use a common debt ratio to proxy 
for leverage, this study constructs a leverage proxy more consistent with earnings management 
research methodology (Martin 1996).   
It is argued in this chapter that pre-merger earnings management conducted by non-cash 
acquirers should be negatively associated with the firm’s level of leverage. This argument is 
built on two theoretical foundations. First, acquiring firms have the incentive to adopt income-
increasing methods before offering their shares to pay for M&A deals (Erickson and Wang 
1999; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Gong et al. 2008). Moreover, leverage can be a determinant of 
the payment method in a M&A (Faccio and Masulis 2005), a control of managerial 
opportunism (Jensen 1986), an effective external monitoring device (DeAngelo et al. 1994) 
and a source of conflicting incentives of earnings management (Jones 1991; Beneish 2001; 
Chung et al. 2002). 
Earnings management is measured using an industry-performance matched model similar to 
Louis (2004) and Kothari et al.’s (2005) method over the last three quarters prior to M&A 
announcement. Similar to the results that have been consistently documented by previous 
studies, such as those found in the works of Erickson and Wang (1999), Botsari and Meek 
(2008) and Gong et al. (2008), this study reports evidences of upward earnings management 
practices displayed by non-cash acquirers prior to deals’ announcement dates. After splitting 
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the sample into low versus high leverage subsamples based on an industry-adjusted leverage 
proxy, only the low-leverage subsample of acquirers provides evidence of earnings 
management. 
As expected, the evidence of pre-merger earnings management is more robust for non-cash 
acquirers. This finding is supported by a multiple regression analysis, which provides evidence 
that the inverse relation between earnings management and leverage is very significant. The 
evidence holds after replacing the leverage proxy with the high-low leverage dummy, as well 
as after controlling for other factors such as the relative size of the deal and new legislations as 
represented by SOX. 
Unlike the non-cash acquirers’ results, no evidence is found to support the notion of earnings 
management by cash acquirers, which is unsurprising as they lack the economic incentive. 
Therefore, as expected, testing of the relationship between earnings management and leverage 
in this particular sample did not reveal any significant results, while the cross-sectional model 
could not predict any relation. 
This chapter has documented how debt creation is more likely to restrict a firm’s ability to 
manipulate discretionary accruals as well as addressing whether it is high in relation to the 
firm’s respective industry, at times when those firms have the economic incentive to 
manipulate their accruals. Given the link between earnings management and managerial 
opportunism (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Easterwood 1997; Jelinek 2007), this can be 
explained by Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis, which predicts that a higher level of leverage 
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has a mitigating effect over managerial opportunism since management’s control over free 
cash flow is reduced.      
Similarly, the findings can be explained in light of agency theory using the close lenders’ 
monitoring hypothesis by DeAngelo et al. (1994), which predicts both that the relationship 
between lenders and the borrowing firms is governed by the firm’s accounting numbers and 
that lenders seek to protect their interests by closely monitoring their borrowers. 
An alternative interpretation of the results of this study can be found by assuming the 
conflicting incentives of earnings management (Jones 1991), given that both debt contracts 
and equity issues are considered as potential sources of incentives for income-increasing 
earnings management (Beneish 2001). Moreover, this school of thought argues that the impact 
of earnings management is transient since the effect of discretionary accruals on earnings in a 
given accounting period has a reversal effect on earnings in a future period (Chung et al. 2002). 
Finally, the importance of the findings of this study not only stems from their consistency with 
previous theories that advocate the mitigating effect of leverage on earnings management, 
such as Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis, but also because these findings emphasise the 
relevance of examining  the “leverage – earnings management” relationship while the 
economic incentive to manage earnings exists. From the perspective of regulators such as the 
SEC, such evidence on earnings management and understanding its mitigating factors has 
implications on direct accounting standards enforcement that improves the credibility of 
corporate reports. 
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Chapter 5 
Pre-merger Earnings Management and Non-cash 
Acquisition Premia46 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, earnings management is investigated within a M&A context by 
focusing on two major issues – the remarkable change in the US legal environment 
represented by the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 (SOX), which is discussed in  Chapter 3, 
and the influence of leverage on managerial discretionary power, which is discussed 
in  Chapter 4.  
In fact, reporting evidence of pre-merger earnings management, here or in the literature, 
indicates that managerial teams succeed in their attempts to influence the reported numbers on 
paper, with the aim of reducing the firm’s cost of capital. Such evidence per se does not 
necessarily indicate that the users’ perceptions, especially those of well-informed ones, are 
also successfully manipulated. This chapter focuses on this issue and addresses the question of 
how earnings management undertaken by a firm is perceived and processed by relevant parties.  
Like any other corporate investment decision, a merger and acquisition proposal must pass 
through extensive ex-ante analyses for the costs and benefits of the deal from the perspective 
of the acquiring firm as well as the target. In particular, an acquiring firm has to determine the 
                                                 
46 A major part of Chapter 5 was presented in the 4th International Accounting & Finance 
Doctoral Symposium, Salamanca, Spain, in July 18th - 20th, 2011. under the title “Pre-merger 
earnings management as an ex ante forecast variable in M&A: evidence from acquisition 
premia.” 
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maximum price it can feasibly offer to the shareholders of a potential target without the deal 
becoming wealth destroying. From the acquirer’s perspective, the true value of a candidate 
target firm not only represents the pre-merger stand-alone value, but should also include the 
expected additional post-merger value resulting from the combination of the firms (i.e. 
synergies). Therefore, the valuation approach that is employed by an acquirer to match the 
value to be received against the value to be given up has a crucial impact on the overall M&A 
decision.   
Although there is no single method recommended to estimate the value of the target firm, the 
most commonly used methods for the valuation of M&A deals’ are either earnings based 
methods, such as the ‘multiples of comparables’, or cash flow based methods, such as the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF) (Sudarsanam 2003). However, the literature has 
repeatedly documented that earnings data are considered more value-relevant and more 
informative from the investors perspective in general as compared to cash flow data which 
focuses on estimating future performance (Dechow 1994). Addressing this issue, Ritter (1984) 
argues that earnings are crucial for pricing firms. 
As a consequence, the high value-relevance of earnings data for predicting future returns is 
argued to derive the motivation of managers to manipulate their firms’ earnings preceding 
specific events. These events include corporate activities such as seasoned equity offerings 
(hereafter SEOs), initial public offering (hereafter IPOs) or M&A deals – all offer clear capital 
market incentives for the managerial team to attempt to affect the valuation of their firms’ 
equity shares.  
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Event-specific earnings management studies document fairly consistent evidence of income-
increasing earnings management for firms raising capital, such as within IPOs (DuCharme et 
al. 2001) SEOs (Teoh et al. 1998; Cohen and Zarowin 2010) or M&As (Erickson and Wang 
1999; Gong et al. 2008). However, arguing that these firms have “capital market incentives” 
for managing their earnings before issuing equity can be reasonable only by assuming that 
capital market participants cannot detect and reverse earnings management (Dechow et al. 
2010, p.384). 
As indicated in the previous chapters, a number of studies have already investigated earnings 
management in a M&A context and have addressed that this pre-merger earnings management 
may impact the firms’ valuation during the M&A transacting process. The perspective 
previously adopted has been to focus on the discretionary power that a management practices 
in order to report abnormally high accruals which boost earnings before the announcement of 
a M&A deal (see Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Gong et al. 
2008). The common argument in the literature is the capital market incentives. Specifically, it 
is argued that if an acquiring firm has managed its accruals upward before offering its shares 
in a M&A deal, the intention has been aimed at inflating the share price in order to issue less 
shares and, therefore, reduce the cost of capital faced.  
As implied above, the “capital market incentives” argument seems theoretically correct in 
light of the acquirer-target information asymmetry and the agency problems between current 
and new equity-holders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). However, the argument 
does not adequately explicate how or whether the new equity-holders (i.e. the target’s 
shareholders or their agent/management) respond to this agency problem or indeed how to 
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deal with the over-reporting of accruals by the acquirer, which implicitly assumes naivety on 
the part of the target’s management. In this way, the literature has ignored the resources at the 
target’s disposal, as a well-informed user, available to aid decision-making. A naive investor 
model is introduced by Sloan (1996, p.291), who suggests “that investors “fixate” on earnings, 
failing to distinguish fully between the different properties of the accrual and cash flow 
components of earnings.” This view predicts that investors respond to the managed earnings, 
which contains abnormal accruals, as if this level of earnings would persist in the future. 
In fact, accruals have a transient effect on earnings among accounting periods and abnormal 
accruals are likely to reverse in a future period (Dechow et al. 1995; Chung et al. 2002). As a 
counter argument to the naive target proposition, this study argues in this chapter that pre-
merger earnings management may not be an effective tool to mislead a well-informed 
participant. Assuming that a target firm is sophisticated enough to recognise the inability of 
acquirer’s abnormal accruals to be able to truly persist, then the non-cash acquisition premium, 
which is the final product of the bargaining process in a M&A deal, should reflect the target’s 
adjustment to the acquirer’s share value. 
This chapter examines this proposition focussing on the relationship between pre-merger 
earnings management and the non-cash acquisition premium. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised in four main sections as follows. Section  5.2 reviews the previous studies on the 
accruals’ implications on valuation as well as some literature on the influences of acquisition 
premium. Under section  5.3, a theoretical model is constructed in order to support the 
development of the proposed hypothesis in this study while section  5.4 illustrates the 
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methodology. Section  5.5 documents the empirical results of the model while some inferences 
are made and summarised in section  5.6 to conclude the chapter.  
5.2. Literature Review 
At least two key areas in the literature must be reviewed in order to establish the relevant 
literary background at present for the research area of this study, as well as to appreciate the 
contribution of these studies to the development of ideas found in this work. First, the related 
studies on accruals manipulation and their implications on valuation are reviewed in 
section  5.2.1. Second, since this study also contributes to the existing field examining the 
acquisition premium and its determinants, the relevant literature on the influences over 
acquisition premium are also reviewed in section  5.2.2. 
5.2.1. Accruals’ Implications on Value 
In the wake of the renowned paper of Dechow et al. (1995), in which they report that 
overstating earnings in one year by manipulating accruals has a reversal effect on earnings in 
the following year, Sloan (1996) employs a market expectation model in a wide sample of US 
firms in order to examine investors’ awareness regarding the reversal effect of accounting 
accruals. Sloan addresses the primary research question “Do stock prices fully reflect 
information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?” in order to investigate the 
differential reaction of investors to the released information concerning the cash and the 
accrual components of earnings.  
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Sloan’s (1996) findings indicate that the persistence of earnings is higher in the cash 
component of earnings than it is in the accrual component. The evidence suggests that the 
lower persistence of earnings can be blamed solely on the accrual component. Sloan also 
presents interesting evidence that investors price – or, in fact, overprice - shares of firms with 
reported abnormal accruals in one period, as if the earnings would persist in future periods. 
This is considered as evidence of investors’ naivety when evaluating the firms’ reported 
earnings and in particular the accrual component.  
On the back of Sloan’s findings, further research was stimulated. This new line of research 
was aimed at investigating the extent of the managerial motivation of manipulating stock 
prices through earnings management practices. For instance, Teoh et al. (1998) and Rangan 
(1995; 1998) argue that seasoned equity issuers have the motivation to inflate accruals in order 
to boost their reported earnings before seasoned equity offerings (hereafter SEO). Teoh et al. 
(1998) investigates the relationship between pre-offering earnings and post-offering 
performance based on firms’ annual data while Rangan (1998) examines the same relationship 
around the date of the firm’s SEO using quarterly data instead. Both studies seem to agree that 
the managerial motive of adopting income-increasing accounting methods is centred on the 
aim of making the stock price overvalued before actually making the equity issue itself, in an 
attempt to obtain more proceeds and reduce the firm’s cost of capital.  
Both studies mentioned report significant evidence of investors’ disappointment in the post-
offering period due to the sharp decline in both the reported earnings and stock returns in the 
period following the earnings management incident, at either a quarterly or an annual period 
span. Such findings seem to advocate the use of the naive investor model as suggested by 
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Sloan (1996), since investors’ disappointment can be blamed on the fixation on the pre-
offering earnings and the failure to adjust for firms’ alteration of the accrual component of 
their earnings.  
While Teoh et al. (1998) and Rangan (1998) implicitly assume pre-offering earrings 
management, Kim and Park (2005) directly examine the association between pre-offering 
earnings management and the pricing of SEO’s. Their work finds explicit evidence of 
aggressive accounting practices (i.e. abnormally higher accruals than normal) by firms before 
a SEO. Moreover, pre-offering earnings management is found to be negatively correlated with 
SEO underpricing as a sign of investors naivety as suggested earlier.    
From a sample of initial public offerings (hereafter IPO), DuCharme et al. (2001) examine 
how pre-offering earnings management impacts the offering pricing and post-offering 
performance. They confirm the findings of earlier studies in respect to the naivety of investors. 
Their work provides a robust support to the view that investors do not show any ability to be 
able to distinguish between managed and unmanaged accruals, which allows managers to 
affect IPO pricing through managing accounting accruals. Moreover, they document a 
significant negative relationship between the abnormal accruals of the firm and the post-
offering performance, which also persists even with risk-adjusted returns. 
On the contrary and despite the documented support for Sloan’s model, the naive investor 
hypothesis has been challenged vigorously. In a paper which aims at re-testing the naive 
investor hypothesis, Ashiq-Ali et al. (2000) adopt a methodology that focuses on the use of 
proxies to measure for the level of investor sophistication in contrast to the approach of 
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investor naivety. They argue that given that earnings fixation by naive investors leads to an 
inverse relationship between the accrual component and future stock performance, then the 
magnitude of such a relationship should be negatively associated with the proportion of 
sophisticated investors’ interest in the firm, where the investor’s sophistication is proxied by 
the institutional ownership. Surprisingly, the findings of Ashiq-Ali et al.’s (2000) study 
disagree with the naive investor proposition and its predictions, since the inverse relationship 
between the accruals and future stock performance is found to be stronger for shares that 
interest investors of a greater level of sophistication. Likewise, Balsam et al. (2002) use 
institutional ownership in order to proxy for the investor’s sophistication and report evidence 
of a negative association between the abnormal accruals in the quarterly earnings and the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the statements’ filing date. This indicates that the accrual 
component of earnings has valuation consequences for sophisticated investors.  
In a different study published in the same year, Shivakumar (2000) reports findings that 
challenge the arguments of Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998). Interestingly, although he 
finds evidence of earnings management around the date of a SEO, he also finds evidence that 
investors assume earnings management as they rationally undo its effects on the SEO, which 
forfeits the investor naivety proposition. Shivakumar (2000) defends his findings by stating 
that the evidence of Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al.’s (1998) are biased due to the 
misspecification of tests, as the results they document lack robustness 47 . Therefore, 
                                                 
47 Shivakumar explains that the negative relationship between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-
offering abnormal stock returns reported by Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) was measured 
either as market-adjusted returns or as prediction errors from the Fama-French three factor model. 
Hence, statistical tests based on these measures of abnormal returns are severely mis-specified 
because of many factors including the skewness in long-horizon returns data as he refers to evidence 
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Shivakumar (2000) suggests that manipulating accruals by issuers does not achieve its 
intended outcome on average. 
In a parallel stream of growing literature, a number of studies look at the implications of 
earnings management on the value of the firm around M&A events by examining per-merger 
abnormal accruals in samples of acquiring firms, and sometimes also their targets (see, for 
example, Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Asano et al. 2007; Baik et al. 2007; Botsari 
and Meeks 2008; Gong et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008; Pungaliya and Vijh 2008; Hamza and 
Lakhal 2010). The core argument in this area of research is that the acquirer’s managerial team 
has the motivation to report abnormally high accruals before deals that entail issuing equity 
shares by the acquirer to its target firm shareholders (for more detail, see section  3.2.2 of 
chapter 3). Prior studies directly assume that the market price of the acquirer’s share responds 
positively to the managed and inflated pre-merger earnings, which would lead to the issuance 
of a lower number of shares to acquire the target firm and would, eventually, reduce the 
acquirer’s cost of capital48.  
The empirical investigation in the literature at present for earnings management around M&A 
events has repeatedly revealed significant evidence of pre-merger abnormal accruals, which 
are positively associated with the relative size of the deal implying the economic incentives of 
                                                                                                                                                         
from two studies: Kothari, S., Warner, J., 1997. Measuring long-horizon security price performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 43, 301-339. and Barber, B., Lyon, J., 1997. Detecting long-run 
abnormal stock returns: the empirical power and specifications of test statistics. Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 341-372. 
48 This argumentation is, to some extent, similar to Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al’s (1996) proposed 
scenario about the firm’s motive to inflate stock price before equity issues as a mechanism for 
minimising the cost of capital. 
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earnings management (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Gong et al. 2008). Focusing on 
non-cash M&A events, in which shares are used to pay the deals, is very much analogous to 
the rationale in Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al.’s (1998) research framework of investigating 
the pre-event earnings management and its ex-post potential effects. Louis (2004), for example, 
provides evidence of post-merger underperformance in his examination of the impact of 
earnings management on the acquirers’ performance. In explaining this anomaly, he concludes 
that the reversal effect of accruals is an important determinant of the post-merger market 
reaction and the stock’s performance. 
Beyond the stock market’s financial reaction, Gong et al. (2008) warn that potential post-
merger litigation costs are likely to be a consequence for those acquiring firms that have 
adopted income-increasing accounting procedures prior to the M&A activity. They report a 
positive relationship between pre-merger earnings management and the probability of post-
merger litigation. The seminal study of Erickson and Wang (1999) also sheds light on another 
negative potential consequence of pre-merger earnings management. They advise the 
acquirer’s management team to consider the M&A target firm as a well-informed user that 
may also hire advisors to encounter the existing agency problem and reduce information 
asymmetry. Therefore, the risk of being caught with pre-merger earnings manipulation is a 
cost that should not be ignored, and acquirers are cautioned to choose to manage earnings 
unless the cost of undoing earnings management outweighs the cost of undertaking it.  
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5.2.2. Influences of Acquisition Premium 
Although there exists a considerable amount of research examining whether M&A deals create 
value for the acquirer and target’s shareholders, there is a relatively small amount of research 
on explaining the variation in acquisition premium (i.e. payment made in excess of the targets 
market value) paid to target shareholders. It appears that the peculiar nature of each M&A deal 
and the complications of the transacting dynamics explain the shortage of research. However, 
research has grown since the introduction of machine-generated data in this area of research 
(Eckbo 2009). 
The acquisition premium is investigated from several perspectives in hopeful attempts of 
finding the key factors that affect its level. In early work, Huang and Walking (1987) suggest 
that personal taxes can be an influential factor if they vary depending on the method of 
payment. They provide evidence that target shareholders demand a higher acquisition 
premium in cash deals since they are immediately taxed and thus, in this situation, they expect 
to be compensated, unlike in non-cash deals where tax is not deducted immediately but 
deferred until the new shareholders exchange their shares for cash at their own disposal. 
From another viewpoint, Haw et al. (1987) focus on the hypothesised relationship between the 
financial health of the target firm prior to M&A and the magnitude of the acquisition premium 
offered. They argue that managers may decide on a M&A in order to avoid a risk of 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, acquiring a healthy firm may result in agreeing on a level of 
acquisition premium that is a substantially different from that offered while acquiring a 
distressed one. Haw et al. (1987) use Altman Z-score to proxy for the target firms’ financial 
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health in their study, after controlling for firm specific variables. Although their findings do 
not indicate a statistically significant difference between acquisition premia offered to the 
distressed targets and those offered to the healthy targets, their findings clearly show the 
variation in the acquisition premium when the distressed firms are sub-grouped into those with 
tax-loss-carryforward experience and those without. They find evidence that distressed target 
firms with tax-loss-carryforward experience enjoy higher acquisition premia than those given 
to healthy firms or distressed ones with no previous experience of tax-loss-carryforward. 
In a different study, Crawford and Lechner (1996) examine the effects of other financial 
attributes of the target firm on acquisition premia. They show mixed and weak results 
regarding tax carryforward after controlling for liquidity and solvency using suitable proxies. 
However, they provide significant evidence that the target’s likelihood to be acquired is 
positively related to its liquidity but inversely related to its leverage. 
The empirical contribution of the studies discussed above is valuable for understanding some 
sources of the acquisition premium. However, they seem to focus exclusively on “target-
related” variables and fall short of considering other important factors, such as those 
“acquirer-related” ones. In this manner, these early works could be accused of viewing the 
acquirer as a passive recipient in the transacting process. This limitation is less pronounced in 
Bugeja and Walter’s (1995) study as they consider the financial performance of the acquirer as 
well as the target’s. In addition, they include the acquirer’s toehold (i.e. pre-merger ownership) 
in the target firm before obtaining a controlling ownership interest (Stulz 1988). The results of 
their model reveal that acquirers’ prior M&A period financial performance is negatively 
associated with the acquisition premium whereas acquirers’ pre-merger toehold in the target 
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firm is positively related with this premium. Despite the fact that Bugeja and Walter (1995) 
introduce new influences over the acquisition premium which distinguishes their study from 
related work, their findings could arguably be biased because they are based on a sample that 
includes M&A deals regardless of whether or not the deals are successfully completed or not. 
Therefore, their evidence does not reflect the equilibrium acquisition premium, which M&A 
parties agree upon.  
However, Bugeja and Walter’s evidence is challenged in research by Schwert (2000), in which 
he argues that firm characteristic variables, such as performance or size, are not reliably 
related to the acquisition premium. Schwert (2000) emphasises the role of negotiation 
dynamics of M&A deals and their impact on the deal’s pricing. He posits that “[o]ne way to 
increase the expected premium is to initiate a multiple-bidder auction”(2000, p.2624). 
Schwert’s (2000) analysis for the acquisition premium compares sub-samples of friendly 
offers to hostile acquisitions and indicates evidence that the acquisition premium is 
significantly higher in unnegotiated deals (i.e. hostile acquisitions). 
A recent paper by Wickramanayake and Wood (2009) reviews some empirical literature on 
the influence of an acquirer holding a toehold on the acquisition premium. They conclude that 
the most convincing argument addressed within the existing literature is that an acquirer’s pre-
merger toehold is inversely related to the acquisition premium. This relationship can be 
explained by proposing that the greater the toehold held, the fewer the additional shares that 
must be sought to obtain the controlling majority. Lower demands and a weaker position for 
competing bidders are natural consequences and, therefore, a lower acquisition premium is 
more likely to be offered. 
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Despite the cumulative contributions by each of Huang and Walking (1987), Haw et al (1987), 
Bugeja and Walter (1995), Crawford and Lechner (1996) and Schwert (2000), the findings of 
all of these studies are obtained using the target’s cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) 
around the deal’s announcement date as a proxy for the acquisition premium. Using target’ 
CAR in the empirical literature of the level of the acquisition premium was common before 
having the exact offer prices available on M&A databases such as SDC and ONE Banker 
(Eckbo 2009).  
One of the earliest studies that investigated the acquisition premium data as obtained from 
SDC and calculated based on the offer price is “How Much Is That Company Worth?: 
Interorganizational Relationships, Uncertainty, and Acquisition  Premiums” by Haunschild 
(1994). She provides evidence that is consistent with previous studies regarding the impact of 
competition on acquisition premia. However, Haunschild’s (1994) paper reports little support 
for the influence of the financial conditions of the target on the acquisition premium after 
controlling for the potential synergy between the acquirer and target. Unexpectedly, she finds 
no evidence on the relationship between high acquisition premia and synergistic acquisitions. 
Hauschild (1994) sheds light on the connection between the uncertainty incorporated with 
target valuation and the use of investment banking firms. In accordance with that, Porrini 
(2006) and Chahine and Ismail (2009) emphasise the role of pre-merger financial advisory and 
investigate its implications on the acquisition premium. Specifically, Porrini (2006) examines 
the relation between the presence of an investment banking firm in the merger process and the 
acquisition premium. She documents a positive relation between acquirers with advisory 
investment bankers and the acquisition premium, even after controlling for the target’s use of 
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advisors. This evidence is explained by the potential conflict of interests between the M&A 
advisor its client - the acquirer. Porrini’s (2006) argument implies that M&A advisory fees are 
based on the deal’s value and that advisors compensation increases with a higher acquisition 
premium. Nonetheless, Porrini (2006) does not directly examine how the advisors’ fees 
correlate with acquisition premia. 
In contrast, Chahine and Ismail’s (2009) study focuses on M&A advisory fees and their 
impact on the acquisition premium. Initially, they argue that the use of M&A advisors per se is 
not the only factor that can influence the acquisition premium, but rather the reputation of the 
hired advisors can also exert an effect. Although they provide evidence that an investment 
banking firm’s reputation is positively correlated with the fees they earn, their results do not 
indicate any evidence on the impact of the investment bank on the acquisition premium. 
Chahine and Ismail (2009) conclude that if advisory fees paid by an acquirers exceed those 
paid by targets, then the acquisition premium is more likely to be lower. 
5.2.3. Summary and Potential Contributions to the Literature 
The relevant literature on the value relevance of accruals reveals that management manipulates 
the accrual component of earnings in order to inflate the share price prior to particular events 
that include issuing equity shares in, such as SEO (see, for example, Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 
1998), IPO (see, for example, DuCharme et al. 2001) and M&A (see, for example, Louis 2004; 
Gong et al. 2008). The common underlying rationale is noticeably aimed at reducing the cost 
of capital. However, the literature of pre-event earnings management implicitly assumes the 
naive investor model of Sloan (1996) in order to validate this argument.  
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Surprisingly, the validity of the naive investor model has been challenged in IPO and SEO 
contexts but not within a M&A context. The earnings management research surrounding 
M&A events implicitly adopts the naive investor model to explain the reportedly positive 
evidence of pre-merger abnormal accruals in order to back the proposition that reducing the 
cost of capital is the managerial motivation (see, for example, Erickson and Wang 1999; 
Asano et al. 2007; Botsari and Meeks 2008). 
Unlike SEOs and IPOs, M&A events are a good example of a business transaction where 
relatively sophisticated users (i.e. management) act as agents on behalf of investors (i.e. their 
shareholders). In such situations, assuming that investors are naive is not persuasive and needs 
to be readdressed. Moreover, there is a substantial gap in the relevant literature related to 
investigating the target’s (or even the acquirer’s) ability of detecting pre-merger earnings 
management and adjusting its effect in the deal’s pricing. 
Analysing the literature related to the acquisition premium indicates that its influences can be 
categorised into three groupings: target-related factors, acquirer-related factors and 
transacting-related factors. Despite the literary attempts of achieving theoretical conformity 
regarding the expected effect of each factor, the empirical evidence does not prove consistent. 
Interestingly, research on the acquisition premium has shifted toward using the offer price 
instead of the target’s CAR near a deal’s announcement, particularly since the availability of 
offer related-data on machine readable format. It is claimed that this move has contributed 
positively to this area of research since using CAR as a proxy for acquisition premium is 
problematic and subject to bias from reflecting offer-irrelevant factors.  
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However, the literature related to the acquisition premium does not explicitly investigate 
whether pre-merger practices such as earnings management would have any influence on a 
deal’s price and, thus, on the offered acquisition premium, especially when the payment (also 
the premium) offered by the acquiring firm is not cash. In addition, there is no clear distinction 
in the literature between the cash and non-cash acquisition premium, although calculating the 
acquisition premium by databases varies depending on the M&A payment method. 
Given the above discussed gaps in the relevant literature, this study contributes to the existing 
research in several ways. First, it examines the naivety of investors in a M&A context by 
adopting the counter argument that a target’s management is a well-informed user that is more 
likely to detect pre-merger earnings management and reverse its impact. Second, by 
developing a theoretical perspective on the potential impact of pre-merger earnings 
management on non-cash deals’ acquisition premia, this chapter can significantly add to the 
existing literature by providing a better understanding of the consequences of manipulating 
earnings given that the user is sophisticated and well informed such as target firms. Third, the 
chapter addresses the question of whether earnings management is relevant to the valuation 
process and acquisition premia in non-cash M&A deals. Finally, this chapter simultaneously 
assesses the same set of acquisition premium factors for cash and non-cash samples. 
The following sections continue by outlining the rationale behind the testable hypothesis of 
this study. 
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5.3. Theoretical Framing and Hypothesis Development 
5.3.1. Agency theory and Informational Asymmetry 
Since the current chapter pays greater attention to the transacting dynamics of a M&A, this 
study is directly complemented by Hansen’s (1987) model which aids the study’s theoretical 
framework. Therefore, it is posited that a M&A deal is initiated in a market where buyers (i.e. 
acquirers) seek to buy the assets of sellers (i.e. targets). On each side of the transaction (i.e. the 
buyer’s side and the seller’s side) there is one agent (i.e. the management) acting on behalf of 
passive owners with the motivation of maximising the owners’ wealth (Myers and Majluf 
1984). However, the efficiency of managers in decision making creates an agency problem 
between the current and the new shareholders every time new equity issues are decided upon 
by a given firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This means that management’s decisions would 
favour current shareholders’ interests over those of the new. 
Therefore, information asymmetry is perceived by the participating sides of a M&A deal as 
each party possesses proprietary information on its own firm’s value. It can be noted here that 
the amount of information known about a firm and its earnings limits the extent of its earnings 
management and, therefore, the motivation as well as the effectiveness of earnings 
management cannot be expected when information is perfectly symmetric between the 
acquiring firm and other stakeholders (Richardson 2000). Although agents bargain under 
imperfect informational conditions, they are well-informed users, whose resources and access 
to information is superior than average users’.  
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5.3.2. The Method of Payment of M&A 
The main goal of this study is to investigate whether earnings management affects M&A deal 
pricing and the resulting acquisition premium. Therefore, for M&A deals paid for with 100 
percent cash, the changes in the acquirer’s share price around the M&A are irrelevant in either 
the deal’s pricing or indeed in the determination of the acquisition premium. Therefore, as 
discussed in  Chapter 3, an acquirer does not have the motivation to influence its share price 
prior a cash M&A deal (Erickson and Wang 1999). Two propositions are needed for the sake 
of developing a relevant theoretical framework here. First, the payment structure of a M&A 
deal must include the issuance of equity shares to the target, and second, the acquiring firm 
must then have the incentive to manage their earnings prior to announcing the M&A deal.  
In a non-cash deal, the acquiring firm agrees to issue new shares to target’s stockholders based 
on the certain exchange (swap) ratio, as recalled from the discussion in section  3.3.3. The 
higher the acquirer’s share price, the lower the exchange ratio and the fewer shares to issue to 
target’s shareholders. Thus, the managers of the acquiring firm may adopt pre-merger income-
increasing earnings management as a technique to minimise the dilutive effect on the current 
shareholder’s EPS and their voting power (Eddey and Taylor 1999).  
5.3.3. Adverse Selection Problem and the Signalling Theory 
The renowned lemons’ problem theory of Akerlof (1970) suggests that in the M&A market a 
potential acquirer assumes that a target firm accepts the cash offer only if it finds - according 
to its proprietary information - that its real value is lower than the offer received. Due to 
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information uncertainty, the acquirer is likely to discount the target’s value to entrench itself 
against adverse selection risk. 
However, the scenario is bidirectional (i.e. dual direction of information asymmetry) when an 
acquiring firm offers equity shares to its target since equity has a contingent-pricing effect. 
The target firm must also deal with information uncertainty regarding the real value of the 
shares offered by an acquirer (Eckbo et al. 1990). Since the target is exposed to the risk of 
adverse selection (i.e. receiving overvalued shares), it is likely to discount the acquirer share’s 
value. This situation is described by Hansen (1987) as a double lemons’ problem.  
Assuming the lemons and double lemons’ problems in the M&A market, Hansen’s (1987) 
theory for the choice of method of payment in M&A suggests that the acquirer offers cash 
when its shares are undervalued while it offers equity shares only when they are overvalued. 
According to this theory, a target firm can use the method of payment in M&A as a signal to 
learn about the fairness of the acquirer’s share value.  
From the acquirer’s perspective, the awareness of the value-discounting strategy adopted by 
targets receiving offers that include equity shares presents another motivation for the 
acquirer’s management to inflate pre-merger earnings and influence its share price before 
offering shares that are going to be eventually discounted during the M&A transacting process. 
5.3.4. M&A Pricing: An Equilibrium Model 
In M&A offers that contain equity shares, the quantity of shares received from the acquirer in 
exchange for one share given up by the target is referred to as the share-swap ratio (Arzac 
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2004). At the equilibrium price of a M&A deal (i.e. at which parties agree to complete the 
transaction), discounting the value of the exchanged acquirer’s shares affects the share-swap 
ratio positively in favour of the target shareholders (i.e. more shares need to be issued by the 
acquirer per one share in the target firm). In proofing this simple premise, let Vi represent the 
equilibrium deal value per share of the target’s share that both the acquirer and the target agree 
to transact upon in deal i, Ci is the average cash or any other form of assets that is included in 
the acquirer’s offer per target share, which will be zero in pure share-for-share deals, while Ei 
is the market value of the total equity consideration issued by the acquirer in exchange for one 
share in the target firm, so that it Vi can be denoted as follows: 
௜ܸ ൌ ܥ௜ ൅ ܧ௜      ( 5.1)  
If we let Ri represent the share-swap ratio, indicating the number of shares issued by the 
acquirer per a target share, and PACQi  represent the market value of the acquirer’s share at time 
the target is approached, then Ei can be defined as: 
ܧ௜ ൌ ൫ܴ௜ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯      ( 5.2)  
So, following this, the share-swap ratio can be calculated as: 
ܴ௜ ൌ
ா೔
௉ಲ಴ೂ೔       ( 5.3)
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If the target perceives PACQi as an overpriced value for the acquirer’s share so that at some 
point it must be discounted by di to adjust it to the fair value, where 0  ൑  di  ൏1, then the share-
swap ratio will also be adjusted as follows: 
തܴ௜ ൌ
ா೔
௉ಲ಴ೂ೔ൈሺଵିௗ೔ሻ       ( 5.4)
  
Hence, the adjusted share-swap ratio ܴపഥ  increases proportionally with the discount di at the 
rate ቀ ଵ
ଵିௗ೔
ቁ to maintain the equilibrium value of the deal Vi as follows; 
തܴ௜ ൌ ܴ௜ ൈ ቀ
ଵ
ଵିௗ೔
ቁ
       ( 5.5)
  
5.3.5. Acquisition Premium and Earnings Management: Earnings 
Management Correction Hypothesis 
A deal’s share-swap ratio ܴపഥ  is determined after agreeing on the deal’s value Vi. As a starting 
point to calculate Vi, the economic value of the target firm should be estimated49. For publicly 
traded targets, the market share price is usually a reasonable platform for valuation. 
Normally, the target’s fair value is not adjusted if the acquirer is not obtaining a controlling 
ownership interest in the target firm. Otherwise, offering a premium above the target share 
                                                 
49  Valuation models range from asset-based to performance-based models. Given the variety of 
valuation methods, a common approach in practice is to combine DCF (i.e discounted cash flow 
method) with valuation multiples, such as using EBITDA multiple with P/E ratio (Arzac 2005). 
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market value is essential and common in controlling deals as the acquiring firm seeks to 
convince the shareholders of the target firm to give up their shares (Arzac 2004).  
Naturally, the acquirer may seek to control the target firm in order to change its operational 
direction to serve the acquirer’s best economic interests. Therefore, the offered price does not 
only pay off the target’s equity value but it should also pay any compensation for obtaining the 
right to control the target’s assets and liabilities. For this reason, the acquisition premium is 
often described as a “control premium” (see, for example, Gaughan 2005; DePamphilis 
2007; Gaughan 2007). 
Arzac (2004: p.148) defines the acquisition premium as “a payment [made by the acquirer] in 
excess to the value improvements that the market has already impounded into the target pre-
acquisition price”. The acquirer’s management usually convinces their shareholders when a 
M&A deal is priced at a premium by claiming that the present value of ex-post M&A 
synergies 50  are equal or greater than the given up acquisition premium. M&A synergies 
indicate the value-created is due to “the ability of a corporate combination to be more 
profitable than the individual profits of the firms that were combined (Gaughan 2005: p.56).”  
Pricing a deal at a premium can be illustrated under the equilibrium model in equation (5.1) by 
breaking down the value Vi into two components - the target’s market value per share, PTGTi, 
                                                 
50 Synergy can be operating, due to cost reductions may result from economies of scale (for example 
the redundant costs) or enhanced revenues of the combined firm, and/or financial, by which the cost 
of capital is cheaper for the combined firm. The anticipation of operating and financial synergies 
provides incentives to the bidder to offer premium (Gaughan 2005). 
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and an incremental amount of acquisition premium offered by the acquirer and accepted by the 
target, PRi, denoted as follows: 
்ܲீ்௜ ൅ ܴܲ௜ ൌ ௜ܸ       ( 5.6) 
If the market price PACQi was perceived by the target as a fair valuation and was not to be 
subsequently discounted, then Vi could be expressed as follows:   
்ܲீ்௜ ൅ ܴܲ௜ ൌ ܥ௜ ൅ ൫ܴ௜ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯      ( 5.7)
 
while the acquisition premium would then be equal to:  
ܴܲ௜ ൌ ܥ௜ ൅ ൫ܴ௜ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯ െ ்ܲீ்௜     ( 5.8)
 
However, if the pre-merger acquirer’s earnings were manipulated in order to influence its 
share price, then the target, as a rational and well-informed user, is likely to detect earnings 
management and correct its effect by discounting the acquirer’s share price. The discounting 
strategy is expected to be proportionate to the magnitude of earnings management in order to 
maintain the same level of “real” acquisition premium, which can be defined as the premium 
offered in excess of the re-evaluated deal’s price after the well-informed transacting parties 
agree to discount any overpriced non-cash medium of exchange51. In fact, a rational acquirer 
                                                 
51  As a consequence, information about either the discounting procedure or the real acquisition 
premium is not publicly available. 
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is more likely to be ready to offer a higher “nominal” acquisition premium if the outgoing 
exchange medium is overpriced52.   
In this case, ܴపഥ  is the share-swap ratio Ri after being adjusted (increased) by ቀ
ଵ
ଵିௗ೔
ቁ as a result 
of discounting PACQi by di, which is likely to be positively associated with the acquirer’s pre-
merger earnings management. Therefore, the real acquisition premium ܴܲపതതതതത can be calculated 
as follows: 
ܴܲపതതതതത ൌ ܥ௜ ൅ ቀܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜ሺ1 െ ݀௜ሻቁ െ ்ܲீ்௜      ( 5.9)
 
Solving the parentheses shows that this can be rewritten as: 
ܴܲపതതതതത ൌ ܥ௜ ൅ ൫ܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯ െ ்ܲீ்௜ െ ൫݀௜ ൈ ܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯   ( 5.10)
 
which means that the real acquisition premium ܴܲపതതതതത  is less than the nominal acquisition 
premium PRi for all di൐0, such that: 
ܴܲపതതതതത ൌ ܴܲ௜ െ ൫݀௜ ൈ ܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯       ( 5.11)
 
In other words, the greater the discount di applied on the acquirer’s share value PACQi in the 
M&A transacting process, the higher the nominal acquisition premium is, as denoted by: 
                                                 
52 The explicit cash or non-cash acquisition premium, which is publicly available from the relevant data 
sources such as Thomson One Banker, is denoted here as the nominal (in contrast to real) premium 
since it is calculated according to the publicly known values of exchange mediums used for paying 
for the M&A deal, such as equity shares.      
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ܴܲ௜ ൌ ܴܲపതതതതത ൅ ൫݀௜ ൈ ܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯       ( 5.12)
 
Unlike the naive investor model of Sloan (1996), the a prior in this study is that the 
transacting parties are sophisticated investors who have greater resources and incentives to 
access relevant information than average users in the market. Therefore, the theoretical model 
of this study stimulates assessing the testable implication that there is a positive association 
between the nominal acquisition premium and the magnitude of acquirer’s pre-merger 
earnings management in M&A deals whose payment methods include equity shares. 
Therefore, it could be argued that acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management, EMACQi, serves 
as a proxy for the discount term ൫݀௜ ൈ ܴపഥ ൈ ஺ܲ஼ொ௜൯. Thus: 
ܴܲ௜ ؠ ܴܲపതതതതത ൅ ܧܯா஼ொ௜        ( 5.13) 
In short, this chapter attempts to assess the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis1: There is a significant positive association between the acquisition 
premium and the magnitude of earnings management in non-cash M&A. 
5.4. Research Methodology   
5.4.1. Linear Regression Model 
The main objective of this research is to examine the hypothetical relationship between the 
level of acquisition premium and acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management. In order to test 
this relationship, a linear regression model is proposed as follows: 
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ܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅
ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜      ( 5.14) 
Where: 
 PR: is the acquisition premium in a M&A deal, which results in a controlling acquirer’s 
interest in the target, and calculated based on the shares’ price index four weeks prior to the 
deal’s date of announcement;   
EMACQ: is the acquirer’s earnings management as proxied by the abnormal accruals during the 
last three quarters prior to the deal’s announcement date; 
ROEACQ: is the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the M&A announcement date. It is 
calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the 12 months preceding the deal;  
ROETGT: is the target’s return on equity ratio prior to M&A announcement date. It is calculated 
based on the target’s performance in the 12 months preceding the deal; 
IBTGT: is the advisory fees paid for investment banking services used by the target firm during 
the M&A transaction; 
TOEACQ: is the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling 
M&A deal, and 0 otherwise; 
RSIZE: is the size of the M&A deal relative to the acquirer’s size; 
DBTTGT: indicates the target’s debt ratio before the M&A; 
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CHLNG: is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by 
having multiple bidders), 0 otherwise; 
VRLTD: is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical 
integration M&A, 0 otherwise; 
Dy൅1999: is a dummy variable for the year in which the M&A was announced, where yൌሾ1,mሿ, 
m ൌ 9.  
ߛ: is the coefficients’ index, 
ߝ: is the error term, and 
i: is the sampled M&A deals’ index. 
5.4.1.1. The Dependent Variable (PRi) 
Before the availability of the offer prices on databases such as SDC and Thomson ONE Banker, 
the target’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement date was frequently 
used as a proxy for the acquisition premium paid in the empirical literature (see, for example, 
Haw et al. 1987; Bugeja and Walter 1995; Crawford and Lechner 1996). This target CAR 
proxy has been criticised and is considered problematic as it can potentially reflect not only 
the original offer price, but also include effects from a probable competing offer or the failure 
of an alternative deal on the date of the initial offer (Eckbo 2009). For this reason, studies that 
have instead been able to use the offer-price-based acquisition premium as available from 
certain databases are believed to produce more reliable results such that the premium is 
calculated as: 
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ܴܲ௜ ൌ
ை௙௙௘௥ ௉௥௜௖௘
஻௔௦௘ ௉௥௜௖௘
െ 1      ( 5.15) 
Ideally, the base prices used should be those that are the closest to the deal announcement date 
but those that are not affected by the potential event-specific informational leakage. Therefore, 
deciding on the correct time horizon of “the base price” of securities to use in order to 
calculate the acquisition premium is another important concern. On the one hand, selecting a 
base price that is too close to the official announcement date (i.e. the window is too small) can 
be inappropriate because it may have already reflected M&A rumours or potential information 
leakage concerning the deal. On the other hand, selecting a base price that is too early (i.e. too 
far away from the merger itself) can also be inaccurate because it is more likely to be a biased 
base price due to potential superfluous factors. For these two reasons, there is no unanimous 
agreement over the correct window for determining a reasonable base price to be used in 
calculating the acquisition premium. Normally, the base prices are selected within a 
reasonably adequate time prior to the announcement date within a period which ranges in the 
literature from two days before the M&A announcement date up to a maximum of three 
months (see, for example, Porrini 2006; Chahine and Ismail 2009; Wickramanayake and 
Wood 2009). 
Schwert (1996) provides empirical evidence suggesting that the market on average anticipates 
a M&A deal 21 days before its official announcement. In accordance with Schwert’s (1996) 
findings and following Porrini (2006), acquisition premium (PRi) data in this study is obtained 
from the Thomson ONE Banker database which calculates the premium using base prices four 
weeks prior to the announcement date. Relevant databases, including Thomson One Banker, 
do not distinguish between the acquisition premium of cash deals and those of non-cash deals. 
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The formula in equation (5.15) is normally used for calculating both types of acquisition 
premia. Therefore, PRi in a non-cash deal indicates the nominal acquisition premium as 
Thomson One Banker uses the pre-merger publically available prices of equity shares of the 
acquirer for calculating the non-cash M&A offer value53.    
5.4.1.2. The Independent Variable (EMACQi) 
The acquirer’s earnings management is measured using the signed value of the cumulative 
abnormal accruals calculated from quarterly data within a three-quarter window prior to the 
M&A announcement date.  
Earlier,  Chapter 3 documented evidence that acquiring firms manage their earnings up to three 
quarters prior to the deal’s announcement date (see section 3.5.2). In light of this, similar to 
the work of Kothari et al.’s (2005), our accruals estimation approach considers the 
performance effect by calculating the expected accruals on Dechow et al’s (1995) modified 
Jones (1991) model in a cross-sectional estimation for the industry-performance matched 
portfolios in each quarter, following the recommendation of Louis (2004) and Gong et al. 
(2008).  
A further detailed discussion about the methodology of estimating the abnormal accruals is 
provided earlier in the thesis within  Chapter 2 (section  2.4) for the general background, 
                                                 
53 Unlike in cash deals, the acquisition premiums in non-cash M&As are calculated based on publicly 
available pre-merger share prices. As explained in section  5.3.5, we use the term “nominal” premium 
to describe this value because non-cash offers may contain mispriced assets (i.e. equity shares) that 
may be subject to revaluation by the well-informed beneficiary.     
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while  Chapter 3 (sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) explain the calculation method within the research 
specific setting.  
5.4.1.3. The Control Variables 
This study controls for a number of variables that may exert an impact over the level of the 
acquisition premium while assessing the relationship between PRi and EMACQi. These variables 
include the pre-merger performance of both the acquirer (ROEACQ) and the target (ROETGT) as 
calculated by dividing their respective EBIT by total equity for the last 12 months prior to the 
M&A announcement date. Bugeja and Walter (1995) argue that acquirers with a better 
performance prior to a M&A deal are more likely to offer higher acquisition premia, since this 
may indicate that the firm’s management has a greater ability to successfully combine the two 
firms into one, creating higher post-merger value for the shareholders involved. ROETGT, 
however, is expected to be negatively associated with the acquisition premium because it is 
argued that the acquirer is less likely to be able to create greater value through acquiring a 
previously well-managed target firm (Haw et al. 1987; Bugeja and Walter 1995). 
The model also includes a variable denoted DBTTGT which represents the target’s debt ratio as 
a proxy for its capital structure. This is included following the recommendation of Crawford 
and Lechner (1996) who assert that firms with lower leverage are more attractive M&A targets. 
In addition, to control for the target’s use of quality M&A advisory services, we include the 
M&A advisory fees which were paid by the target firm before the deal (IBTGTi)54. This variable 
                                                 
54  The fees of the acquirer’s advisor are not included in the model because there is a likely 
misalignment between the interests of the acquirers’ advisors and the interests of the acquirers 
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is expected to be positively related to the premium paid, PRi (Haunschild 1994; Porrini 
2006; Chahine and Ismail 2009). Moreover, the acquirer’s pre-merger toehold ownership in 
the target firm (TOEACQ) is also controlled for because it may be inversely related to the 
acquisition premium, due to the fact that a bidder with a toehold position in the firm needs to 
acquire fewer shares in order to obtain a controlling interest. This means that the quantity 
demanded of shares is lower and thus the chance for challenging bidders to enter the 
competition for corporate control is also lower so that there intuitively should be a lower 
chance for the acquisition premium to be pushed higher (Stulz 1988; Bugeja and Walter 
1995; Wickramanayake and Wood 2009). 
If there is more than one potential acquirer competing for a certain target, then the acquisition 
premium is more likely to be higher (Schwert 2000). Hence, the dummy variable (CHLNGi) is 
added to the model to capture the effects emanating from a multiple bidder contest. Similarly, 
the relative size of the M&A deal (RSIZEi) is an alternative important factor since prevailing 
empirical evidence finds that relatively large deals produce lower post-merger returns for the 
acquiring firms (Antoniou et al. 2008). RSIZEi is a known control variable that has been used 
in the M&A literature and is usually calculated as the total assets of the target divided by the 
total assets of the acquirer (Moeller et al. 2004; Wickramanayake and Wood 2009; Madura 
and Ngo 2010).  
An additional explanatory factor can be the degree of relatedness between the acquirer and 
target – that is, whether or not they belong to the same industry. The model controls for the 
                                                                                                                                                         
themselves (see, for example, Porrini 2006). The acquirers’ advisors fees are normally structured based 
on factors other than the acquisition premium. 
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acquirer-target industry sector interaction by including a dummy variable (VRLTDi) that 
indicates the vertical relatedness of the merging firms. The vertical integration of production 
for two companies is likely to realise economies of scale for the merged firm and create 
greater value from the cost reduction (i.e. operating synergy) (Haunschild 1994). To calculate 
this variable, the approach of Haunschild (1994) has been followed to determine the deals with 
synergistic vertical integration. By comparing the 2-digit SIC of the acquirer with its 
respective target, the M&A deal is defined as being a vertical integration if 5 percent or more 
of the output of the target’s industry is used as input by the acquirer’s industry, or indeed if 5 
percent or more of the output of the acquirer’s industry is used as input by the target’s industry. 
Finally, the sampled M&A deals are obtained from a ten-year time period wherein the M&A 
market has witnessed considerable changes in the behaviour and valuation of deals, especially 
since the occurrence of big US corporate scandals and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (Madura and Ngo 2010). Thus, this study includes a set of year dummies in the model to 
capture the macroeconomic differences over years for other factors that are not specified by 
the model55.  
                                                 
55 Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had a significant impact on the corporate environment in general 
in the US, a dummy variable, SOXi, is included in the model as an alternative procedure to year 
dummies to indicate the post-SOX era to control for the differences in the corporate investment 
attitudes and the regulation setting between the two periods. When applying this procedure, the 
results do not significantly change. 
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5.4.2. Sampling and data 
5.4.2.1. Sample Selection 
A sample of US acquiring firms is taken from Thomson One Banker according to the 
following criteria: 
1. The M&A deals are announced between 01/01/1999 and 12/31/2008.56 
2. All merger and acquisition deals included are completed transactions. 
3. The acquiring firms and their respective targets are publicly listed companies in order 
to mitigate variation in information asymmetry and motives in managing earnings 
(Baik et al. 2007). 
4. All deals which include either acquiring and/or target firms from the financial sector, 
which have SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, are excluded from the sample. This is a 
common practice in the literature as this sector is subject to special regulations (see, for 
example, Erickson and Wang 1999; Gong et al. 2008). 
5. The deal value is at least $1 million to exclude all deals of negligible size. The purpose 
of this procedure is to discard deals where firms have a lower motivation to manage 
earnings due to the insignificant economic motivation to do so (Erickson and Wang 
1999). 
6. The deal should result in allowing the acquiring firm to obtain a controlling ownership 
interest in the deal (i.e. the acquirer owned less than 50 percent before the transaction 
                                                 
56 The sampling period cut-off point (31/12/2008) is determined once data collection for this study 
started in the beginning of 2009. A period of ten years is chosen in an ad hoc sampling period.  
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and greater than 50 percent by completing the deal) so that the acquirer is more likely 
to offer an acquisition premium to the target (Arzac 2004). 
7. The deals have acquisition premium data available on Thomson One Banker and 
earnings management data on Compustat. 
Applying these criteria results in a total of 424 M&A deals where 262 of them represent a 
sample of non-cash deals which are later used for assessing the research hypothesis while the 
remaining 162 are cash deals used in a robustness check. Further details regarding the sample 
distribution are presented shortly in section  5.5.1. 
5.4.2.2. Data Sources 
The source of the data used within this chapter for all variables, except for VRLTDi, is either 
Thomson ONE Banker or Compustat (for further details please refer to section  3.4.4.2). In 
order to calculate the vertical relatedness of the deals (VRLTDi), we used the Input-Output 
Accounts from the industry data from Survey of Current Business on the website of US 
Department of Commerce in order to find The Use of Commodities by Industries tables.57   
Since industry classification used in the tables follow the North American Classification 
System (NAICS), the codes are converted into the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system using the correspondence tables between NAICS and SIC as provided by the US 
                                                 
57 The Input-Output Accounts were obtained from http://www.bea.gov/industry/iotables/ on January 20, 
2011.  
Chapter 5: Pre-merger Earnings Management and Non-cash Acquisition Premia 
212 
 
Census Bureau.58 Finally, the pre-merger acquirer’s share performance (CARACQi), which is 
used in the sensitivity analysis, is calculated using Eventus and CRSP.59  
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics and the sample distribution by year are organised in three panels 
in Table 5.1 for the overall sample, for non-cash deals and cash deals respectively. Panel A 
of Table 5.1 reveals that 34 percent (146 deals) of the total 424 deals were announced between 
2000 and 2001. Interestingly, when the big corporate scandals engulfed the financial world 
and when Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002, the statistics show that deals within this 
year exhibited the highest mean acquisition premium of 113.04 percent with the highest 
standard deviation of 355.93 percent (for 39 deals) indicating a dramatic change in the 
corporate attitude toward M&As and their valuation (Madura and Ngo 2010). In contrast, the 
37 deals undertaken during 2007 reveal the lowest mean acquisition premium of 24.797 
percent as well as the lowest standard deviation of 24.79 percent. Overall, the full sample has 
a mean acquisition premium of 50.59 percent, which is consistent with previously reported 
average acquisition premium levels in the literature. 
                                                 
58 The NAICS-SIC conversion tables were found at the US Census Bureau website at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm on February 4, 2011. 
59 Eventus and CRSP are available at http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/  Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS). 
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Panels B and C of Table 5.1 describe the acquisition premium by years for non-cash deals and 
cash deals, respectively. It can be seen that the mean (median) value of the acquisition 
premium in cash deals is 73.819 percent (41.085 percent), higher than that seen in non-cash 
deals, that being 36.227 percent (27.815 percent). The acquisition premium found in cash 
deals is normally higher to compensate the target shareholders for the personal tax that is 
immediately deducted from their capital gains from selling their shares for cash, unlike non-
cash deals where the tax component is deferred (Huang and Walkling 1987). 
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Table  5.1 The distribution and the descriptive statistics of acquisition premium by year 
The following table presents the distribution of the acquisition premium, which is calculated using shares prices four weeks prior to the M&A deal’s 
announcement date. The distribution by year is provided for the total 424 deals in Panel A, for the 262 non-cash deals in Panel B and for the 162 cash deals 
in Panel C. The samples were initially taken from Thomson One Banker for the period 1999-2008 then we require that acquiring and target firms of the 
respective deals have accounting data on Compustat from 1997 and 2008 inclusive. Descriptive statistics including mean, standard deviation (STDV), median, 
minimum, maximum and the count of deals (N) are provided on the acquisition premium of the deals per year in each panel. 
 
Panel A: Total Deals 
Year  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 Total
Mean  86.643  45.661  42.559 113.042 56.828 38.652 39.107 50.804 27.653 40.909 50.590
STDV  63.748  52.738  47.634 355.929 70.243 53.639 37.608 68.090 24.797 46.300 119.514
Median  58.530  33.330  43.990 28.030 45.140 28.895 28.400 33.500 27.500 32.230 32.160
Minimum  32.640  ‐31.580  ‐74.630 ‐91.910 ‐55.880 ‐19.580 ‐16.290 ‐6.420 ‐42.940 ‐16.600 ‐91.910
Maximum  233.220  331.200  152.220 1937.040 267.350 301.880 161.190 402.630 108.460 231.330 1937.040
N  11  79  67 39 39 44 47 36 37 25 424
Panel B: Non‐cash Deals 
Year  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 Total
Mean  89.806  44.878  35.032 17.649 51.163 29.067 31.344 33.653 19.581 33.789 36.227
STDV  64.450  54.144  47.648 51.938 66.143 40.892 32.894 34.784 21.780 28.977 48.209
Median  58.530  33.200  40.890 18.200 32.700 22.430 25.415 26.885 24.475 28.380 27.815
Minimum  56.030  ‐30.790  ‐74.630 ‐91.910 ‐55.880 ‐19.580 ‐16.290 ‐6.420 ‐42.940 ‐16.600 ‐91.910
Maximum  233.220  331.200  148.720 131.950 202.120 199.000 127.690 141.940 68.370 89.070 331.200
N  7  57  45 23 24 27 30 16 20 13 262
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Cont’d Table 5.1 
Panel C: Cash Deals 
Year  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 2008 Total
Mean  81.108  47.687  57.955 250.171 65.892 53.875 52.805 64.526 37.149 48.623 73.819
STDV  71.931  50.070  44.771 531.948 77.861 67.924 42.343 84.495 25.357 60.302 181.332
Median  52.025  35.725  53.985 45.705 45.830 32.010 37.260 40.800 29.610 33.390 41.085
Minimum  32.640  ‐31.580  ‐38.460 4.120 0.810 7.530 2.700 12.950 ‐0.740 ‐10.570 ‐38.460
Maximum  187.740  210.190  152.220 1937.040 267.350 301.880 161.190 402.630 108.460 231.330 1937.040
N  4  22  22 16 15 17 17 20 17 12 162
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The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model are reported in Table 2 
for the overall sample, as well as the relevant results once the sample has been stratified by the 
method of payment used. In this table, the pre-merger abnormal accruals of acquirers (EMACQi) 
in non-cash deals show a mean (median) value of 1.09% (0.67%), which is much higher than 
the mean (median) abnormal accruals value of cash acquirers, which rests at 0.43% (-0.72%). 
This observed difference is consistent with the literature as well as the findings of chapter 3 as 
cash acquirers lack the economic incentive to adopt income-increasing reporting methods 
unless they use equity shares to finance the M&A deal (Erickson and Wang 1999). 
On average, acquirers that are able to offer cash in order to pay off their M&A deals seem to 
be more profitable with a mean (median) pre-merger ROE of 5.95% (7.01%) compared to 
those which used non-cash payment methods with a mean (median) ROE of -12.77% 
(2.69%). Table 5.2 also reveals that cash acquirers have a greater pre-merger toehold in their 
target firms with a mean (median) value of 6.82% (25.28%) with contrast to acquirers in non-
cash deals with a mean (median) value of 1.60% (12.56%). This is intuitive as obtaining a 
controlling interest in a target firm using cash is more feasible if the acquirer has a greater 
toehold in it (Bugeja and Walter 1995).  
More descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.2 and the next section provides the results of 
the regression analysis. 
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Table  5.2 The descriptive statistics of the regression variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression for the total deals, the non-cash deals and the cash deals, where PRi 
indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index four weeks prior to announcement date, EMACQi indicates the 
acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi indicates the 
acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 months, 
ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the preceding 
12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s 
toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal deal relative to the 
acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by having 
multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi: is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Total 
Nൌ424
Non‐cash deals 
Nൌ262 
Cash deals
Nൌ162
Mean  STDV Median Mean STDV  Median Mean STDV Median
PRi  50.5900  119.5138 32.160 36.22687 48.20867  27.815 73.81926 181.3321 41.085
EMACQi  0.85892  8.221839 0.1133 1.088619 9.007225  0.6739 0.425043 6.489607 ‐0.717
ROEACQi  ‐0.06085  0.860654 0.0457 ‐0.12777 1.063846  0.02685 0.059529 0.131085 0.0701
ROETGTi  0.138386  6.059784 0.0000 0.293234 7.542949  ‐0.0200 ‐0.14089 0.57842 0.0100
IBTGTi  212.2749  728.2786 0.0000 146.2683 701.3294  0.0000 326.5605 761.3034 0.0000
TOEACQi  0.034765  0.183371 0.0000 0.015974 0.125577  0.0000 0.068182 0.252777 0.0000
RSIZEi  58.55877  252.9482 5.5050 39.15371 226.0667  3.3000 94.15454 293.4188 13.680
DBTTGTi  0.549553  0.731884 0.4275 0.607112 0.876586  0.4615 0.445399 0.315638 0.3720
CHLNGi  0.042945  0.20294 0.0000 0.038339 0.19232  0.0000 0.051136 0.220904 0.0000
VRLTDi  0.793456  0.40524 1.0000 0.795527 0.403962  1.0000 0.789773 0.408633 1.0000
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5.5.2. Regression Analysis 
5.5.2.1. OLS Regression Results: Non-cash Deals 
The hypothetical relationship between the acquisition premium (PRi) and an acquirer’s pre-
merger earnings management (EMACQi) in non-cash deals is initially assessed in an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model. In Table 5.3, the results of the OLS regression are 
presented for non-cash deals. The F-statistic of the model reveals significance (P-value < 1 
percent) for all different combinations of control variables. In addition, the explanatory power 
of the model is at its best (Adj R-Sq = 0.1075) in model (7), in which the acquirer’s 
performance (ROEACQi), the acquirer’s pre-merger toehold (TOEACQi), the target’s performance 
(ROETGTi), the target’s debt ratio (DBTTGTi), the target’s financial advisory fee (IBTGTi) and the 
relative size of the deal (RSIZEi) is controlled for. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management (EMACQi), i.e. the 
measurement variable, has a positive and significant sign (P-value < 1 percent) for all models 
ran for non-cash deals, as presented in Table 5.3. The coefficient ranges from 1.21 with the 
lowest t-value of 3.06 in model (7) to 1.39 with the highest t-value of 3.67 in model (2), which 
controls only for the acquirer’s performance (ROEACQi). The overall results of regressions (1) 
to (9) reported in Table 5.3 indicate a significant positive relation between premerger earnings 
management by acquirers and the acquisition premium calculated based on share prices in 
non-cash M&A deals. 
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Table  5.3 The results of the ordinary least squares’ regression for the non-cash deals 
The following table presents the results of the OLS regression modelܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅
ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  where PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal 
based on shares price index four weeks prior to announcement date, EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals 
during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date 
and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s 
announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking 
services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling 
M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, 
CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi is a dummy variable 
which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses represent t-values in two-tailed tests. The 
symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant  73.463***  74.485***  74.623*** 73.641*** 73.545*** 73.572***  81.009*** 81.078*** 86.695*** 77.946***
   ሺ 3.16ሻ  ሺ 3.23ሻ  ሺ 3.23ሻ ሺ 3.18ሻ ሺ 3.19ሻ ሺ 3.18ሻ ሺ 3.47ሻ ሺ 3.47ሻ ሺ 3.50ሻ ሺ 3.10ሻ
EMACQi  1.3298***  1.3949***  1.3958*** 1.2554*** 1.2387*** 1.2690***  1.2095*** 1.2232*** 1.240***
   ሺ3.47ሻ  ሺ3.65ሻ  ሺ3.65ሻ ሺ3.2ሻ ሺ3.17ሻ ሺ3.2ሻ ሺ3.06ሻ ሺ3.08ሻ ሺ3.11ሻ
ROEACQi     5.6283**  5.7121** 5.5395** 5.7270** 5.6851**  5.6720** 5.7337** 5.6351** 5.401**
      ሺ2.21ሻ  ሺ2.25ሻ ሺ2.16ሻ ሺ2.25ሻ ሺ2.22ሻ ሺ2.23ሻ ሺ2.25ሻ ሺ2.2ሻ ሺ2.07ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐0.541 ‐0.731* ‐0.730* ‐0.753*  ‐0.741* ‐0.738* ‐0.728* ‐0.6902
         ሺ‐1.39ሻ ሺ‐1.76ሻ ሺ‐1.76ሻ ሺ‐1.80ሻ ሺ‐1.78ሻ ሺ‐1.78ሻ ሺ‐1.75ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ
IBTGTi          0.0053 0.0054 0.0054 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060
           ሺ1.25ሻ ሺ1.27ሻ ሺ1.27ሻ ሺ1.42ሻ ሺ1.41ሻ ሺ1.4ሻ ሺ1.38ሻ
TOEACQi          ‐2.219* ‐2.197*  ‐2.361* ‐2.372* ‐2.325* ‐2.4731*
           ሺ‐1.76ሻ ሺ‐1.73ሻ ሺ‐1.87ሻ ሺ‐1.87ሻ ሺ‐1.83ሻ ሺ‐1.91ሻ
RSIZEi          0.0301 0.0319 0.0301 0.0273 ‐0.0012
           ሺ0.48ሻ ሺ0.52ሻ ሺ0.49ሻ ሺ0.44ሻ ሺ‐0.02ሻ
DBTTGTi          ‐13.97* ‐13.89* ‐13.76* ‐15.834**
           ሺ‐1.81ሻ ሺ‐1.79ሻ ሺ‐1.77ሻ ሺ‐2.00ሻ
CHLNGi             ‐8.091 ‐8.132 ‐5.0692
              ሺ‐0.53ሻ ሺ‐0.53ሻ ሺ‐0.33ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.3 
VRLTDi             ‐5.568 ‐4.0468
              ሺ‐0.7ሻ ሺ‐0.5ሻ
D2000i  ‐29.81  ‐28.67  ‐28.88 ‐27.92 ‐27.82 ‐28.37 ‐29.21 ‐28.84 ‐29.72 ‐20.67
   ሺ‐1.24ሻ  ሺ‐1.20ሻ  ሺ‐1.21ሻ ሺ‐1.16ሻ ሺ‐1.16ሻ ሺ‐1.18ሻ ሺ‐1.22ሻ ሺ‐1.21ሻ ሺ‐1.24ሻ ሺ‐0.85ሻ
D2001i  ‐35.63  ‐32.99  ‐33.38 ‐36.51 ‐35.04 ‐35.63 ‐37.21 ‐36.48 ‐37.56 ‐31.22
   ሺ‐1.46ሻ  ሺ‐1.36ሻ  ሺ‐1.38ሻ ሺ‐1.49ሻ ሺ‐1.44ሻ ሺ‐1.46ሻ ሺ‐1.53ሻ ሺ‐1.50ሻ ሺ‐1.53ሻ ሺ‐1.25ሻ
D2002i  ‐58.40**  ‐58.84**  ‐61.30** ‐61.11** ‐60.95** ‐61.22**  ‐64.26** ‐64.36** ‐65.65** ‐54.50**
   ሺ‐2.29ሻ  ሺ‐2.33ሻ  ሺ‐2.42ሻ ሺ‐2.39ሻ ሺ‐2.39ሻ ሺ‐2.40ሻ ሺ‐2.53ሻ ሺ‐2.53ሻ ሺ‐2.57ሻ ሺ‐2.11ሻ
D2003i  ‐23.24  ‐22.84  ‐23.16 ‐21.79 ‐17.08 ‐17.99 ‐15.20 ‐15.28 ‐16.33 ‐0.930
   ሺ‐0.91ሻ  ሺ‐0.90ሻ  ሺ‐0.92ሻ ሺ‐0.85ሻ ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.70ሻ ሺ‐0.59ሻ ሺ‐0.59ሻ ሺ‐0.63ሻ ሺ‐0.04ሻ
D2004i  ‐44.71*  ‐45.44*  ‐46.25* ‐46.06* ‐45.97* ‐46.26*  ‐47.19* ‐47.26* ‐48.79* ‐40.52
   ሺ‐1.78ሻ  ሺ‐1.83ሻ  ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐1.84ሻ ሺ‐1.84ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐1.90ሻ ሺ‐1.90ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ
D2005i  ‐46.25**  ‐47.67  ‐47.83 ‐46.88 ‐46.77* ‐47.52 ‐48.24* ‐47.43* ‐48.94* ‐37.76
   ሺ‐1.85ሻ  ሺ‐1.92ሻ  ሺ‐1.93ሻ ሺ‐1.88ሻ ሺ‐1.89ሻ ሺ‐1.91ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ ሺ‐1.91ሻ ሺ‐1.96ሻ ሺ‐1.50ሻ
D2006i  ‐42.87  ‐43.98  ‐44.15 ‐42.11 ‐41.97 ‐42.53 ‐43.08 ‐42.61 ‐44.32* ‐32.02
   ሺ‐1.63ሻ  ሺ‐1.69ሻ  ሺ‐1.69ሻ ሺ‐1.60ሻ ሺ‐1.60ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ ሺ‐1.65ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ ሺ‐1.68ሻ ሺ‐1.20ሻ
D2007i  ‐52.93**  ‐54.17  ‐50.70 ‐50.24* ‐50.19* ‐50.43**  ‐51.59** ‐51.66** ‐52.69** ‐45.81*
   ሺ‐2.07ሻ  ሺ‐2.13ሻ  ሺ‐1.98ሻ ሺ‐1.96ሻ ሺ‐1.97ሻ ሺ‐1.97ሻ ሺ‐2.03ሻ ሺ‐2.03ሻ ሺ‐2.06ሻ ሺ‐1.76ሻ
D2008i  ‐46.81*  ‐47.72  ‐47.94 ‐49.86* ‐47.81* ‐48.11*  ‐48.22* ‐48.31* ‐48.93* ‐37.82
   ሺ‐1.74ሻ  ሺ‐1.79ሻ  ሺ‐1.80ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐1.78ሻ ሺ‐1.79ሻ ሺ‐1.80ሻ ሺ‐1.80ሻ ሺ‐1.82ሻ ሺ‐1.39ሻ
             
N  262  262  262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
F‐statistic  2.61***  3.00***  2.96*** 2.76*** 2.81*** 2.63***  2.69*** 2.54*** 2.42*** 1.92**
P‐value  0.0051  0.0009  0.0008 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.001 0.0015 0.0182
R2  0.1024  0.1285  0.1386 0.1448 0.1571 0.1581 0.171 0.1721 0.1741 0.1354
Adj R2  0.0632  0.0858  0.0918 0.0924 0.1012 0.0979 0.1075 0.1045 0.1023 0.0647
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Further analysis in regression (10), in Table 5.3, models the same relationships as before 
without the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management (EMACQi) included, unlike regressions 
(1) to (9). Interestingly, it can be noticed that the explanatory power as well as the significance 
of the OLS model deteriorates after excluding the variable EMACQi when running the regression 
for the non-cash acquisition premium. In particular, the model loses almost 37% of its 
explanatory power as the Adjusted R-Squared drops from 0.10 in regression (9) to 0.06 in 
regression (10) and loses around 21% of its significance as the F-Statistic declines from 2.42 
(P-value < 1 percent) in regression (9) to 1.92 (P-value < 5 percent).  
By comparing the OLS regression results reported for the model with different sets of control 
variables in Table 5.3, it can be noted that the control variables ROEACQi, ROETGTi, TOEACQi and 
DBTTGTi reveal coefficient estimates with statistical significance. The coefficient estimate of 
ROEACQi (ߛଶ) indicates a positive association between the pre-merger acquirer’s profitability 
and the size of the acquisition premium offered in a M&A deal. The coefficient ߛଶ ranges 
from 5.40 in model (10) up to 5.73 in model (8) with significance at the 5% confidence 
interval for all regressions. As explained in the theoretical framework, offering a higher 
premium in a share-swap deal implies that the bidder will issue more shares than is necessary 
to the shareholders of the target, which eventually dilutes the EPS for the original shareholders 
of the acquirer. Therefore, this positive relationship between PRi and ROEACQi indicates that 
the acquirer’s management team must hold a greater level of confidence over the future 
prospects of the firm. Thus it is more convincing to bidding firm shareholders to pay a 
relatively higher acquisition premium (i.e. issuing more shares) if the acquiring firm has 
shown better pre-merger performance (Roll 1986; Hayward and Hambrick 1997). 
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However, the coefficient (ߛଷ) of ROETGTi, which indicates the pre-merger target’s performance, 
has a negative sign in all models, as shown in Table 5.3. It has an estimate that ranges between 
-0.541 (t-value = -1.39) in model (3) and -0.753 (t-value = -1.80) in model (6). The coefficient 
ߛଷ is significant with confidence interval of 5 percent in regressions (4) to (9). These results 
indicate evidence of an inverse relation between ROETGTi and the premium paid in a M&A 
deal, which is consistent with the empirical findings of some previous studies arguing that 
there is higher potential of creating value by acquiring the poorly managed targets (see, for 
example Lang et al. 1989; Servaes 1991; Bugeja and Walter 1995). Therefore, the acquirer’s 
management can justify offering higher premia by the anticipated potential of post-merger 
value creation. 
The control variable TOEACQi is included in regressions (5) to (10), as shown in Table 5.3. The 
OLS output provides negative coefficient estimates for this variable (ߛହ) between -2.20 in 
regression (6) and -2.47 in regression (10) at a 10% significance level across all models. 
Consistent with the literature, the acquirer’s pre-merger ownership interest in the target firm 
before a controlling position has been achieved, has a reducing effect on the acquisition 
premium offered (Stulz 1988; Bugeja and Walter 1995; Wickramanayake and Wood 2009). 
Naturally, the acquirer’s toehold in the target should be inversely related to the incremental 
percentage for obtaining a controlling interest, which means there will be a lower quantity 
demanded for the target’s shares, thus there should be a lower equilibrium price and 
consequently a lower premium offered. 
The model also controls for the capital structure of the target firm (DBTTGT) in regressions (7) 
to (10), as presented in Table 5.3. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship 
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between the target’s debt ratio and the acquisition premium as the variable DBTTGT has a 
negative coefficient ranging between -13.76 (t-value = -1.77) in regression (9) to -15.83 (t-
value = -2.00) in regression (10). The negative sign of the coefficient ߛ଻ is predicted by 
Crawford and Lechner (1996) whose work argued that the target firm’s attractiveness 
decreases with the level of its leverage. However, the results produced by the OLS regression 
for the non-cash M&A deals in Table 5.3 do not indicate significance for the coefficients of 
the variables IBTGTi, RSIZEi, CHLNGi orVRLTDi. 
5.5.2.2. Concurrent Analysis for Cash Deals 
As argued under the hypothesis development section (i.e. section  5.3.5), pre-merger earnings 
management would have an impact on the acquisition premium only if the acquirer decided to 
offer its equity within the M&A payment structure. This hypothesis is directly tested in the 
previous section using a non-cash sample. Alternatively, it could be argued that the hypothesis 
itself must imply that the acquirer’s pre-merger earning management should be shown to be 
irrelevant to the acquisition premium in the case of a 100% cash deal. Therefore, this section 
presents the results of a simultaneous analysis conducted using a sample of cash deals in order 
to verify the aforementioned argument and add support to the findings of the previous section.  
In Table 5.4, the OLS regression results of the model are reported for a concurrent sample of 
cash deals for the same period. Interestingly, ߛଵ, the coefficient of EMACQi, is insignificantly 
different from zero since it has negative and insignificant values in all regressions, unlike the 
results reported for the non-cash deals. The regressions produce coefficient estimates -0.7382 
൑ ߛଵ ൑ 0.1661 with their |t-values| ൑ 0.27.  
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Table  5.4 The results of the ordinary least squares’ regression for the cash deals 
The following table presents the results of the OLS regression modelܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅
ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  where PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal 
based on shares price index four weeks prior to announcement date, EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals 
during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date 
and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s 
announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking 
services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling 
M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, 
CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi is a dummy variable 
which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses represent t-values in two-tailed tests. The 
symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant  79.869  78.912  85.840 93.510 93.456 94.586 36.474 43.953 61.785 61.722
   ሺ 0.84ሻ  ሺ 0.70ሻ  ሺ 0.78ሻ ሺ 0.85ሻ ሺ 0.84ሻ ሺ 0.85ሻ ሺ 0.32ሻ ሺ 0.40ሻ ሺ 0.52ሻ ሺ 0.52ሻ
EMACQi  ‐0.5765  ‐0.7382  0.0269 ‐0.5346 ‐0.5248 ‐0.4424  ‐0.1168 0.1661 ‐0.0327
   ሺ‐0.22ሻ  ሺ‐0.27ሻ  ሺ0.01ሻ ሺ‐0.19ሻ ሺ‐0.18ሻ ሺ‐0.15ሻ ሺ‐0.04ሻ ሺ0.06ሻ ሺ‐0.01ሻ
ROEACQi     198.9832  161.9677 151.2256 150.0161 145.5255  122.8587 105.4682 112.4646 112.4084
      ሺ1.43ሻ  ሺ1.17ሻ ሺ1.08ሻ ሺ1.05ሻ ሺ1.02ሻ ሺ0.87ሻ ሺ0.77ሻ ሺ0.82ሻ ሺ0.82ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐88.997** ‐86.38** ‐86.298** ‐95.49**  ‐79.494** ‐86.323** ‐86.977** ‐87.04**
         ሺ‐2.55ሻ ሺ‐2.46ሻ ሺ‐2.44ሻ ሺ‐2.57ሻ ሺ‐2.13ሻ ሺ‐2.39ሻ ሺ‐2.4ሻ ሺ‐2.44ሻ
IBTGTi          ‐0.0233 ‐0.0229 ‐0.0232  ‐0.0298 ‐0.0246 ‐0.0224 ‐0.0224
           ሺ‐1.02ሻ ሺ‐0.97ሻ ሺ‐0.98ሻ ሺ‐1.27ሻ ሺ‐1.08ሻ ሺ‐0.95ሻ ሺ‐0.96ሻ
TOEACQi          ‐0.1336 ‐0.19 ‐0.4377 ‐0.2172 ‐0.247 ‐0.2486
           ሺ‐0.05ሻ ሺ‐0.08ሻ ሺ‐0.18ሻ ሺ‐0.09ሻ ሺ‐0.1ሻ ሺ‐0.11ሻ
RSIZEi          ‐0.0545  ‐0.0422 ‐0.047 ‐0.0528 ‐0.0528
           ሺ‐0.83ሻ ሺ‐0.65ሻ ሺ‐0.75ሻ ሺ‐0.82ሻ ሺ‐0.82ሻ
DBTTGTi          127.48** 111.288* 107.236* 107.290*
           ሺ2.15ሻ ሺ1.93ሻ ሺ1.83ሻ ሺ1.84ሻ
CHLNGi             204.09*** 205.24*** 205.26***
              ሺ2.95ሻ ሺ2.95ሻ ሺ2.97ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.4 
VRLTDi             ‐17.309 ‐17.215
              ሺ‐0.39ሻ ሺ‐0.39ሻ
D2000i  ‐27.93  ‐39.31  ‐64.40 ‐67.38 ‐66.99 ‐67.34 ‐60.29 ‐73.81 ‐75.70 ‐75.80
   ሺ‐0.27ሻ  ሺ‐0.33ሻ  ሺ‐0.54ሻ ሺ‐0.56ሻ ሺ‐0.56ሻ ሺ‐0.56ሻ ሺ‐0.51ሻ ሺ‐0.64ሻ ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.66ሻ
D2001i  ‐21.55  ‐41.28  ‐53.65 ‐54.73 ‐54.44 ‐45.48 ‐45.75 ‐54.72 ‐57.39 ‐57.46
   ሺ‐0.21ሻ  ሺ‐0.34ሻ  ሺ‐0.46ሻ ሺ‐0.46ሻ ሺ‐0.46ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.39ሻ ሺ‐0.48ሻ ሺ‐0.50ሻ ሺ‐0.50ሻ
D2002i  200.82*  211.29*  187.59 193.01 193.13 191.78 187.27 154.26 148.38 148.36
   ሺ 1.87ሻ  ሺ 1.71ሻ  ሺ 1.54ሻ ሺ 1.58ሻ ሺ 1.57ሻ ሺ 1.56ሻ ሺ 1.55ሻ ሺ 1.31ሻ ሺ 1.25ሻ ሺ 1.25ሻ
D2003i  ‐4.750  1.7852  ‐13.98 ‐14.19 ‐14.07 ‐14.89 7.7189 ‐18.06 ‐18.94 ‐19.12
   ሺ‐0.04ሻ  ሺ 0.01ሻ  ሺ‐0.11ሻ ሺ‐0.11ሻ ሺ‐0.11ሻ ሺ‐0.12ሻ ሺ 0.06ሻ ሺ‐0.15ሻ ሺ‐0.15ሻ ሺ‐0.16ሻ
D2004i  ‐25.75  ‐33.86  ‐58.98 ‐46.87 ‐47.00 ‐46.83 ‐51.54 ‐53.44 ‐55.09 ‐55.18
   ሺ‐0.24ሻ  ሺ‐0.28ሻ  ሺ‐0.49ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.43ሻ ሺ‐0.46ሻ ሺ‐0.47ሻ ሺ‐0.47ሻ
D2005i  ‐23.09  ‐30.62  ‐70.88 ‐68.57 ‐68.07 ‐59.50 ‐37.98 ‐77.08 ‐80.63 ‐80.70
   ሺ‐0.21ሻ  ሺ‐0.24ሻ  ሺ‐0.57ሻ ሺ‐0.55ሻ ሺ‐0.54ሻ ሺ‐0.47ሻ ሺ‐0.31ሻ ሺ‐0.64ሻ ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.67ሻ
D2006i  ‐8.401  ‐24.17  ‐46.52 ‐47.27 ‐46.66 ‐43.93 ‐29.12 ‐31.49 ‐33.57 ‐33.64
   ሺ‐0.08ሻ  ሺ‐0.20ሻ  ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.39ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.36ሻ ሺ‐0.24ሻ ሺ‐0.27ሻ ሺ‐0.28ሻ ሺ‐0.29ሻ
D2007i  ‐47.89  ‐65.37  ‐61.03 ‐60.75 ‐60.68 ‐59.76 ‐44.69 ‐62.31 ‐71.83 ‐71.77
   ሺ‐0.44ሻ  ሺ‐0.52ሻ  ሺ‐0.50ሻ ሺ‐0.49ሻ ሺ‐0.49ሻ ሺ‐0.48ሻ ሺ‐0.37ሻ ሺ‐0.53ሻ ሺ‐0.59ሻ ሺ‐0.60ሻ
D2008i  ‐31.57  ‐49.44  ‐64.94 ‐53.32 ‐53.08 ‐48.55 ‐20.83 ‐25.88 ‐33.08 ‐33.09
   ሺ‐0.29ሻ  ሺ‐0.39ሻ  ሺ‐0.51ሻ ሺ‐0.42ሻ ሺ‐0.41ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.16ሻ ሺ‐0.21ሻ ሺ‐0.26ሻ ሺ‐0.27ሻ
N   162   162   162 162 162 162  162 162 162 162
F‐statistic  1.83*  1.76*  2.23** 2.11** 1.94** 1.85** 2.08** 2.61*** 2.46*** 2.63***
P‐value  0.0611  0.0682  0.0147 0.0186 0.0291 0.0358 0.0139 0.0014 0.0023 0.0014
R2  0.1252  0.139  0.1899 0.1968 0.1968 0.2018 0.2343 0.2914 0.2924 0.2924
Adj R2  0.0569  0.0601  0.1046 0.1036 0.0955 0.093 0.1219 0.1799 0.1734 0.181
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Moreover, by looking at the results of the conducted regressions in Table 5.4, it can be noticed 
that both the explanatory power and the significance of the model is improved by omitting the 
variable EMACQi. Specifically, the Adj R-Squared improves from 0.17 in regression (9), which 
contains the test variable EMACQi, to 0.18 in regression (10), from which EMACQi is excluded, 
while the F-statistic increases from 2.46 to 2.63, respectively.  
The overall findings of the analysis of pure cash deals fails to show any significant relation 
between acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management and the acquisition premium. This 
evidence adds greater robust support for the earlier findings regarding the noted significant 
relation in non-cash deals.  
5.5.2.3. Specification Tests 
5.5.2.3.1. Heteroscedasticity and Robustness Check 
One important assumption of an OLS model is that each error term has a similar variance, i.e 
they are homoscedastic. Therefore, the inferences made based on results that exhibit 
heteroscedastic error terms may be misleading (Gujarati 2004; Stock and Watson 2007).      
In this study, the diagnostic tests of Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) 
is performed in order to assess the underlying assumption of homoscedasticity. The testing 
procedure outcome indicates that the null hypothesis regarding potential heteroscedasticity as 
Ho: Constant variance being rejected. 60 As a remedial measure, White’s (1980) 
                                                 
60 This test is performed using STATA package with the command “estat hottest”. 
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heteroscedasticity-corrected variances or robust standard errors 61 are used to reduce the 
likelihood of producing results that may lead to erroneous inferences (Gujarati 2004). 
The results for the robust models after applying White’s procedure are reported in Table 5.5. 
Interestingly, the inferences made regarding the tested independent variable (EMACQi) hold for 
all regressions after heteroscedasticity has been corrected for. The robust t-value of the 
coefficient estimate ߛଵremains very significant for all regressions at a confidence interval of 
1%, ranging between 2.87 in regression (5) to 3.28 in regressions (2) and (3). Accordingly, it 
could be stated that the positive relationship between the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings 
management and the acquisition premium in non-cash deals is robust. 
Similarly, the results of the control variables ROEACQi, ROETGTi, TOEACQi and DBTTGTi in Table 
5.5 are robust and the robust t-values improved for their coefficient estimates in all regression. 
Moreover, the robust model results show that the variable IBTGTi has a significant positive 
coefficient estimate (ߛସ) in the regressions in which it is included, namely regressions (5) to 
(10). Table 5.5 reports estimated values for the coefficient ߛସ  that range between 0.0054 
(robust t-value = 1.92) in model (4) and 0.006 (2.17 ≥ robust t-value ≥ 2.21) in models (7) to 
(10). This finding indicates that target firm’s hiring M&A advisors has a positive impact on 
the acquisition premium, which is consistent with previous studies (see, for example, Porrini 
2006; Chahine and Ismail 2009).62 
                                                 
61 This procedure is also called heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators, according 
to the seminal paper of White (1980).  
62 The M&A advisory fees (IBTGTi) can proxy not only for the existence of the M&A advisors, but also 
for the quality of the consultancy service provided to the target firm in aiding the management’s 
decision and its bargaining position. The results hold even after replacing the control variable IBTGTi 
by a dummy variable that indicates the use of M&A advisors by the target. 
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Table  5.5 The heteroscedasticity -corrected regression results of the acquisition premium (t‐4w) for the non-cash deals 
The following table presents the results of the regression model ܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅
ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜ using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected variances (i.e. robust standard errors). 
PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index four weeks prior to the announcement date, EMACQi indicates 
the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi indicates the 
acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 months, 
ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the preceding 
12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s 
toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal relative to the 
acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by having 
multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 otherwise. 
Numbers in parentheses represent robust t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
   ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant   73.46***   74.48***   74.62*** 73.64*** 73.54*** 73.57***   81.00*** 81.07*** 86.69*** 77.94***
   ሺ6.92ሻ  ሺ6.51ሻ  ሺ6.56ሻ ሺ7.06ሻ ሺ7.11ሻ ሺ6.97ሻ ሺ8.88ሻ ሺ8.77ሻ ሺ5.87ሻ ሺ6.07ሻ
EMACQi  1.329***  1.394***  1.395*** 1.255*** 1.238*** 1.269***  1.209*** 1.223*** 1.240***
   ሺ3.08ሻ  ሺ3.28ሻ  ሺ3.28ሻ ሺ2.91ሻ ሺ2.87ሻ ሺ3.03ሻ ሺ2.92ሻ ሺ2.92ሻ ሺ2.9ሻ
ROEACQi     5.628***  5.712*** 5.539*** 5.727*** 5.685***  5.672*** 5.733*** 5.635*** 5.401***
      ሺ7.17ሻ  ሺ7.17ሻ ሺ6.79ሻ ሺ7.00ሻ ሺ7.05ሻ ሺ7.44ሻ ሺ7.41ሻ ሺ7.24ሻ ሺ7.16ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐0.54*** ‐0.73*** ‐0.73*** ‐0.75***  ‐0.74*** ‐0.73*** ‐0.72*** ‐0.69***
         ሺ‐10.73ሻ ሺ‐6.73ሻ ሺ‐6.96ሻ ሺ‐6.46ሻ ሺ‐6.64ሻ ሺ‐6.6ሻ ሺ‐6.34ሻ ሺ‐6.19ሻ
IBTGTi          0.0053* 0.0054** 0.0054**  0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
           ሺ1.92ሻ ሺ2.05ሻ ሺ2.04ሻ ሺ2.21ሻ ሺ2.19ሻ ሺ2.13ሻ ሺ2.17ሻ
TOEACQi          ‐2.21*** ‐2.19***  ‐2.36*** ‐2.37*** ‐2.32*** ‐2.47***
           ሺ‐3.70ሻ ሺ‐3.63ሻ ሺ‐3.58ሻ ሺ‐3.62ሻ ሺ‐3.51ሻ ሺ‐3.78ሻ
RSIZEi          0.030 0.031 0.030 0.027 ‐0.00
           ሺ0.54ሻ ሺ0.56ሻ ሺ0.53ሻ ሺ0.49ሻ ሺ‐0.03ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.5 
DBTTGTi          ‐13.9* ‐13.8* ‐13.7* ‐15.8*
           ሺ‐1.84ሻ ሺ‐1.82ሻ ሺ‐1.8ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ
CHLNGi             ‐8.09 ‐8.13 ‐5.06
              ሺ‐1.01ሻ ሺ‐0.99ሻ ሺ‐0.57ሻ
VRLTDi             ‐5.56 ‐4.04
              ሺ‐0.52ሻ ሺ‐0.38ሻ
D2000i  ‐29.81**  ‐28.67**   ‐28.8** ‐27.92** ‐27.82** ‐28.37**   ‐29.2*** ‐28.8*** ‐29.72*** ‐20.67**
   ሺ‐2.44ሻ  ሺ‐2.21ሻ  ሺ‐2.23ሻ ሺ‐2.31ሻ ሺ‐2.31ሻ ሺ‐2.33ሻ ሺ‐2.84ሻ ሺ‐2.75ሻ ሺ‐2.89ሻ ሺ‐2.24ሻ
D2001i  ‐35.63***  ‐32.99**  ‐33.38** ‐36.51*** ‐35.04 ‐35.63***  ‐37.21*** ‐36.4*** ‐37.56*** ‐31.22***
   ሺ‐2.68ሻ  ሺ‐2.36ሻ  ሺ‐2.39ሻ ሺ‐2.67ሻ ሺ‐2.57ሻ ሺ‐2.61ሻ ሺ‐3.1ሻ ሺ‐2.98ሻ ሺ‐2.97ሻ ሺ‐2.84ሻ
D2002i  ‐58.40***  ‐58.84***  ‐61.30*** ‐61.1*** ‐60.9*** ‐61.22***   ‐64.2*** ‐64.36*** ‐65.65*** ‐54.50***
   ሺ‐3.6ሻ  ሺ‐3.52ሻ  ሺ‐3.61ሻ ሺ‐3.62ሻ ሺ‐3.62ሻ ሺ‐3.61ሻ ሺ‐4.11ሻ ሺ‐4.09ሻ ሺ‐4.09ሻ ሺ‐3.85ሻ
D2003i  ‐23.24  ‐22.84  ‐23.16 ‐21.79 ‐17.08 ‐17.99 ‐15.20 ‐15.28 ‐16.33 ‐.9301
   ሺ‐1.35ሻ  ሺ‐1.3ሻ  ሺ‐1.32ሻ ሺ‐1.22ሻ ሺ‐0.95ሻ ሺ‐0.98ሻ ሺ‐0.94ሻ ሺ‐0.93ሻ ሺ‐0.98ሻ ሺ‐0.06ሻ
D2004i  ‐44.71***   ‐45.4***    ‐46.*** ‐46.06*** ‐45.97*** ‐46.26***  ‐47.19*** ‐47.26*** ‐48.79*** ‐40.52***
   ሺ‐3.31ሻ  ሺ‐3.21ሻ  ሺ‐3.23ሻ ሺ‐3.38ሻ ሺ‐3.39ሻ ሺ‐3.37ሻ ሺ‐3.76ሻ ሺ‐3.73ሻ ሺ‐3.6ሻ ሺ‐3.35ሻ
D2005i  ‐46.25***  ‐47.67***  ‐47.83*** ‐46.88*** ‐46.77***  ‐47.***   ‐48.2*** ‐47.43*** ‐48.94*** ‐37.76***
   ሺ‐3.75ሻ  ሺ‐3.65ሻ  ሺ‐3.68ሻ ሺ‐3.84ሻ ሺ‐3.85ሻ ሺ‐3.83ሻ ሺ‐4.57ሻ ሺ‐4.43ሻ ሺ‐4.37ሻ ሺ‐4.15ሻ
D2006i  ‐42.87***  ‐43.98***  ‐44.15*** ‐42.11*** ‐41.97*** ‐42.53***  ‐43.08*** ‐42.61*** ‐44.32*** ‐32.02***
   ሺ‐3.12ሻ  ሺ‐3.04ሻ  ሺ‐3.06ሻ ሺ‐2.99ሻ ሺ‐2.99ሻ ሺ‐3.02ሻ ሺ‐3.45ሻ ሺ‐3.41ሻ ሺ‐3.25ሻ ሺ‐2.64ሻ
D2007i  ‐52.93***  ‐54.17***  ‐50.70*** ‐50.24*** ‐50.1*** ‐50.43***  ‐51.59*** ‐51.66*** ‐52.69*** ‐45.81***
   ሺ‐4.51ሻ  ሺ‐4.3ሻ  ሺ‐4.19ሻ ሺ‐4.51ሻ ሺ‐4.53ሻ ሺ‐4.47ሻ ሺ‐5.72ሻ ሺ‐5.65ሻ ሺ‐5.43ሻ ሺ‐6.34ሻ
D2008i  ‐46.81***  ‐47.72***  ‐47.94*** ‐49.86*** ‐47.81*** ‐48.11***  ‐48.22*** ‐48.31*** ‐48.93*** ‐37.8***
   ሺ‐3.78ሻ  ሺ‐3.63ሻ  ሺ‐3.66ሻ ሺ‐3.99ሻ ሺ‐3.87ሻ ሺ‐3.86ሻ ሺ‐4.62ሻ ሺ‐4.58ሻ ሺ‐4.48ሻ ሺ‐4.14ሻ
          
N  262  262  262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
F‐statistic  3.18***  7.21***  23.04*** 24.98*** 25.32*** 23.81***  29.23*** 27.97*** 26.34*** 29.62***
P‐value  0.0008  ൏0.000  ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000
R2  0.1024  0.1285  0.1386 0.1448 0.1571 0.1581 0.171 0.1721 0.1741 0.1354
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Table  5.6 Multicollinearity tests 
The following table provides the results of the multicollinearity tests of the independent variables. Panel A of this table presents Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients (r) (left bottom) as well as Spearman’s correlation coefficients ሺρሻ. Panel B of the table presents the variance inflation factors of the independent 
variables along with tolerance level (1/VIF). Highly correlated variables will have Tolerance ≤ 10 percent. EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings 
management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on 
equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the 
target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi 
indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership 
interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi 
indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 
otherwise and VRLTDi: is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 otherwise.  
Panel A: Pearson and Spearman’s Correlation Matrix 
  EMACQi  ROEACQi  ROETGTi IBTGTi TOEACQi RSIZEi DBTTGTi CHLNGi VRLTDi
EMACQi    1.0000  ‐0.1112  ‐0.0955 ‐0.0037 0.0525 ‐0.0903  0.0148 0.0181 0.084
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‐0.0606  1.0000  0.4956 0.1646 ‐0.0100 0.0048  ‐0.0254 0.0377 ‐0.058 ROEACQi
ROETGTi  ‐0.0333  0.1205  1.0000 0.2135 0.0317 ‐0.0734  ‐0.1331 0.0465 ‐0.005 ROETGTi
IBTGTi  0.0573  0.0129  ‐0.0103 1.0000 0.1067 ‐0.0133  ‐0.0844 0.0698 0.036 IBTGTi
TOEACQi  0.0102  0.0171  ‐0.0001 0.1535 1.0000 0.0855  ‐0.0055 ‐0.0245 ‐0.013 TOEACQi
RSIZEi  ‐0.1034  0.0281  0.0053 ‐0.0107 ‐0.0137 1.0000  0.0725 ‐0.1227 ‐0.044 RSIZEi
DBTTGTi  0.0995  ‐0.0149  0.0460 ‐0.0533 ‐0.0105 0.0963  1.0000 ‐0.0814 ‐0.032 DBTTGTi
CHLNGi  0.0063  0.0251  ‐0.0145 ‐0.0365 ‐0.0224 ‐0.0435  ‐0.0379 1.0000 ‐0.050 CHLNGi
VRLTDi  0.1545  ‐0.0602  0.0299 ‐0.0444 ‐0.0636 ‐0.0356  0.0371 ‐0.0502 1.0000 VRLTDi
 
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables
  EMACQi  ROEACQi  ROETGTi IBTGTi TOEACQi RSIZEi  DBTTGTi CHLNGi VRLTDi Mean
VIF    1.12  1.20  1.17 1.04 1.28 1.08  1.17 1.05 1.04 1.05
Tolerance    0.895858  0.832705 0.85263 0.962487 0.778649 0.922509  0.853789 0.950497 0.962642 0.956664
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Interestingly, the coefficient of the vertical relatedness dummy variable (VRLTDi) remains 
insignificant even in the robust model despite the theoretical importance of this variable in 
determining the potential synergies to be extracted in a M&A deal. However, this result is not 
dissimilar to the findings of Haunschild (1994).63 
5.5.2.3.2. Multicollinearity Test 
Another important assumption of linear regression models is that the regressors (i.e. 
independent variables) are independent and are not highly correlated (Stock and Watson 2007). 
In the model of this study, no evidence related to multicollinearity problems is found among 
the model’s independent variables. Two procedures are employed to assess potential 
multicollinearity - namely the variance inflation factors’ (VIF) test and a correlation matrix.  
Table 5.6 presents a matrix of Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the 
independent variables. The correlation coefficients of all pairs of independent variables are 
statistically insignificant indicating that there is no multicollinearity problem among them with 
the highest absolute value of Pearson’s correlation coefficient, Corrr  (EMACQi , VRLTDi)  being 
equal  to 0.1545, while the highest Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is Corrrho 
(ROEACQi , ROETGTi) = 0.4956, both with insignificant P-values. 
Furthermore, the output of the VIF test for the independent variables does not indicate any 
material multicollinearity problem. The VIF factors range between 1.04 and 1.28 with a mean 
value of 1.12, as presented in Table 5.6. Therefore, it could be stated that no evidence of the 
                                                 
63 Haunschild’s (1994) study did not find a significant relationship between the vertical relatedness of 
the acquired target and the acquisition premium. 
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existence of multicollinearity is detected for the regressors of the model such that they are 
sufficiently independent.64 
5.5.3. Further Investigation 
For additional robustness tests over the findings of this chapter, the relationship between the 
acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management and acquisition premium in non-cash deals is re-
assessed applying three different sensitivity measures.  
5.5.3.1. Redefining the Dependent Variable as (PRt‐1w)  
The first sensitivity analysis concerns re-defining the independent variable itself via using a 
different time horizon in selecting the base prices used for calculating the acquisition premium. 
As mentioned in section  5.4.1.1, the base prices for calculating the acquisition premium 
should be selected within a reasonably adequate time prior to the announcement date, which 
varies among different previous studies (see, for example, Porrini 2006; Chahine and Ismail 
2009; Wickramanayake and Wood 2009). 
Taking a shorter time horizon for selecting the base prices makes it less likely that the 
calculation of the acquisition premium is biased against any extraneous events (Brown and 
Warner 1980). Instead of using base prices four weeks (PRt‐4w) before the deal announcement 
date, the acquisition premium is re-calculated using base prices one week (PRt‐1w) before the 
                                                 
64 Normally, a VIF value should have a factor below 10.0 (i.e. Tolerance > 0.10) to conclude that there 
is no indication of multicollinearity. The Tolerance factor is the inverse of VIF (1/ VIF). The 
tolerance for the independent variables ranges between 0.778649 and 0.962642 with a mean value of 
0.896843. These values of VIF tolerance level are good indication since they should not be below 0.1 
for good models. 
Chapter 5: Pre-merger Earnings Management and Non-cash Acquisition Premia 
233 
 
announcement date, reflecting the market valuation for the acquiring and target firms closer to 
the official announcement date.65 A comparison of the descriptive statistics per year for the 
two definitions of the acquisition premium is presented in Table 5.7, where it can be noticed 
that PRt-1w is, on average, slightly lower than PRt-4w with a mean (median) value of 34.29 
(26.19) compared to 36.23 (27.82), respectively. 
Table  5.7 Comparison of acquisition premium: two different time horizons 
The following table compares the calculation of acquisition premia offered in the non-cash deals using 
prices indices of two different time horizons (t‐1w vs. t‐4w), where t‐1w indicates using shares prices 
index one week before the deal’s announcement while t‐4w indicates using shares prices index one 
week before the deal’s announcement. 
 
Year   N 
Acquisition Premium
ሺt‐4wሻ
Acquisition Premium
ሺt‐1wሻ 
Mean STDV Median Mean STDV  Median
1999  7  89.806 64.450 58.530 67.390  36.112 64.140
2000  57  44.878 54.144 33.200 37.992  44.675 28.700
2001  45  35.032 47.648 40.890 30.860  49.599 27.800
2002  23  17.649 51.938 18.200 21.007  47.344 23.320
2003  24  51.163 66.143 32.700 39.268  51.082 28.550
2004  27  29.067 40.892 22.430 31.104  52.852 20.100
2005  30  31.344 32.894 25.415 47.025  65.596 27.930
2006  16  33.653 34.784 26.885 31.286  25.243 28.615
2007  20  19.581 21.780 24.475 20.070  21.374 21.035
2008  13  33.789 28.977 28.380 29.167  26.795 23.460
Total  262  36.227 48.209 27.815 34.287  47.332 26.185
                                                 
65 Using base prices closer to the deal’s announcement date may seem much more realistic but also 
prices of closer dates are more likely to reflect an event-specific informational leakage.  
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Table  5.8 The heteroscedasticity-corrected regression results of the acquisition premium (t‐1w) in non-cash deals 
The following table presents the results of the regression model ܴܲ1ݓ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅
ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected variances (i.e. robust 
standard errors). PR1wi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index one week prior to the announcement date, 
EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, 
ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the 
preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s 
performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, 
TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of 
the deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was 
challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi: is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical 
integration M&A, and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses represent robust t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence 
interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant    61.9***   62.60***   62.81*** 62.47*** 62.41*** 62.37***   68.20*** 68.24*** 71.64*** 63.18***
   ሺ4.06ሻ  ሺ3.96ሻ  ሺ3.96ሻ ሺ4.02ሻ ሺ4.03ሻ ሺ4.1ሻ ሺ4.86ሻ ሺ4.83ሻ ሺ3.94ሻ ሺ4.78ሻ
EMACQi  1.291***  1.325***  1.336*** 1.284*** 1.275*** 1.229***  1.182*** 1.189*** 1.199***
   ሺ3.27ሻ  ሺ3.36ሻ  ሺ3.37ሻ ሺ3.19ሻ ሺ3.16ሻ ሺ2.99ሻ ሺ2.88ሻ ሺ2.85ሻ ሺ2.81ሻ
ROEACQi     3.875***  3.986*** 4.062*** 4.163*** 4.228***  4.217*** 4.249*** 4.189*** 3.963***
      ሺ2.87ሻ  ሺ2.87ሻ ሺ2.96ሻ ሺ3.11ሻ ሺ3.24ሻ ሺ3.08ሻ ሺ3.11ሻ ሺ3.04ሻ ሺ3.15ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐0.56*** ‐0.60*** ‐0.60*** ‐0.56***  ‐0.56*** ‐0.55*** ‐0.55*** ‐0.51***
         ሺ‐10.49ሻ ሺ‐5.2ሻ ሺ‐5.18ሻ ሺ‐4.75ሻ ሺ‐5.02ሻ ሺ‐5.01ሻ ሺ‐4.81ሻ ሺ‐4.55ሻ
IBTGTi           0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
            ሺ0.28ሻ ሺ0.29ሻ ሺ0.3ሻ ሺ0.46ሻ ሺ0.45ሻ ሺ0.44ሻ ሺ0.46ሻ
TOEACQi           ‐1.19 ‐1.22 ‐1.35* ‐1.36* ‐1.33 ‐1.47*
            ሺ‐1.55ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ ሺ‐1.66ሻ ሺ‐1.67ሻ ሺ‐1.63ሻ ሺ‐1.83ሻ
RSIZEi           ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.07***
            ሺ‐1.46ሻ ሺ‐1.44ሻ ሺ‐1.45ሻ ሺ‐1.55ሻ ሺ‐3.32ሻ
DBTTGTi           ‐10.9 ‐10.9 ‐10.8 ‐12.8
            ሺ‐1.37ሻ ሺ‐1.36ሻ ሺ‐1.35ሻ ሺ‐1.47ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.8 
CHLNGi              ‐4.10 ‐4.13 ‐1.16
               ሺ‐0.36ሻ ሺ‐0.36ሻ ሺ‐0.1ሻ
VRLTDi              ‐3.37 ‐1.90
               ሺ‐0.32ሻ ሺ‐0.18ሻ
D2000i  ‐24.14  ‐23.37  ‐23.66 ‐23.31 ‐23.26 ‐22.41 ‐23.07 ‐22.88 ‐23.42 ‐14.6
   ሺ‐1.51ሻ  ሺ‐1.41ሻ  ሺ‐1.42ሻ ሺ‐1.43ሻ ሺ‐1.43ሻ ሺ‐1.4ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ ሺ‐1.63ሻ ሺ‐1.65ሻ
D2001i  ‐29.30*  ‐27.50  ‐27.96 ‐27.28 ‐26.49 ‐25.5 ‐26.82 ‐26.45 ‐27.10 ‐20.97*
   ሺ‐1.68ሻ  ሺ‐1.52ሻ  ሺ‐1.54ሻ ሺ‐1.49ሻ ሺ‐1.44ሻ ሺ‐1.41ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ ሺ‐1.57ሻ ሺ‐1.58ሻ ሺ‐1.73ሻ
D2002i   ‐44.4**  ‐44.62**  ‐44.54** ‐43.93** ‐43.84** ‐43.42**   ‐45.8** ‐45.86** ‐46.64** ‐35.86***
   ሺ‐2.35ሻ  ሺ‐2.31ሻ  ሺ‐2.27ሻ ሺ‐2.22ሻ ሺ‐2.21ሻ ሺ‐2.22ሻ ሺ‐2.5ሻ ሺ‐2.49ሻ ሺ‐2.51ሻ ሺ‐2.59ሻ
D2003i  ‐25.31    ‐24.  ‐25.35 ‐22.83 ‐20.30 ‐18.90 ‐16.71 ‐16.75 ‐17.39 ‐2.491
   ሺ‐1.42ሻ  ሺ‐1.36ሻ  ሺ‐1.38ሻ ሺ‐1.23ሻ ሺ‐1.08ሻ ሺ‐1.01ሻ ሺ‐1.01ሻ ሺ‐1.01ሻ ሺ‐1.04ሻ ሺ‐0.19ሻ
D2004i  ‐28.90  ‐29.34  ‐29.48 ‐29.27 ‐29.22 ‐28.78 ‐29.50 ‐29.5 ‐30.47 ‐22.47
   ሺ‐1.53ሻ  ሺ‐1.52ሻ  ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐1.61ሻ ሺ‐1.6ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ ሺ‐1.48ሻ
D2005i  ‐16.94  ‐17.83  ‐18.08 ‐17.69 ‐17.63 ‐16.48 ‐17.04 ‐16.63 ‐17.5 ‐6.73
   ሺ‐0.87ሻ  ሺ‐0.89ሻ  ሺ‐0.91ሻ ሺ‐0.9ሻ ሺ‐0.89ሻ ሺ‐0.84ሻ ሺ‐0.94ሻ ሺ‐0.9ሻ ሺ‐0.92ሻ ሺ‐0.43ሻ
D2006i  ‐34.44**  ‐35.10**  ‐35.37 ‐33.74** ‐33.66** ‐32.80**  ‐33.23 ‐33.00** ‐34.03** ‐22.13**
   ሺ‐2.09ሻ  ሺ‐2.07ሻ  ሺ‐2.08ሻ ሺ‐2ሻ ሺ‐2ሻ ሺ‐1.97ሻ ሺ‐2.22ሻ ሺ‐2.19ሻ ሺ‐2.15ሻ ሺ‐2.13ሻ
D2007i  ‐40.98**  ‐41.47**  ‐37.88** ‐37.61** ‐37.5** ‐37.24**  ‐38.15*** ‐38.18*** ‐38.81*** ‐32.15***
   ሺ‐2.54ሻ  ሺ‐2.48ሻ  ሺ‐2.31ሻ ሺ‐2.34ሻ ሺ‐2.34ሻ ሺ‐2.36ሻ ሺ‐2.74ሻ ሺ‐2.72ሻ ሺ‐2.7ሻ ሺ‐4.15ሻ
D2008i  ‐36.82**  ‐37.35**   ‐37.6** ‐37.73** ‐36.6** ‐36.16**  ‐36.24** ‐36.29** ‐36.66** ‐25.92**
   ሺ‐2.19ሻ  ሺ‐2.15ሻ  ሺ‐2.17ሻ ሺ‐2.2ሻ ሺ‐2.14ሻ ሺ‐2.14ሻ ሺ‐2.38ሻ ሺ‐2.37ሻ ሺ‐2.36ሻ ሺ‐2.49ሻ
              
N  262  262  262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
F‐statistic  1.99***  2.62***  17.51*** 15.36*** 14.88*** 13.87***  16.03*** 15.65*** 14.75*** 18.27***
P‐value  0.0352  0.0037  ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000
R2  0.074  0.0844  0.0919 0.0901 0.0935 0.0956 0.1032 0.1034 0.1041 0.0697
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The regression model with robust standard errors (see Table 5.5) is replicated using PRt‐1w,i as 
the dependent variable and the new results are reported in Table 5.8. Similar to the results 
reported earlier, the coefficient estimate of EMACQi remains very significant (P-value < 1 
percent) in all regressions, ranging between 1.18 (robust t-value = 2.99) in regression (7) to 
1.34 (robust t-value = 3.37) in regression (3).   
The overall results of the variable PRt‐1w in the regression in Table 5.8 provide robust 
evidence over the positive relationship between the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings 
management and the acquisition premium in non-cash M&A deals. This relationship holds 
under different approaches used for calculating the acquisition premium.  
5.5.3.2. Controlling for the Acquirer’s Pre-merger Share Performance 
In another sensitivity measure, the acquirer’s pre-merger share performance is used as an 
additional control variable in the regression model in order to partially control for other factors 
that may influence the valuation process (Lubatkin 1987), such as a potential hubris effect 
(Roll 1986). Roll (1986) develops a hypothesis that offers a potential explanation for the 
overpayment by bidders in M&A deals. In essence, he argues that acquiring firms infected 
with hubris (i.e. managerial overconfidence) end up paying too much for their target firms. 
However, Roll (1986) provides neither an exact definition of the hubris effect nor does he 
suggest a clear measurement methodology. 
Hubris, in a M&A context, is explained by Hayward and Hambrick (1997) as the exaggerated 
confidence of management, which results in managers overestimating their ability to manage 
the acquired firm. Likewise, Antoniou et al. (2008) attributes the hubris effect to the over-
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optimism of acquiring firm managers regarding their past performance such that they 
overestimate the post-merger economic gains required in order to recover the high premia paid. 
Following Hayward and Hambrick (1997) and Antoniou et al. (2008), the acquirer’s pre-
merger share performance is considered to be one of the most important sources of managerial 
overconfidence and one of the most commonly used proxies for management’s hubris. 
Following this literature (such as, Puffer and Weintrop 1991; Hayward and Hambrick 1997; 
Antoniou et al. 2008) the acquirer’s pre-merger CAR is calculated in order to measure the 
acquirer’s pre-merger performance, which is then used as a proxy for hubris in this study’s 
model. A positive (negative) pre-merger abnormal performance indicates that the market has 
adjusted its expectations regarding the future performance upwards (downwards).  
Using daily returns sourced via the Eventus database, the Market Model (MM) is used as a 
benchmark, following the seminal work of Fama et al. (1969), for calculating the normal 
returns by estimating the following parameters using the market portfolio: 
෨ܴ஺஼ொ௜,௧ ൌ  ߙ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߚ஺஼ொ௜ ෨ܴ௠,௧ ൅ ݑ෤஺஼ொ௜,௧ 
Where ෨ܴ஺஼ொ௜,௧ is the total return of the security ACQi at the time t, ෨ܴ௠,௧ is the market return at 
time t, ݑ෤஺஼ொ௜,௧ is the error term, ߙ஺஼ொ௜is the intercept and ߚ஺஼ொ௜ is the beta coefficient of the 
market return. The abnormal return is calculated by taking the difference between the actual 
return of the security and the expected return according to the Market Model (hereafter MM) 
(Strong 1992): 
ݑො஺஼ொ௜,௧ ൌ  ܴ஺஼ொ௜,௧ െ ሺߙො஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߚመ஺஼ொ௜ܴ௠,௧ሻ 
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Table  5.9 The heteroscedasticity-corrected regression results of the acquisition premium (t‐4w) for the non-cash deals after 
controlling for the pre-merger acquirer’s share performance 
The following table presents the results of the regression model ܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅
ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܥܣܴ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଵ଴ܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected variances (i.e. robust 
standard errors). PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index four weeks prior to the announcement date, 
EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, 
ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the 
preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s 
performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, 
TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of 
the deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was 
challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise, VRLTDi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration 
M&A, and 0 otherwise and CARACQi indicates the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer’s share for the estimation period (-100,-10) and using the 
Market Model as a benchmark. Numbers in parentheses represent robust t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence 
interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant   36.80   39.90   44.70** 49.33**  48.8** 48.60**   43.57*  45.0* 52.34** 46.71**
   ሺ1.41ሻ  ሺ1.60ሻ  ሺ2.01ሻ ሺ2.57ሻ ሺ2.52ሻ ሺ2.47ሻ ሺ1.71ሻ ሺ1.80ሻ ሺ2.26ሻ ሺ2.28ሻ
EMACQi  1.543***  1.581***  1.622*** 1.388*** 1.373*** 1.411***  1.402*** 1.407*** 1.439***
   ሺ2.99ሻ  ሺ3.12ሻ  ሺ3.19ሻ ሺ2.89ሻ ሺ2.87ሻ ሺ3.10ሻ ሺ3.09ሻ ሺ3.10ሻ ሺ3.14ሻ
ROEACQi     3.453  6.026 9.493** 9.184** 9.116** 8.813** 9.407*** 9.448*** 8.227**
      ሺ1.60ሻ  ሺ1.54ሻ ሺ2.41ሻ ሺ2.36ሻ ሺ2.34ሻ ሺ2.32ሻ ሺ2.82ሻ ሺ2.86ሻ ሺ2.46ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐8.02 ‐21.4* ‐20.0 ‐19.9 ‐19.3 ‐20.8* ‐21.3* ‐20.2*
         ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐1.70ሻ ሺ‐1.60ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ ሺ‐1.59ሻ ሺ‐1.91ሻ ሺ‐1.93ሻ ሺ‐1.79ሻ
IBTGTi           ‐0.0007 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0009
            ሺ‐1.04ሻ ሺ‐0.54ሻ ሺ‐0.57ሻ ሺ‐0.50ሻ ሺ‐0.54ሻ ሺ‐0.72ሻ ሺ‐0.31ሻ
TOEACQi           ‐2.42*** ‐2.40***  ‐2.41*** ‐2.39*** ‐2.29*** ‐2.46***
            ሺ‐3.70ሻ ሺ‐3.63ሻ ሺ‐3.6ሻ ሺ‐3.59ሻ ሺ‐3.29ሻ ሺ‐3.38ሻ
RSIZEi           0.027 0.025 0.019 0.016 ‐0.01
            ሺ0.49ሻ ሺ0.46ሻ ሺ0.35ሻ ሺ0.31ሻ ሺ‐0.50ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.9 
DBTTGTi           5.143 3.958 3.430 5.517
            ሺ0.32ሻ ሺ0.24ሻ ሺ0.21ሻ ሺ0.33ሻ
CHLNGi              ‐26.7* ‐27.6* ‐26.8**
               ሺ‐1.92ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ ሺ‐2.08ሻ
VRLTDi              ‐6.63 ‐4.29
               ሺ‐0.61ሻ ሺ‐0.39ሻ
CARACQi  25.86  21.56  20.28 23.17 23.02 23.00 23.37 23.79 23.79 27.22
   ሺ1.52ሻ  ሺ1.11ሻ  ሺ1.04ሻ ሺ1.15ሻ ሺ1.14ሻ ሺ1.13ሻ ሺ1.14ሻ ሺ1.16ሻ ሺ1.18ሻ ሺ1.29ሻ
D2000i   9.611   7.111   1.243 ‐6.00 ‐5.283 ‐5.634 ‐2.892 ‐3.980 ‐5.590 ‐3.15
   ሺ0.34ሻ  ሺ0.26ሻ  ሺ0.05ሻ ሺ‐0.28ሻ ሺ‐0.24ሻ ሺ‐0.25ሻ ሺ‐0.12ሻ ሺ‐0.17ሻ ሺ‐0.25ሻ ሺ‐0.16ሻ
D2001i   10.54    10.5   3.625 ‐10.22 ‐9.204 ‐9.52 ‐6.642  ‐5.3 ‐7.339 ‐6.827
   ሺ0.38ሻ  ሺ0.40ሻ  ሺ0.15ሻ ሺ‐0.48ሻ ሺ‐0.42ሻ ሺ‐0.44ሻ ሺ‐0.28ሻ ሺ‐0.23ሻ ሺ‐0.33ሻ ሺ‐0.35ሻ
D2002i  ‐27.42  ‐30.15  ‐40.07 ‐47.99** ‐47.06* ‐47.06*  ‐43.4 ‐44.91* ‐47.40* ‐40.05*
   ሺ‐0.95ሻ  ሺ‐1.08ሻ  ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐2.00ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ ሺ‐1.93ሻ ሺ‐1.63ሻ ሺ‐1.72ሻ ሺ‐1.93ሻ ሺ‐1.78ሻ
D2003i   16.19   13.82   6.255 7.340 13.09 12.44  15.30 14.27 12.56 22.60
   ሺ0.55ሻ  ሺ0.49ሻ  ሺ0.25ሻ ሺ0.32ሻ ሺ0.55ሻ ሺ0.51ሻ ሺ0.59ሻ ሺ0.56ሻ ሺ0.51ሻ ሺ0.96ሻ
D2004i  ‐7.528  ‐10.28  ‐16.04 ‐19.92 ‐19.8 ‐19.8 ‐17.14 ‐17.99 ‐19.68 ‐16.96
   ሺ‐0.27ሻ  ሺ‐0.38ሻ  ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.94ሻ ሺ‐0.93ሻ ሺ‐0.92ሻ ሺ‐0.68ሻ ሺ‐0.73ሻ ሺ‐0.82ሻ ሺ‐0.78ሻ
D2005i  ‐13.15  ‐16.23  ‐21.75 ‐26.78 ‐26.34 ‐26.86 ‐24.18 ‐21.73 ‐23.66 ‐17.72
   ሺ‐0.50ሻ  ሺ‐0.65ሻ  ሺ‐0.97ሻ ሺ‐1.39ሻ ሺ‐1.35ሻ ሺ‐1.36ሻ ሺ‐1.12ሻ ሺ‐1.00ሻ ሺ‐1.16ሻ ሺ‐0.99ሻ
D2006i  ‐8.934  ‐11.68  ‐16.90 ‐21.35 ‐20.79 ‐21.12 ‐18.63 ‐17.49 ‐19.40 ‐12.61
   ሺ‐0.33ሻ  ሺ‐0.46ሻ  ሺ‐0.73ሻ ሺ‐1.06ሻ ሺ‐1.02ሻ ሺ‐1.03ሻ ሺ‐0.87ሻ ሺ‐0.82ሻ ሺ‐0.94ሻ ሺ‐0.70ሻ
D2007i  ‐13.45  ‐16.93  ‐21.95 ‐26.54 ‐26.33 ‐26.30 ‐23.80 ‐24.63 ‐26.2 ‐25.16
   ሺ‐0.50ሻ  ሺ‐0.66ሻ  ሺ‐0.94ሻ ሺ‐1.32ሻ ሺ‐1.3ሻ ሺ‐1.28ሻ ሺ‐1.06ሻ ሺ‐1.12ሻ ሺ‐1.26ሻ ሺ‐1.38ሻ
D2008i  ‐18.49  ‐21.29  ‐26.20 ‐26.22 ‐25.44 ‐25.33 ‐23.39 ‐24.04 ‐24.55 ‐21.59
   ሺ‐0.71ሻ  ሺ‐0.86ሻ  ሺ‐1.18ሻ ሺ‐1.38ሻ ሺ‐1.32ሻ ሺ‐1.3ሻ ሺ‐1.12ሻ ሺ‐1.17ሻ ሺ‐1.21ሻ ሺ‐1.20ሻ
N  188  188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
F‐statistic  2.33**  4.71***  4.91*** 6.37*** 8.22*** 7.57*** 7.42*** 7.95*** 6.97*** 7.02***
P‐value  0.0108  ൏0.000  ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000
R2  0.1819  0.1901  0.1971 0.2192 0.2316 0.2325 0.2333 0.2422 0.245 0.1993
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The cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer’s share (CARACQi) is calculated using an 
estimation period (EP) of (-100,-10) as follows: 
ܥܣܴ஺஼ொ௜ ൌ ෍ ݑො஺஼ொ௜,௧
ିଵ଴
௧ୀିଵ଴଴
  
CARACQi is included in the study’s model as a control for the pre-merger market performance 
of the acquirer’s share. The results of the regression model after including CARACQi are 
reported in Table 5.9. The coefficient of CARACQi shows a positive sign for all regressions, as 
predicted by the hubris hypothesis, but the robust t-values do not indicate a statistical 
significance. 
As reported in Table 5.9, the positive coefficient of EMACQi holds with very significant robust 
t-values (P-value < 1 percent) in all regressions, indicating additional robustness of the 
relationship between acquirers’ pre-merger earnings management and the acquisition premium 
in non-cash even after controlling for the acquirer’s pre-merger share performance. 
5.5.3.3. Controlling for Bear/Bull Markets 
As an additional investigation, the regression analysis is replicated after controlling for bear 
and bull stock markets. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) provide a model suggesting that market 
valuations impact the decisions of M&A. Likewise, Bouwman et al. (2009) argue that M&A 
valuation in bear markets should be significantly different from the valuation in bull markets. 
Consistent with these views, in addition to CARACQi, which is computed in the previous section, 
two categorising dummy variables are used in the regression model to control for bearish 
(BEARi) and bullish (BULLi) markets. 
Chapter 5: Pre-merger Earnings Management and Non-cash Acquisition Premia 
241 
 
Table  5.10 The heteroscedasticity-corrected regression results of the acquisition premium (t‐4w) for the non-cash deals 
after controlling for the pre-merger acquirer’s share performance and bear/bull markets 
The following table presents the results of the regression model ܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅
ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܥܣܴ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଵଵܤܧܣܴ௜ ൅ ߛଵଶܤܷܮܮ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected variances (i.e. 
robust standard errors). PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index four weeks prior to the announcement 
date, EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, 
ROEACQi indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the 
preceding 12 months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s 
performance in the preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, 
TOEACQi indicates the acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of 
the deal relative to the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was 
challenged (i.e. by having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise, VRLTDi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration 
M&A, and 0 otherwise, CARACQi indicates the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer’s share for the estimation period (-100,-10) and using the Market 
Model as a benchmark, BEARi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal is completed during a bear market (i.e. the bottom quartile of the difference 
between the market’s detrended PE or the current period and the average of past years detrended PE ratio), and 0 otherwise, while BULLi is a dummy 
variable which takes 1 if the deal is completed during a bull market (i.e. top quartile of the difference between the market’s detrended PE or the current 
period and the average of past years detrended PE ratio), and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses represent robust t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols 
(*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ ሺ10ሻ
Constant    37.1***   37.81***   35.79*** 33.72*** 34.19*** 33.22***   29.63*** 31.09*** 35.30***  34.4***
   ሺ9.14ሻ  ሺ9.26ሻ  ሺ8.57ሻ ሺ7.48ሻ ሺ7.5ሻ ሺ7.15ሻ ሺ3.32ሻ ሺ3.47ሻ ሺ2.91ሻ ሺ2.91ሻ
EMACQi  1.447***  1.471***  1.511*** 1.373*** 1.384*** 1.455***  1.445*** 1.442*** 1.465***
   ሺ2.79ሻ  ሺ2.86ሻ  ሺ2.94ሻ ሺ2.71ሻ ሺ2.73ሻ ሺ3.04ሻ ሺ3.07ሻ ሺ3.05ሻ ሺ3.09ሻ
ROEACQi     2.730  5.378 8.599** 8.432** 8.295** 7.842** 8.335** 8.316** 7.300**
      ሺ1.3ሻ  ሺ1.41ሻ ሺ2.21ሻ ሺ2.17ሻ ሺ2.14ሻ ሺ2.1ሻ ሺ2.46ሻ ሺ2.46ሻ ሺ2.12ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐8.40 ‐19.9 ‐19.1 ‐18.8 ‐18.0 ‐19.5* ‐19.7* ‐18.9*
         ሺ‐0.74ሻ ሺ‐1.64ሻ ሺ‐1.57ሻ ሺ‐1.56ሻ ሺ‐1.55ሻ ሺ‐1.86ሻ ሺ‐1.87ሻ ሺ‐1.73ሻ
IBTGTi           ‐0.0007 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0009
            ሺ‐1.26ሻ ሺ‐0.92ሻ ሺ‐0.96ሻ ሺ‐0.87ሻ ሺ‐0.95ሻ ሺ‐1.07ሻ ሺ‐0.52ሻ
TOEACQi           ‐1.52*** ‐1.50***  ‐1.50*** ‐1.49*** ‐1.42*** ‐1.35***
            ሺ‐4.72ሻ ሺ‐4.7ሻ ሺ‐4.37ሻ ሺ‐4.35ሻ ሺ‐3.81ሻ ሺ‐3.61ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.10 
RSIZEi           0.052 0.049 0.044 0.041 0.005
            ሺ0.96ሻ ሺ0.90ሻ ሺ0.80ሻ ሺ0.76ሻ ሺ0.15ሻ
DBTTGTi           9.041 8.111 7.891 9.302
            ሺ0.55ሻ ሺ0.49ሻ ሺ0.48ሻ ሺ0.53ሻ
CHLNGi              ‐24.0* ‐24.7* ‐24.7**
               ሺ‐1.90ሻ ሺ‐1.93ሻ ሺ‐2.04ሻ
VRLTDi              ‐5.40 ‐3.13
               ሺ‐0.50ሻ ሺ‐0.29ሻ
CARACQi   27.04   23.82   23.42 26.84 26.63 26.57  27.00 27.42 27.53 30.51
   ሺ1.57ሻ  ሺ1.20ሻ  ሺ1.17ሻ ሺ1.31ሻ ሺ1.29ሻ ሺ1.28ሻ ሺ1.30ሻ ሺ1.33ሻ ሺ1.34ሻ ሺ1.43ሻ
BEARi  ‐10.13  ‐10.65  ‐9.344 ‐7.070 ‐7.706 ‐7.281 ‐7.619 ‐7.94 ‐7.943 ‐8.989
   ሺ‐1.58ሻ  ሺ‐1.63ሻ  ሺ‐1.38ሻ ሺ‐1.02ሻ ሺ‐1.10ሻ ሺ‐1.04ሻ ሺ‐1.11ሻ ሺ‐1.16ሻ ሺ‐1.15ሻ ሺ‐1.26ሻ
BULLi  ‐1.076  0.5815   7.604 12.97 12.33 12.96  8.654 8.458 9.598  5.82
   ሺ‐0.04ሻ  ሺ0.02ሻ  ሺ0.33ሻ ሺ0.62ሻ ሺ0.58ሻ ሺ0.60ሻ ሺ0.37ሻ ሺ0.37ሻ ሺ0.44ሻ ሺ0.31ሻ
              
N  188  188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
F‐statistic  2.91**  7.74***  8.41*** 9.35*** 12*** 10.54***  8.77*** 9.23*** 8.25*** 7.37***
P‐value  0.0231  ൏0.000  ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000
R2  0.1096  0.1131  0.1192 0.139 0.1432 0.1462 0.1483 0.1597 0.1614 0.1127
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Table  5.11 The heteroscedasticity-corrected regression results of the acquisition premium (t‐4w) for the non-cash deals 
after the inclusion of the target’s pre-merger earnings management (EMTGTi) 
The following table presents the results of the regression model ܴܲ௜ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧܯ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߱଴ܧܯ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛଷܴܱܧ்ீ்௜ ൅ ߛସܫܤ்ீ்௜ ൅
ߛହܱܶܧ஺஼ொ௜ ൅ ߛ଺ܴܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߛ଻ܦܤ ்ܶீ்௜ ൅ ߛ଼ܥܪܮܰܩ௜ ൅ ߛଽܸܴܮܶܦ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௬ାଽܦ௬ାଵଽଽଽ௠ୀଽ௬ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜ using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected variances (i.e. 
robust standard errors). PRi indicates the acquisition premium in a controlling M&A deal based on shares price index four weeks prior to the announcement 
date, EMACQi indicates the acquirer’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last three quarters prior to deal’s announcement date, 
EMTGTi indicates the target’s earnings management proxied by the abnormal accruals during the last one quarter prior to deal’s announcement date, ROEACQi 
indicates the acquirer’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the acquirer’s performance in the preceding 12 
months, ROETGTi indicates the target’s return on equity ratio prior to the deal’s announcement date and calculated based on the target’s performance in the 
preceding 12 months, IBTGTi indicates the advisory fees of investment banking services used by the target firm for completing the deal, TOEACQi indicates the 
acquirer’s toehold ownership interest in the target firm prior to the controlling M&A deal, and 0 otherwise, RSIZEi indicates the size of the deal relative to 
the acquirer’s size, DBTTGTi indicates the target’s debt ratio before the deal, CHLNGi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was challenged (i.e. by 
having multiple bidders), and 0 otherwise and VRLTDi is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the deal was a synergistic vertical integration M&A, and 0 
otherwise. Numbers in parentheses represent robust t-values in two-tailed tests. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote confidence interval of 10, 5 and 1 
percent, respectively. 
 
   ሺ1ሻ  ሺ2ሻ  ሺ3ሻ ሺ4ሻ ሺ5ሻ ሺ6ሻ ሺ7ሻ ሺ8ሻ ሺ9ሻ
Constant  53.136***  53.224*** 54.637*** 59.932*** 59.393*** 60.035*** 68.703*** 68.210*** 69.212***
   ሺ2.67ሻ  ሺ2.66ሻ  ሺ2.65ሻ ሺ3.12ሻ ሺ3.02ሻ ሺ3.02ሻ ሺ4.36ሻ ሺ4.20ሻ ሺ3.24ሻ
EMACQi  2.0473***  2.0343*** 2.0355*** 1.7591*** 1.7869*** 1.7800*** 1.5707** 1.5824** 1.5875**
   ሺ3.45ሻ  ሺ3.41ሻ  ሺ3.42ሻ ሺ2.96ሻ ሺ2.97ሻ ሺ2.97ሻ ሺ2.62ሻ ሺ2.63ሻ ሺ2.51ሻ
EMTGTi  ‐0.963  ‐0.970  ‐1.005* ‐0.814 ‐0.848 ‐0.883 ‐0.794 ‐0.825 ‐0.827
   ሺ‐1.59ሻ  ሺ‐1.6ሻ  ሺ‐1.74ሻ ሺ‐1.39ሻ ሺ‐1.43ሻ ሺ‐1.47ሻ ሺ‐1.36ሻ ሺ‐1.4ሻ ሺ‐1.39ሻ
ROEACQi     1.6585  3.1982 4.6718 8.3617 8.9527 ‐1.252 ‐0.919 ‐0.993
      ሺ0.09ሻ  ሺ0.15ሻ ሺ0.21ሻ ሺ0.36ሻ ሺ0.38ሻ ሺ‐0.05ሻ ሺ‐0.04ሻ ሺ‐0.04ሻ
ROETGTi        ‐3.055 ‐7.681 ‐7.194 ‐7.713 ‐2.613 ‐2.115 ‐2.174
         ሺ‐0.23ሻ ሺ‐0.46ሻ ሺ‐0.43ሻ ሺ‐0.47ሻ ሺ‐0.15ሻ ሺ‐0.12ሻ ሺ‐0.13ሻ
IBTGTi        0.0070** 0.0069** 0.0069** 0.0084** 0.0084** 0.0084**
         ሺ2.14ሻ ሺ2.00ሻ ሺ2.00ሻ ሺ2.40ሻ ሺ2.39ሻ ሺ2.37ሻ
TOEACQi        ‐2.468*** ‐2.469*** ‐2.692*** ‐2.707*** ‐2.700***
         ሺ‐2.89ሻ ሺ‐2.89ሻ ሺ‐2.94ሻ ሺ‐2.95ሻ ሺ‐2.88ሻ
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Cont’d Table 5.11 
RSIZEi        ‐0.048 ‐0.037 ‐0.044 ‐0.044
         ሺ‐1.14ሻ ሺ‐0.84ሻ ሺ‐0.97ሻ ሺ‐0.95ሻ
DBTTGTi           ‐17.12 ‐17.02 ‐16.97
            ሺ‐1.44ሻ ሺ‐1.43ሻ ሺ‐1.41ሻ
CHLNGi           ‐15.25 ‐15.34
            ሺ‐1.50ሻ ሺ‐1.44ሻ
VRLTDi           ‐1.042
            ሺ‐0.07ሻ
D2000i  ‐7.379  ‐7.508  ‐9.336 ‐14.60 ‐14.19 ‐13.97 ‐12.86 ‐11.45 ‐11.61
   ሺ‐0.33ሻ  ሺ‐0.33ሻ  ሺ‐0.40ሻ ሺ‐0.66ሻ ሺ‐0.63ሻ ሺ‐0.62ሻ ሺ‐0.63ሻ ሺ‐0.55ሻ ሺ‐0.57ሻ
D2001i  ‐6.128  ‐5.252  ‐7.763 ‐18.79 ‐17.30 ‐17.74 ‐19.45 ‐17.87 ‐18.08
   ሺ‐0.28ሻ  ሺ‐0.24ሻ  ሺ‐0.34ሻ ሺ‐0.85ሻ ሺ‐0.76ሻ ሺ‐0.78ሻ ሺ‐0.99ሻ ሺ‐0.89ሻ ሺ‐0.88ሻ
D2002i  ‐60.87**  ‐60.66**  ‐62.43** ‐71.90*** ‐70.57*** ‐70.83*** ‐74.18*** ‐73.44*** ‐73.74***
   ሺ‐2.62ሻ  ሺ‐2.58ሻ  ሺ‐2.55ሻ ሺ‐2.99ሻ ሺ‐2.89ሻ ሺ‐2.88ሻ ሺ‐3.43ሻ ሺ‐3.34ሻ ሺ‐3.24ሻ
D2003i  ‐5.474  ‐4.970  ‐7.036 ‐15.92 ‐6.746 ‐6.702 ‐4.337 ‐3.434 ‐3.558
   ሺ‐0.21ሻ  ሺ‐0.18ሻ  ሺ‐0.24ሻ ሺ‐0.57ሻ ሺ‐0.23ሻ ሺ‐0.23ሻ ሺ‐0.16ሻ ሺ‐0.12ሻ ሺ‐0.13ሻ
D2004i  ‐20.71  ‐20.76  ‐22.18 ‐28.76 ‐28.12 ‐28.20 ‐29.70 ‐29.18 ‐29.37
   ሺ‐0.87ሻ  ሺ‐0.87ሻ  ሺ‐0.93ሻ ሺ‐1.29ሻ ሺ‐1.24ሻ ሺ‐1.23ሻ ሺ‐1.41ሻ ሺ‐1.36ሻ ሺ‐1.34ሻ
D2005i  ‐24.74  ‐24.89  ‐26.52 ‐32.07 ‐31.69 ‐31.01 ‐30.90 ‐27.85 ‐28.04
   ሺ‐1.19ሻ  ሺ‐1.18ሻ  ሺ‐1.2ሻ ሺ‐1.53ሻ ሺ‐1.48ሻ ሺ‐1.43ሻ ሺ‐1.62ሻ ሺ‐1.41ሻ ሺ‐1.40ሻ
D2006i  ‐9.705  ‐9.716  ‐11.32 ‐17.31 ‐16.55 ‐16.01 ‐16.06 ‐13.47 ‐13.71
   ሺ‐0.39ሻ  ሺ‐0.39ሻ  ሺ‐0.44ሻ ሺ‐0.69ሻ ሺ‐0.65ሻ ሺ‐0.62ሻ ሺ‐0.69ሻ ሺ‐0.57ሻ ሺ‐0.58ሻ
D2007i  ‐29.38  ‐29.88  ‐31.44 ‐37.50* ‐37.17* ‐37.71* ‐37.56** ‐37.09* ‐37.14
   ሺ‐1.42ሻ  ሺ‐1.42ሻ  ሺ‐1.44ሻ ሺ‐1.8ሻ ሺ‐1.75ሻ ሺ‐1.76ሻ ሺ‐2.03ሻ ሺ‐1.96ሻ ሺ‐1.95ሻ
D2008i  ‐31.36  ‐31.37  ‐32.83 ‐42.65** ‐39.00* ‐39.39* ‐39.78** ‐39.23** ‐39.35
ሺ‐1.49ሻ  ሺ‐1.48ሻ  ሺ‐1.5ሻ ሺ‐2.09ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐1.85ሻ ሺ‐2.21ሻ ሺ‐2.12ሻ ሺ‐2.11ሻ
N  154  154  154 154 154 154  154 154 154
F‐statistic  3.48  3.82  2.94 4.94 7.73 7.4  6.25 5.85 5.73
P‐value  0.0003  0.0001  0.0008 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000 ൏0.000
R2  0.1697  0.1810  0.1706 0.1797 0.1937 0.1957 0.214 0.2177 0.2178
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Following Bouwman et al.’s (2009) concept, the market’s (i.e. S&P500) detrended annual 
price-earnings (P/E) ratio is used to indicate the mood of the stock market. BEARi is indicated 
by the bottom quartile of the difference between the detrended P/E of the year of interest and 
the average of the past 5 years, while BULLi is indicated by the top quartile. 
The results of the regression model after controlling for the market mood are presented 
in Table 5.10.  The coefficient of EMACQi does not show any change ranging between 1.37 
(robust t-value = 2.71) in regression (4) and 1.51 (robust t-value = 2.94) in regression (3), 
remaining very significant at a 1% confidence interval. 
5.5.3.4. Earnings Management by the Target Firms: 
The framework of this study considers the implication of the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings 
management in particular. However, one could argue that the rationale of the study’s 
theoretical model can be extended by including the potential pre-merger earnings management 
of the target firm as well. This argument should expect to find a negative relationship between 
the target’s pre-merger earnings management and the acquisition premium paid by the 
acquirer. For this reason, a further investigation is conducted by including the pre-merger 
abnormal accruals of the target, EMTGTi. Interestingly, the regression results reported in Table 
5.11 reveal some evidence for the expected relationship.  
The coefficient estimate of EMTGTi shows the expected negative sign in all regressions, but this 
fails to show statistically significance in any model except for regression (3), where both 
ROEACQi and ROETGTi are controlled for, in addition to the acquirer’s earnings management and 
the year categorisation dummies. The coefficient estimate of EMTGTi in regression (3) is -1.005 
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with significance at a 10%confidence interval with a robust t-value = -1.74, while the robust t-
value of the coefficient estimates in the other regressions range between -1.36 in regression (7) 
and -1.60 in regression (2). 
 This weak evidence on the negative relationship between targets’ earnings management and 
the acquisition premium can be explained initially by the inconsistent evidence of earnings 
management undertaken by target firms before a M&A, which is attributed to the time 
constraint facing the target’s management (Erickson and Wang 1999). The target’s 
management is normally not aware about a potential M&A plan before they are approached by 
an acquirer. Therefore, it cannot plan and manage the target’s accruals efficiently in advance 
before the deal’s official announcement. 
5.6. Summary and Conclusion 
The existing literature emphasises that capital markets provide incentives for event-specific 
earnings management when firms issue equity shares to raise capital, such as SEO (see, for 
example, Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998), IPO (see, for example, DuCharme et al. 2001) and 
M&A (see, for example, Louis 2004; Gong et al. 2008). The common justification of this 
argument is that firms attempt to reduce their cost of capital (equity) and try to mitigate the 
dilutive effect on the existing shareholders’ interests (Hansen 1987; Fields et al. 2001). 
Therefore, the specific research area of event-specific earnings management implicitly 
considers Sloan’s (1996) naive investor hypothesis - by assuming that earnings management 
cannot be uncovered by market participants - in order to validate the managerial motivation 
argument. However, investors’ naivety could not be the only explanatory factor. 
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By considering the M&A transacting context, this chapter addresses the question of how pre-
merger earnings management is handled by users. This study challenges the naive investors’ 
hypothesis and its relevance to the theoretical rationalisation of earnings management in a 
M&A context. It offers a counter-theory suggesting that M&A participants are relatively 
sophisticated - rather than naive – users,  since there are informed agents (i.e. managements) 
acting on behalf of investors (i.e. the shareholders). Correspondingly, this chapter 
hypothesises that the pre-merger earnings management exhibited by an acquiring firm, on 
which evidence has been repeatedly documented in the literature, can be detected and the 
acquirer’s share price will be discounted by a target firm that agrees a non-cash deal.  
The theoretical model developed in this chapter predicts that the magnitude of acquirer’s pre-
merger earnings management should be positively associated with the acquisition premium in 
M&A deals that are completed through issuing equity shares to the target shareholders. This 
hypothesis is empirically assessed in a regression model of the acquisition premium after 
considering a number of control variables that may have a potential impact in determining the 
acquisition premium. 
The findings of this study document very significant and robust empirical evidence showing 
that the acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management and acquisition premium are positively 
related. This evidence is obtained from a sample of non-cash M&A, which holds under 
different sets of control variables. The reported evidence remains significant after applying 
several sensitivity tests, such as employing different time horizons in order to define the 
acquisition premium, controlling for the pre-merger share performance impact on valuation 
and considering the effect of bear and bull markets. 
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Consistent with the prediction of our hypothesis, no evidence is found for the impact of the 
acquirer’s pre-merger earnings management on the acquisition premium when the M&A deal 
itself is paid for using 100% cash, as the acquirers lack the motivation to inflate their accruals. 
The findings of this chapter also indicate evidence that acquirers with higher pre-merger 
profitability can afford to offer higher premia. The shareholders of such an acquirer with 
higher profitability measures are more likely to approve offering a higher acquisition premium 
to the sought target (Roll 1986; Hayward and Hambrick 1997). 
It might be argued that our hypothesis can also be used to predict that a target’s pre-merger 
earnings management will be detected by the acquiring firm and reflected in the M&A 
valuation. This argument can only be valid if target firms are initially fortunate enough to be 
aware about the potential M&A deals so as to be able to effectively manage their earnings in 
the accounting periods that precede the M&A announcement. However, this is not normally 
the case and the existence of a target’s pre-merger earnings management is hardly reported by 
either the earlier chapter of this study (i.e. in  Chapter 3) or by the previous research in the 
literature (see, for example, Eddey and Taylor 1999; Erickson and Wang 1999; Koumanakos 
et al. 2005; Baik et al. 2007). Accordingly, the targets’ restricted ability to inflate their 
accruals justifies the weak empirical evidence over the negative relation between the targets’ 
pre-merger earnings management and the acquisition premium that is reported earlier in this 
chapter.  
In addition, this chapter documents some evidence related to the negative relationship between 
the acquisition premium and an acquirer’s toehold ownership in the target, the target’s debt 
ratio and the target’s profitability. Since the acquirer’s toehold in the target is inversely related 
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to the incremental percentage for obtaining a controlling interest in the target, there will be a 
lower quantity demanded for the target’s shares and thus we will see a lower equilibrium price 
and lower premium offered (Stulz 1988; Bugeja and Walter 1995; Wickramanayake and 
Wood 2009). Our evidence of a negative association between target’s debt ratio and 
acquisition premium is consistent with Crawford and Lechner’s (1996) predictions as they 
argue that the target firm’s attractiveness decreases with the level of the leverage in its capital 
structure. Reporting evidence of an inverse relation between the target’s profitability and the 
acquisition premium is consistent with the notion that merging with poorly managed targets is 
more likely to create greater post-merger value. Therefore, an acquirer’s management is more 
confident and willing to pay higher premia given the higher potential M&A gains (Lang et al. 
1989; Servaes 1991; Bugeja and Walter 1995).    
To conclude, non-cash acquirers, which adopt income-increasing pre-merger earnings 
management, pay higher acquisition premia in completing their M&A deals. Although this 
evidence may be of interest to researchers, M&A advisors and regulators, it can be interpreted 
in two different ways.  
Firstly, it could be as a result of the inefficiency of the acquirer’s management team such that 
their efforts are not beneficial due to the target’s ability to detect and adjust its acquirer’s 
earnings management. Given the acquirers’ endeavours to reduce their cost of capital via 
earnings management prior to issuing equity in non-cash M&A’s, it could be said that the 
success of managing earnings and, consequently, influencing the firm’s market valuation does 
not necessarily imply that merging targets are also naively mislead. Therefore, the target firms’ 
ability to uncover the cosmetic inflation of their acquirers’ pre-merger earnings would signal a 
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bargaining advantage that they would demand a higher share swap-ratio (i.e. premium) in 
order to compensate for the potential overvaluation of the acquirer’s share so as to avoid the 
adverse selection problem. This explanation directly challenges the naive investor hypothesis 
in the M&A context and further suggests that acquirers’ efforts to manage earnings prior to 
non-cash M&A deal are wasteful.  
Or secondly, it could be argued that the acquiring firm’s management are efficient, planning 
certain bids such that it may appear a high premium is being offered, but in effect it is done at 
no extra real cost. An acquiring firm management may decide to plan earnings management in 
order to temporarily inflate the share price. Thus, a higher (nominal) premium can be offered 
to a the target in order to secure the success of the bid such that the firm successfully 
completes the M&A deal, but it is the acquirer which actually knows the real acquisition 
premium, based on the real value of the acquiring firm after neutralising the manipulation. 
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
This research has investigated earnings management within a structured sample design using a 
M&A context in the US. It offers three empirical studies that contribute to three streams of 
literature – these being the literature related to event-specific earnings management, corporate 
debt-contracting and the evidence of non-cash M&A valuation – through addressing three 
main empirical questions. The first question of whether firms near M&A manage their 
earnings and whether this practice has changed after SOX is addressed in the first empirical 
study presented in  Chapter 3. The second study examines whether debt-financing has 
implications on event-specific earnings management as addressed in  Chapter 4. 
Finally,  Chapter 5 presents the third empirical study, which challenges the effectiveness of 
earnings management in a M&A context by addressing the question of whether acquirers’ pre-
merger earnings management can be uncovered and adjusted by the transacting targets. 
The extant literature of the event-specific earnings management has focused on detecting and 
investigating the consequences of earnings management around particular corporate events (i.e. 
a structured sample design) such as those that involve the issuance of equity (i.e. IPO, SEO 
and M&A), where management is more likely to have motivations to influence the reported 
earnings.  Chapter 3 of this research presents the first empirical study, which has assessed the 
differences of pre-merger earnings management in quarterly reports by acquiring and target 
firms in pre- and post-SOX eras. As hypothesised, the evidence provided in this regard 
suggests a strong tendency on the acquirer’s side to manage their earnings upwards before 
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completing non-cash deals, while weak evidence is reported on the target’s side. More 
importantly, pre-merger earnings management does not seem to be significantly different 
between pre- and post-SOX eras, despite the assertions that the enactment of SOX was aimed 
at improving the reporting quality and the containment of earnings management practices 
(Cohen et al. 2008; Zhou 2008; Bartov and Cohen 2009; Wilson 2009; Ghosh et al. 2010; Iliev 
2010).  
Hence, three implications of these findings can be of importance to academics, practitioners 
and standard setters. First, even though there has been compliance with the provisions of SOX 
outlining the corporate responsibility for both annual and quarterly reports of public firms, 
interim reports are normally not audited by independent auditors. Thus, managers relatively 
have greater room for discretion and a better chance to manipulate quarterly statements while 
this manipulation can be reconciled in the annual statements (Jeter and Shivakumar 
1999; Yang and Krishnan 2005). In other words, if managers excessively reported 
discretionary accruals at one quarter, they could revise - or even reverse – the manipulation of 
accruals at a later quarter so the level of accruals seems reasonable in the annual statements.66 
Quarterly earnings management, relative to annual earnings management, seem to be judged 
with more tolerance, according to Grasso et al’s (2009) survey of managers’ perceptions on 
earnings management after the enactment of SOX.  
                                                 
66 Normally, the impact of earnings management is transient, meaning that the effect of discretionary 
accruals on earnings of a given accounting period has a reversal effect on earnings of a future period 
(Chung et el. 2002). 
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The second implication is related to the relevance of SOX to M&A. Over and beyond the 
greater corporate governance and better internal control measures requested by SOX, the law 
led to stronger due diligence and a more intense use of advisors for M&A deals (see, for 
example, Madura and Ngo 2010). Therefore, it could be argued that the setting of M&A 
activity creates a greater opportunity to manage earnings, given that managers’ 
resourcefulness for planning and altering accounting numbers is exclusively much greater in 
the case of M&A after SOX, where longer planning and greater involvement of M&A 
advisors have been documented (Madura and Ngo 2010).  
The third implication is methodological in nature and relates to the metrics of earnings 
management. In cross-sectional models of accruals (including the one employed in this 
research), earnings management is detected relatively to the average level of normal accruals 
in peer firms at the time of estimation. So, the change in the general level of accruals due to 
SOX, for example, will not be captured by the common cross-sectional models of accruals in 
event-specific earnings management studies. 67  The magnitude of pre-merger earnings 
management may even appear more intensified68 in a post-SOX context because (peer) firms’ 
in general have adopted conservative reporting policies since the enactment of SOX (see 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2008; Zhou 2008). 
                                                 
67 This is similar to a recent study published in the Journal of Corporate Finance by Chahine et al. 
(2011), entitled "The Effects of Venture Capital Syndicate Diversity on Earnings Management and 
Performance of IPOs in the US and UK: An Institutional Perspective".    
68 In Chapter 4, a post-SOX dummy is regressed on earnings management in a linear model and the 
coefficient is significantly positive indicating that the pre-merger abnormal accruals seem to have a 
higher estimation in post-SOX era (see section  4.5.3 for details).  
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This research also adds to the literature of event-specific earnings management by focusing on 
the impact of leverage in particular, as shown in the second empirical investigation presented 
in  Chapter 4. The literature of leverage with earnings management in general is very 
controversial as there are two poles apart in views backed with theory and evidence. In this 
research, an inverse relation between the pre-merger income-increasing earnings management 
levels and the industry-adjusted leverage of the non-cash acquiring firms is documented as 
predicted by Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis. However, the importance of this contribution 
lies in two key points: 1) appreciating the role of industry-adjustment when using the leverage 
proxy in this type of studies, and 2) using a structured test sample that controls for the firms’ 
motivation to manage earnings. As discussed in  Chapter 2, corporate events that involve 
equity issuance represent capital market motivations to management to manipulate accruals 
(see section  2.3.1). The impact of leverage has been examined for unstructured samples of 
firms with random motivations of earnings management while in this study earnings 
management motivation is arguably consistent and intentional for all firms in the testing 
sample. This contribution leads to a better understanding of how a firm makes an accounting 
choice when it does favour one choice for its economic incentives but at the same time it is 
under creditors’ monitoring pressures. 
Earnings management studies - especially those conducted in a M&A context (such as 
Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Koumanakos et al. 2005; Baik et al. 2007; Botsari and 
Meeks 2008; Gong et al. 2008)- usually focus on detecting earnings management without 
verifying whether earnings management has achieved its intended goal i.e. manipulating users’ 
perceptions. In fact, their evidence seems only to indicate whether the managerial team has 
Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
256 
 
succeeded in manipulating what is reported on paper, but fails to outline how seriously this 
would influence the users’ perceptions - especially the sophisticated ones. Motivated by this 
research gap,  Chapter 5 presents the third empirical study, which addresses the question of 
how pre-merger earnings management undertaken by an acquiring firm is perceived and 
processed by its target firm in a deal which includes equity in the payment structure. 
The naivety of investors seems to be the preferred theorem in the literature especially after 
proving it repetitively in documented evidence by several studies in contexts such as SEO and 
IPO (See, for example, Sloan 1996; Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; DuCharme et al. 2001). In 
fact, assuming the naivety of investors in earnings management research is in accordance with 
the rationale of the motivations of implementing earnings management. In other words, 
managers conceal their earnings manipulation behind the asymmetrical distribution of 
information, which exists between the preparers (i.e. the management) and the users (i.e. 
investors).  Chapter 5 of this thesis benefits from this view by developing a counter-argument 
to the literature from a M&A context, where the transacting process allows the information 
asymmetry problem between parties to be minimised (i.e. relative to IPO and SEO contexts). 
The support to this argument is obtained by documenting robust evidence of higher acquisition 
premia in deals where acquiring firms have adopted income-increasing earnings management 
before offering their equity shares in paying off their targets. 
The evidence shown within  Chapter 5 has several implications to the researchers in this area, 
the M&A advisors and the regulators as the findings carry at least two interpretations. On the 
one hand, the acquirers’ managerial teams are inefficient given that despite the success of 
acquirers in exercising pre-merger earnings management, their endeavours proved to be 
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unsuccessful in effectively reducing the cost of capital in non-cash M&A, since the firms 
becoming targets for M&A can be informed enough to uncover and reverse such manipulation. 
Therefore, the naivety assumption for the target firms should be abolished. On the other hand, 
the acquirers’ managerial teams can also be viewed as efficient, given that the acquirer itself 
has been successful in using pre-merger upward earnings management to become able to offer 
unbeatable or attractive premia to target firms at no extra real cost. 
Irrespective of the different interpretations, this study sheds light on a potential problem 
related to dealing with the calculated values of acquisition premium. Unlike cash premia, 
acquisition premia in non-cash deals are provided based on the market valuation – not the 
valuating of transacting parties – for the acquiring and the target firms.69 Therefore, such a 
provisional valuation in non-cash deals requires special attention by the interested users when 
comparing between cash and non-cash acquisition premia. 
However, the evidence presented in this thesis has been empirically obtained. The positivist 
orientation of this research implies that the collected evidence does not suggest that firms 
should follow specific procedures or an optimal method to report their earnings. Rather, the 
emphasis is on explaining and predicting the managerial practices when they report the 
earnings. Hence, this thesis helps to understand why, when and which firms may decide to 
choose particular accounting methods and engage earnings management and how users may 
react to the adopted accounting practices.  
                                                 
69 In this thesis, specifically in Chapter 5, the non-cash acquisition premia, which are available on the 
databases and calculated based on the market valuation of the acquiring and the target firms, are 
referred to nominal premia. 
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In terms of potential limitations, concerns regarding data, generalisability and scope can be 
outlined herein. This research is based on samples taken solely from the US and, hence, 
extending generalisations to other countries should be done with extra care. Further, it is 
noteworthy to remember that the period of the study, which is around the enactment of SOX, 
has experienced several major corporate scandals that have all caused huge damage to capital 
markets.  
Additionally, many public firms made a decision to go private after SOX due to the costly 
regulatory requirements (Leuz 2007). This exposes the sample to a type of survival bias, given 
that only firms that afford to stay public are selected in the post-SOX sample. The datasets 
used in this research are obtained from different sources, which might affect the consistency of 
the merged datasets. Primarily, the M&A deal-related data is obtained from Thomson ONE 
Banker while the firms’ data for calculating earnings management proxies and other variables 
are obtained from Compustat.  
In addition, the scope of the first empirical investigation presented in  Chapter 3 is limited to 
documenting the differences in the pre-merger earnings management between pre- and post-
SOX periods and, therefore, generalising of the findings may not be applicable to the different 
types of studies in the broader area of earnings management.  
Regarding the accruals model adopted in this research, the estimation of the normal accruals is 
accomplished cross-sectionally, as recommended by Kothari et al (2005). Thus, the results of 
this approach are likely to be affected by the overall market’s reporting attitude (i.e. 
conservative versus aggressive), given that peer firms reflect the market’s attitude. Having 
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said that, the cross-sectional results are still better than the results of time-series approach, 
which are more likely to produce large abnormal accruals for firms with higher growth rates 
during the estimation period (Kothari et al. 2005).70  
Finally, this research stimulates a number of researchable ideas and opens more avenues for 
future investigation. For instance, annual data in a concurrent sample can be used to extend the 
first empirical study presented in  Chapter 3 by conducting a comparison between results 
around SOX for the audited and the unaudited earnings. Moreover, this research focused on 
public acquiring and target firms while a further study may investigate how the results of 
acquirers that acquire private targets differ, due to the different levels of information 
asymmetry. Another possibility for future research is examining earnings management for 
firms involved with other relevant events (i.e. SEO, IPO or MBO) around SOX to assess the 
generalisability of the findings of  Chapter 3. 
In addition, the second empirical study presented in  Chapter 4 can provide a platform for an 
expanded study that may introduce corporate governance indicators in a similar research 
setting while assessing the creditors controlling hypothesis in samples with potential pre-event 
earnings management. Besides, the evidence of the association between pre-merger earnings 
management and acquisition premium, which is provided by the third empirical study 
presented in  Chapter 5, has not been reported previously and may need to be re-assessed in a 
wider M&A samples from different countries. Another further contribution can be made to the 
broader literature by investigating the pre-merger earnings management practices after 
                                                 
70 Kothari et al (2005, p.174) provide more discussion on this point.  
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adopting some emerging advances in earnings management area of research such as the 
developing methods of measuring earnings management suggested by researchers such as the 
discretionary revenues approach by Stubben (2010) and the approach of incorporating accruals’ 
reversals by Dechow et al (2011). 
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